

THE PAÑCADAŚĪ

of

BHĀRATĪTĪRTHA-VIDYĀRANYA

An Interpretative Exposition

BY

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*Director, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy
University of Madras*



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DR T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

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
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P R E F A C E

The present work attempts an interpretative exposition of the *Pañcadaśī*. It is a companion volume to my earlier work, *The Philosophy of Advaita, with special reference to Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāranya*. It is being published in the Madras University Philosophical Series. I am thankful to the authorities of the University of Madras for sanctioning its publication under the auspices of the Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, and to the University Grants Commission for the facilities provided. I am grateful to Dr T. P. Ramachandran and Dr N. Veezhinathan for their help in seeing the work through the press.

Madras
November 10, 1969.

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AIU</i>	<i>Aitareya Upaniṣad</i>
<i>BBU</i>	<i>Brahmabindu Upaniṣad</i>
<i>BS</i>	<i>Brahma-sūtra</i>
<i>BSB</i>	<i>Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya</i>
<i>BU</i>	<i>Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad</i>
<i>CU</i>	<i>Chāndogya Upaniṣad</i>
<i>KAIU</i>	<i>Kaivalya Upaniṣad</i>
<i>KAU</i>	<i>Kaṭha Upaniṣad</i>
<i>KAUU</i>	<i>Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad</i>
<i>KU</i>	<i>Kena Upaniṣad</i>
<i>MAU</i>	<i>Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad</i>
<i>MU</i>	<i>Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad</i>
<i>NUTU</i>	<i>Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinī Upaniṣad</i>
<i>RV</i>	<i>Ṛg Veda</i>
<i>SLS</i>	<i>Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha</i>
<i>SP</i>	<i>Sūrya-purāṇa</i>
<i>SU</i>	<i>Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad</i>
<i>TU</i>	<i>Taittirīya Upaniṣad</i>
<i>VS</i>	<i>Vedāntasāra</i>

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INTRODUCTION

1

Advaita manuals fall into two types—those designed to instruct the elect, and those which aim at refuting the stand-points that regard themselves as opposed to Advaita. The purpose of the first type is to teach those who seek to know the essentials of Advaita. The aim of the second type is to answer the criticisms levelled against Advaita by its opponents. While the principal objective of the polemical works is to destroy the thought-systems of others, that of the expository works is to constructively help the student understand the tenets of the tradition itself. In the polemical works the method of negative dialectic figures prominently, since the main attention of the authors is directed towards meeting the adverse criticisms of the opponents, and reducing their position to absurdity. In the expository treatises whose sole aim is to instruct the student, the method adopted is the direct mode of setting forth the doctrine and clarifying the concepts involved therein, through a free use of analogical reasoning. To suit their varying purposes, the writers of dialectical works often choose the medium of rigorous prose, while the authors of expository texts generally adopt the verse-form which is a great aid to memory.

The *Pañcadaśī* belongs to the category of expository texts. It is primarily a book of instruction—*upadeśa-śāstra*. As the author says even at the outset, the aim of his work is to teach the supreme truth in an easily understandable manner to those whose hearts have been purified through the worship of the lotus-like feet of the Guru (i, 2). It is not that argumentation and dialectics are not employed in the *Pañcadaśī*; but they are subordinated to the principal

aim of conveying the light of truth to the disciple. The reasoning based on the principle of co-presence and co-absence (*anvaya-vyatireka*), for instance, is had recourse to for showing that the self which is of the nature of consciousness is constant and therefore real, while the phenomena constituting the world are inconstant and therefore non-real (ii, 60 ff). The method of dialectical refutation of systems such as the *Mādhyamika* is resorted to (see e. g. ii, 30 ff). The central objective of the *Pañcadaśī*, however, is to provide guidance to the seeker through instruction. While sound logical reasoning helpful to an understanding of scriptural teaching is to be welcomed, quibbling should be avoided, (see viii, 67, 68 ; ii, 30).

When it is said that scripture is the basic authority for Vedānta, it does not mean that the Vedāntin's attitude is one of blind acceptance of, or unthinking belief in, the words of the Veda. The words are not mere sounds ; they convey meaning ; and the meaning should be understood. Reasoning is helpful in understanding the teaching of scripture. Although it is true that the ultimate Reality taught there is not graspable either through thoughts or through words, nevertheless logic is useful in a negative way in so far as it can assure us as to what is not real, and language is of service in indicating the nature of the Real. The final court of appeal is experience—the plenary experience which is the fruit of inquiry. In fact, the texts of scripture are but indicators of that experience. Thus, in Vedānta, the nature of the Truth is sought to be expounded on the triple basis of scripture, reasoning, and experience *śrutyuktyanubhūtibhyaḥ*, v. 56 & xi, 89).

The *Pañcadaśī* is so named because it consists of fifteen chapters (*Pañcadaśa-prakaraṇa*). The chapters are not of equal length ; the longest has two-hundred and ninety-eight verses, and the shortest has only eight. The total number of couplets which compose the *Pañcadaśī* is one thousand,

five hundred and forty-one. Thus the length of this work is slightly more than twice that of the *Bhagavad-gītā* (which is composed of seven hundred *ślokas*). There are several verses in the *Pañcadaśī* which are delightful adaptations from the *Upaniṣads* and the *Bhagavad-gītā*. There are also citations from the metrical works of earlier teachers of Advaita, such as Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, and Sureśvara. One other work from which the author of the *Pañcadaśī* has freely extracted is the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*.

The chapters of the *Pañcadaśī* are called *prakaraṇas*. The characteristic feature of a *prakaraṇa* is that it selects a few topics falling within the scope of a philosophical tradition and deals with them in a clear and concise manner.

śāstraikadeśa-saṁbaḍḍham
śāstrakāryāntare sthitam,
āhuḥ prakaraṇaṁ nāma
grantha-bhedaṁ vipaścitaḥ.

Each of the chapters of the *Pañcadaśī* selects one or more aspects of the Advaita-teaching, and discusses them in a simple and lucid manner with a view to benefit those who seek to know the truth and realize it. Each chapter may be regarded as a manual of Advaita; and all of them together afford the student such a wealth of detail about the philosophy as is seldom to be had in a single philosophical work.

The fifteen chapters of the *Pañcadaśī* are grouped into three quintads: *viveka-pañcaka* (dealing with the discrimination of the real from the non-real), *dīpa-pañcaka* (expounding the nature of the Self as pure consciousness), and *ānanda-pañcaka* (dwelling on the bliss-nature of *Brahman*). It is for the sake of convenience that it is stated that the three quintads have for their theme the three aspects of *Brahman*, *sat* (existence), *cit* (consciousness), and *ānanda* (bliss), respec-

tively.¹ But it should be borne in mind that such a statement could only be roughly true. The essential doctrines of Vedānta occur in almost every chapter. There are, naturally, repetitions; but repetitions are necessary for enabling the reader to understand firmly the truths of Vedānta. Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya has succeeded in an eminent way in setting forth the essentials of Advaita in this great work of his—the *Pañcadaśī*.

2

The question of authorship of the *Pañcadaśī* is a vexed one, as is the case with many of our philosophical texts. The authors seem to be so indifferent about associating their names with their works, that they have left problems of authorship to posterity which it is eager to solve but is unable to, in most cases.

There are three views in regard to the authorship of the *Pañcadaśī*: (i) that it was written by Vidyāraṇya (known as Mādhavācārya in his *pūrvāśrama*); (ii) that Vidyāraṇya and Bhāratīrtha were its joint authors; and (iii) that the work is to be ascribed to Bhāratīrtha.

In an early work, *The Philosophy of Advaita, with special reference to Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya*,² I suggested that probably Bhāratīrtha wrote the *Pañcadaśī* and the *Vivaraṇaprameya-saṅgraha*, and not Mādhavācārya, the reputed author of such works as the *Parāśara-mādhavīya*, etc. The main authority for making this suggestion is Appayya Dīkṣita's *Siddhānta-śaṅkha-saṅgraha* where the *Vivaraṇaprameya-saṅgraha* is ascribed

1. Some commentators think that the three quintads are devoted to an exposition respectively of the three words that constitute the major text, *tat tvam asi*.

2. First published in 1938 (Luzac & Co., London); second edition (1957), and third edition (1969), published by Messrs. Ganesh & Co. (Madras) Private Ltd., Madras-17.

to Bhāratīrtha, as also the *Pañcadaśī* from which passages are cited, attributing them to Bhāratīrtha.³ The passages cited by Appayya Dīkṣita are from the *Citrādīpa* (ch. v), the *Dhyānadīpa* (ch. ix), and the *Brahmānanda-Yogānanda* (ch. xi). I gave also other evidences in support of my view that Bhāratīrtha might be considered the author of the *Pañcadaśī*, the *Vivaraṇaprameya-saṅgraha*, and possibly of the *Dṛg-dṛśya-viveka* also.

I may draw the attention, here, of those who are interested that I did not question the tradition which identifies Mādhava with Vidyāraṇya. After examining the view of those who dispute the identity, I said that the identity-theory has greater probability of being true. The hypothesis that I put forward related only to the authorship of the three works referred to above: I said that Bhāratīrtha, rather than Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya, should be regarded as their author. I also made the suggestion that probably Bhāratīrtha also had the appellation 'Vidyāraṇya', and that the confusion of ascribing the works of the one to the other was possibly due to the common appellation.

It has been argued that it is not correct to ascribe the *Pañcadaśī* to Bhāratīrtha just because Appayya Dīkṣita attributes it to him, and that the cumulative evidence drawn from other sources goes to show that the author was

3. SLS Vol. II, p. 67: *vivaraṇopanyāse bhāratīrtha-vacanam*. The *Vivaraṇaprameya-saṅgraha* seems to be known as the *Vivaraṇopanyāsa* also. Cf. VPS, p. 108: *iti śrī vivaraṇopanyāse prathamam varṇakam samāptam*. SLS, Vol. II, p. 23: *tasya sarvaviśayavāsanāsākṣitayā sarvajñatvaṁ iti bhāratīrthādīpakṣaḥ prāgeva darśitaḥ* (citing the evidence of the *Citrādīpa-prakaraṇa*).

SLS, Vol. II, p. 94: *bhāratīrthāḥ dhyānadīpe vidyāvāptau upāyāntaram-apy-āhuḥ*

SLS, Vol. II, p. 15: *brahmānande tu jīva ity-uktaṁ*.

Vidyāraṇya, who in his *pūrvāśrama* was known as Mādhavācārya.⁴ The learned scholar to whose view we are now referring believes that Appayya Dīkṣita's ascription of the *Pañcadaśī* to Bhāratī-tīrtha is a mistake. And, the mistake was corrected by the commentator on the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* who mentions the name of the author of the *Pañcadaśī* (as of the *Dṛg-dr̥śya-viveka*) as Vidyāraṇya.⁵ The scholar gives his reason why the commentator's evidence must be accepted and not Appayya Dīkṣita's. What is unclear in the original is made clear in the commentary. It cannot be said that because the name 'Bhāratī-tīrtha' is not widely known, the commentator acquaints us with the better known name 'Vidyāraṇya'; for Bhāratī-tīrtha was the *guru* of Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya, and there is no point in identifying the two. Then, why does Appayya Dīkṣita ascribe the *Pañcadaśī* to Bhāratī-tīrtha? The scholar's answer to this question is as follows: Mādhavācārya should have published his works in the name of his *guru*. In the time of Appayya Dīkṣita the *Pañcadaśī*, etc., were believed to be the works of Bhāratī-tīrtha, while in fact they were Mādhavācārya's. By the time the commentator wrote his commentary, the fact became known, and so he was able to correctly identify the author as Vidyāraṇya.

4. See a series of articles on 'Śrī Vidyāraṇya Śrīcaraṇāḥ' (Tamil) by Sri S. R. Krishnamurti Sastri, in *Śrī Kāmakoṭi Pradīpam* (Madras) Vol. I, 1, 4, 6, 7.

5. Commentary *Kṛṣṇālaṅkāra* of Acyuta-kṛṣṇānanda Tīrtha. See *SLS* (Kumbhakonam Edition) p. 78.

(i) *citrādīpe śrī-vidyāraṇya-gurubhiḥ īśvaratvenoktānandamayasya taireva brahmānandākhyagranthe jīvatvokti-rūpa-viśeṣārthakaḥ tu śabdaḥ.*

Ibid. p. 84:

(ii) *śrī-vidyāraṇya-gurubhiḥ citrādīpe svoktaṁ...vihāya...granthāntare.....viśeṣa ukta ity-āha.*

In reply to the argument stated above, I should like to point out that there is no evidence to show that Mādhavācārya wrote the works in question and published them in the name of Bhāratīrtha, and that Appayya Dīkṣita was under a misapprehension as to the authorship of those works. The commentator's substitution of the name 'Vidyāraṇya' for 'Bhāratīrtha' which is the name mentioned in the original may be taken to mean that, according to the commentator, the two names refer to the same person, that, in other words, Bhāratīrtha also had the appellation 'Vidyāraṇya'. And, it may not be irrelevant to remark that if the commentator thought that Appayya Dīkṣita's ascription of the *Pañcadaśī*, etc., to Bhāratīrtha was wrong, he could have easily said so. Since there is no such correction made by the commentator, it is not improper to suggest that he did not disagree with Appayya Dīkṣita in the matter of authorship.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Advaita-siddhi* has a commentary *Laghucandrikā* written by Gauḍa Brahmānanda Svāmin. The commentary is also known as *Gauḍa-brahmānandīya*. For this commentary there is a gloss by Viṭṭhaleśopādhyāya called *Viṭṭhaleśīya*. Brahmānanda quotes a verse from the *Dhyānadīpa* of the *Pañcadaśī* in support of the view that there is no harm in the world continuing to appear to the *jñānin* who has realized the Self. Here Brahmānanda mentions Vidyāraṇya by name as the author of the *Dhyānadīpa*.⁶ In the *Viṭṭhaleśīya*, however, the verse is stated to be that of Mādhavācārya.⁷ Adverting to this, the scholar whose view we are at present considering says that this is a clear evidence to show that Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya⁸ it was who

6. The *Advaita-siddhi* (Nirnaya Sagar Edn.), p. 258 :
ata evoktaṁ dhyānadīpikāyāṁ vidyāraṇya-svāmibhih.

7. *mādhavācāryāṇām sammatim āha.*

8. This form of the name is adopted here only for the sake of convenience. It may be the case that the teacher was known as Mādhava in his *pūrvāśrama*, and subsequently as Vidyāraṇya.

wrote the *Pañcadaśī*. He argues that Viṭṭhaleśa's identification of the author as Mādhavācārya cannot be questioned. Viṭṭhaleśa was a great scholar. He was the preceptor of Kṛṣṇaṁ Bhaṭṭa, the renowned commentator on the *Gadhādhariya*, a classical work on Navya-nyāya. What such a great scholar says cannot be called in question. Moreover, there is nothing wrong in attributing the work of a disciple to his preceptor, especially if the disciple himself has done so. But, to ascribe the work of the preceptor to his disciple is improper. If we are to say that Viṭṭhaleśa ascribes Bhāratīrtha's work to Mādhavācārya, it would amount to the ascription of the preceptor's work to the disciple. Viṭṭhaleśa could not have committed this impropriety. And so, his statement should be taken as evidence not only for the identity of Mādhava and Vidyāraṇya, but also for Mādhava being the author of the *Pañcadaśī*.

As against this argument, I should like to make the following comments: (1) Viṭṭhaleśa was, certainly, an erudite scholar. But, there is nothing improbable in his going wrong in regard to the ascription of a work to an author. High ranking scholarship is no guarantee against mistakes about the authorship of works written earlier. (2) It is not suggested that Viṭṭhaleśa knew the author of the *Pañcadaśī* to be Bhāratīrtha and ascribed it to his disciple Mādhavācārya, in which case alone he could be charged with impropriety. What must have been the case, according to our hypothesis, is this: Brahmānanda says that the author of the *Dhyānadīpa* is Vidyāraṇya Svāmin. It may well be that he refers to Bhāratīrtha as Vidyāraṇya. Viṭṭhaleśa accepts the current tradition about the Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya identity, not knowing that Bhāratīrtha also had the appellation 'Vidyāraṇya'. And so, where Brahmānanda says 'Vidyāraṇya', Viṭṭhaleśa says 'Mādhavācārya'.

There is one more evidence cited which I want to examine. The *Jīvanmukti-viveka* is a work of Mādhava-

Vidyāraṇya, one of whose earlier works is the *Parāśara-mādhaviya*. Verse 11 of the *Jīvanmukti-viveka* reads thus :

*eteṣāṃ tu samācārāḥ proktāḥ pārāśarasmr̥tau,
vyākhyāne'smābhir-atrāyaṃ parahamso nirūpyate.*

Here, the author says : "The different duties and actions of these (i. e. of the grades of *sannyāsins* known as *kuṭīcaka*, *bahūdaka*, and *hamsa*) have been described by us, in the commentary on the *Parāśara-smṛti*. Here, what is described is the (status of) *paramahamsa*." The *paramahamsa* is the *jīvanmukta*. The present work explains the nature of *jīvanmukti*, the authorities for it, the means to it, and its fruit. The fruit is said to be five-fold : (i) the safe-guarding of the knowledge gained, (ii) austerity, (iii) absence of discord, (iv) the cessation of misery, and (v) the manifestation of happiness. After explaining the first three, the author says : "The fourth and the fifth fruits, viz., the cessation of misery and the manifestation of happiness have been explained in the *Vidyānanda* which is the fourth chapter of the *Brahmānanda*. A summary statement about those two is made here."⁹ From this it is argued that the author of the *Jīvanmukti-viveka* refers, here, to his own earlier work, the *Brahmānanda* in which the fourth chapter is *Vidyānanda*.

I would like to point out that the evidence is inconclusive in so far as the author of the *Jīvanmukti-viveka* uses the expression "have been explained", and not "have been explained by us". It is true that such an expression is sometimes used to refer to one's own earlier work; but it may also be used to refer to a work other than one's own—the work of one's own preceptor which is well-known, or of one with whom one is closely connected. There is the following verse in the fourteenth chapter of the *Pañcadaśī*, *Vidyānanda* (v. 38) :

9. The *Jīvanmukti-viveka*, ch. iv : *duḥkhanāśa-sukhāvirbhāvarūpe caturthā-pañcama-prāyōjane vidyānandātmakena brahmānandagatena caturthādhyāyena nirūpite tadubhayam atra saṁkṣipyocyate.*

*duḥkhābhāvaśca kāmāptirubhe hyevaṁ nirūpīte,
kṛtakṛtyatvam anyac-ca prāpta-prāpyatvam ikṣatām.*

“Absence of sorrow and accomplishment of desire have thus been explained; the state of having done what had to be done, and the state of having attained what had to be attained may now be seen.” Here, the expression “have been explained” does not involve any doubt; for it refers to the exposition preceding the verse in the same chapter. In the very next verse (39) where there is reference to the *Tr̥ptidīpa* (chapter vii of the *Pañcadaśī*), the author says: “These two have been set forth clearly by us (*asmābhiḥ īritam*) in the *Tr̥ptidīpa*.”

A learned reviewer of the book, *The Philosophy of Advaita, with special reference to Bhāratī-tīrtha-Vidyāraṇya*, contributed a separate article on ‘*Bhāratī-tīrtha and Vidyāraṇya*’ to the journal in which the review appeared.¹⁰ In that article, the following observations were made :

(i) “It is well to point out at the outset that the names Bhāratī Tīrtha and Vidyāraṇya are never found in any work in conjunction as denoting a single individual.”

(ii) “Further Tīrtha and Araṇya are two distinct Sannyāsi name-terminations and the name Bhāratī Tīrtha Vidyāraṇya as denoting a single individual is an impossibility.”

In my earlier work, I have referred to the name ‘Bhāratī-tīrtha-Vidyāraṇya’ which is to be found in the colophon to one of the manuscripts¹¹ available in the Tanjore Palace Library. It is an incomplete manuscript of the

10. Sri R. Krishnaswamy Aiyar, in *The Journal of The Sri Sankaragurukulam, Srirangam*, Vol. II, No. 5.

11. Descriptive Catalogue, Vol. XII, No. 7067. See *The Philosophy of Advaita*, p. 6.

Vivaraṇaprameya-saṅgraha. The colophon at the end reads thus :

iti śrīmat-paramahaṁsa-parivrājakācārya śrīmad-bhāratīrtha-vidyāraṇya-munivarya-viracite vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgrahē caturtha-sūtre dvitīyavarṇakam samāptam.

I shall cite now a few more places where the name ‘Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya’ occurs :

In a manuscript copied by the late Polagam Rama Sastri from a printed edition of the *Dṛg-dṛśya-viveka* containing forty-nine ślokaś, there is the following colophon :

iti śrīmat-paramahaṁsa-parivrājakācārya śrī bhāratīrtha-vidyāraṇya-viracitaḥ dṛg-dṛśya-vivekaḥ saṁpūrṇaḥ

In a manuscript of the work, *Puruṣārtha-prabodha* by Brahmānanda Bhāratī, there occurs the following line in a verse:

*śrī-vidyāraṇya-saṁjñaiḥ
śrī-bhāratīrtha-deśikaiḥ.*^{1 2}

As for the remark that ‘tīrtha’ and ‘araṇya’ are two distinct *sannyāsi* name-terminations, and so both of them cannot be found in the name of a *sannyāsin* of the Advaita tradition, I wish to point out that my suggestion is not that ‘Vidyāraṇya’ formed part of Bhāratīrtha’s *sannyāsa* name, but only that it was an appellation meaning ‘Forest of Learning’ sometimes applied to him.

In regard to the question of the precise authorship of a work like the *Pañcadaśī*, there can be no conclusive proof; there can be only surmises. And, the surmise that I have made may be taken for what it is worth.

An interpretative exposition of the teaching of the *Pañcadaśī* in its fifteen chapters will be found in the sequel. Here, I shall attempt to give a short summary of the teaching.

The basic skill that the disciple should develop in himself is the ability to discriminate the real from the non-real. The *Pañcadaśī* indicates the various methods by means of which the discrimination could be gained. One of the most useful methods is the analysis of the three states of experience, viz., waking, dream, and deep sleep. As a result of such analysis one realizes that the Self persists in all the states while the objects vary and are inconstant. The same conclusion may be reached by an investigation into the five sheaths (*kośas*) that cover the Self, as it were. The principle which is applied in this investigation is : what is grosser and more external and less pervasive is less real than what is subtler and more internal and more pervasive. Applying this principle one arrives at the truth that the Self is supremely real because it is the subtlest and the inmost being which is non-dual (see ch. iii). Just as the individual soul and its states could be analysed with a view to discovering the Self, the external objective world could also be analysed with the same end in view. Beginning with the grossest element, earth, we have progressively subtler elements; water, fire, air, and ether. But the Self is subtler than ether. One may think of the Self without ether, but not of ether without the Self. One may deny anything, but not the Self. To doubt the existence of the Self is as ridiculous as the doubt expressed by a man "Have I a tongue or not?" (iii, 20)

The Self is of the nature of pure consciousness ; it is unfailing light, ever-present awareness. This is explained by means of apt analogies. Like the anvil in the smith's shop which serves as the basis of beating the metal into various shapes, without itself changing, the Self remains as

the immutable witness of changes in the physical and the psychical orders; hence it is called the *kūṭastha* (see. ch. viii). Just as the lamp set on a dramatic stage sheds light on all concerned during the performance, and shines also after everyone has left the theatre, even so the witness-consciousness manifests all things, viz., the egoity, the intellect, and the objects, and continues to shine even when they are non-existent. Just as the lamp on the stage illumines without moving and without being affected by the movements of the actors and the audience, even so the witness which is eternal and immutable manifests all things both within and without, and their absence too (see. ch. x.). Just as the canvas is that whereon the various painted figures appear, both of inanimate things like mountains and animate beings like men and animals, so also on the consciousness which is the immutable Self, the variegated world appears (see. ch. vi).

The bliss-nature of the Self (Brahman) is explained in great detail in the last five chapters. The Self is not only existence and consciousness, it is also bliss, the supreme value. The teaching of Yājñavalkya to Maitreyī in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* constitutes the basis for understanding the bliss-nature of the Self. The core of the teaching is that the Self is the seat of supreme love. Anything becomes dear, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the Self. There are, it is true, different notions of Self-hood, three of which may be distinguished: the secondary self, the illusory self, and the principal self. When a parent identifies himself with his son, for instance, the self-hood of the son in relation to the parent is secondary. The identification of the self with the body, etc., is illusory. The principal Self is the unconditioned non-dual reality. It is the Self in the principal sense that is of the very essence of bliss or love. But even when the self in the other two senses is loved, it is because of the mistaken or wrong identification with the true Self. Thus it is easy to see that the Self, whatever be the

conception thereof, is the centre and seat of love. If there be love for any other object, it is for the sake of the Self to which that is subsidiary. It is a reflection of the bliss that is the Self that is experienced as happiness or pleasure in the objects. A right understanding of the happiness that is derived from the contact of the mind with the objects may serve as the door to the bliss that is Brahman. When an object is being enjoyed, the mind turns inward and becomes calm. In that state of mind the bliss that is Self is reflected. It is this which is experienced as happiness or pleasure. The Brahman-bliss or a reflection of it is experienced in other states also. In deep sleep one experiences unqualified bliss; only that experience lies under the cover of nescience. Just before falling into deep sleep, and immediately for a few moments after getting up from sleep, one has a taste of happiness prospectively or retrospectively. In the interval between two modes of the mind also, one experiences the reflection of bliss. The *yogī* enjoys bliss in *samādhi*. The *jñānī* realizes directly the bliss that is the Self.

The bliss that is the Self (Brahman) is unexcellable and unconditioned. A calculus of bliss is given in the Upaniṣads. Starting with the unit-measure of human bliss, the higher levels are reached by multiplying each lower level of bliss by a hundred. One may thus go upto the bliss of the Creator Brahmā. But Brahman-bliss is beyond all calculation. And, the wise one's experience of the plenary bliss admits of no degrees. Having achieved all that was to be achieved, and having done all that was to be done, the illumined one rests in perfect contentment and peace (xiv, 58).

The nature of Brahman that is the Self is, as we have seen, existence (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*), and bliss (*ānanda*) (see also xiii, 63). Existence, consciousness, and bliss are not parts of Brahman, or its attributes; they constitute its essential nature (*svarūpa*). They are not three separate

constituents : existence is consciousness, and consciousness is bliss. It is because the world of plurality is characterized by impermanence, inertness, and disvalue that in order to distinguish the non-dual Brahman from the world that Brahman is said to be existence, consciousness, and bliss. In Brahman's essential nature, however, there is no split, and no distinction. Brahman is free from any of the three kinds of differences, *sajātīya*, *vijātīya*, and *svagata* (ii. 20-21).

How does it happen that the one Reality appears as the world of plurality? The Vedānta formulates the concept of *māyā* precisely to show that no satisfactory answer can be given to this vexatious question since causation itself is unintelligible.

There are three standpoints from which *māyā* may be envisaged, says Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya : (1) the standpoint of revealed experience (*śrauta*), (2) that of reasoning (*yauktika*), and (3) that of the ordinary men of the world (*laukika*). From the standpoint of the ordinary worldly men, *māyā* is real (*vāstavi*) ; they have no reason to doubt its reality. From the standpoint of those who have realized the teaching of scripture, *māyā* is unreal (*tuccha*) ; for them, there is no world to be accounted for ; *māyā* is that (*yā*) which is not (*mā*). And, for those who seek to understand through reasoning *māyā* is indeterminable, *anirvacanīya* (vi, 130).

From the standpoint of reasoning, *māyā* is uncharacterizable either as real, or as unreal, or as both real and unreal. The world of plurality appears in Brahman on account of *māyā*, even as a snake appears in what is a rope. This is known as *vivarta*, transfiguration.

There is no use asking questions about *māyā*. The more we question, the deeper will the mystery become. *Māyā* is that which makes apparently possible what is inherently impossible (vi, 235). Wonder is *māyā*'s gar-

ment ; inscrutable is its nature (vi, 139). What is necessary is that we should endeavour to transcend *māyā* (vi, 138). And, in this endeavour, the world of plurality in which we as empirical individuals live can be a help instead of serving as an obstacle (iv, 42).

The *jīva* is the non-dual Self appearing in a limited or conditioned form on account of nescience. In what manner is the appearance of the *jīva* to be understood? Bhāratī-tīrtha-Vidyāraṇya who follows mainly the *Vivaraṇa* tradition, teaches a modified form of the reflection-theory or *pratibimbavāda* which is referred to as *ābhāsa-vāda*. While the *Vivaraṇa* view regards the reflection as real and as identical with the prototype, the theory sponsored in the *Pañcadaśī* holds that the reflection (*ābhāsa*) is mere appearance, an illusory manifestation. The apposition between the *jīva* and Brahman, according to this view, is through sublation (*bādhā*), and not through identification (*aikya*).

The direct means to release, Advaita holds, is the path of knowledge (*jñāna*). As *mokṣa*, is the very nature of the Self, it is not an experience which is to be brought about through works (*karma*). The path of knowledge consists of 'hearing' (i. e. study, *śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*), and meditation (*nididhyāsana*) (i, 52-54).

What is the immediate instrument of release? Is it *śravaṇa* of the *mahāvākya* 'That thou art'? Or, is it continued meditation (also called *prasaṅkhyāna*)? According to the *Bhāmatī* view, verbal testimony (*śabda*), of which the *mahāvākyas* form part, can yield only mediate knowledge, and not immediate or direct knowledge. If the mediate knowledge gained from verbal testimony is to be transformed into immediate experience, there should be continued meditation till this is achieved; and this is possible because the mind which is the instrument in meditation is a sense organ (*indriya*). The *Vivaraṇa* view maintains that the mind is

not a sense organ, as it is an auxiliary to all *pramāṇas* and that verbal testimony can yield immediate knowledge if the object is immediate. To illustrate this point the story of the ten travellers is given (vii, 22 ff). There is no object more immediate than the Self. Hence, the *mahāvākya* "That thou art" imparts to the competent hearer the direct experience of the non-dual Self. Giving a citation from the *Vākyavṛtti*, Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya says, "The major texts are for the sake of imparting direct knowledge of Brahman. In regard to this there is no room for doubt". (vii, 70).

Meditation, however, is not without its great use. In chapter ix, '*Dhyāna-dīpa*', Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya compares it to *saṁvādidbhrama*, delusion which culminates in a fruitful result. The man who mistakes the lamp-light for a gem and gets to the place whence the light comes, gains nothing, whereas the person, who mistakes the light of the gem for the gem itself, obtains the precious stone. Although both are cases of delusion, the latter is a fruitful one. When the attributeless Brahman is meditated upon, the content of meditation is not itself Brahman. But the contemplation leads to Brahman-realization. Thus, for those who are not qualified for gaining true knowledge through enquiry, Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya recommends the *yoga* of meditation (*dhyāna*).

In more than one place in the *Pañcadaśī*, the state of Brahman-realization is described in glowing terms, and the incomparable happiness of the *jīvanmukta* is praised. It is only from the standpoint of the unreleased that the continuance of the body of the *jīvanmukta* is explained as due to the residue of *prārabdha* (*karma* which is responsible for his present body), and illustrations, such as the continued rotation of the potter's wheel for a time even after the propelling rod has been removed, are offered. In truth, however, the *mukta* has no body, and there are no grades of *mukti*.

In the *Pañcadaśī* Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya reveals himself as a writer not only with great philosophical insight but also with equally great literary skill. The *Pañcadaśī* is not only a veritable mine of Vedāntic treasure, but is also a work with poetic charm that delights the reader. No wonder, it is one of the most favoured texts and has found a permanent place among the Advaita classics. And, Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya, its author, takes his rank with the best preceptors of Advaita after Śaṅkara. His contribution to Advaita is as immense as it is abiding.

CHAPTER ONE

INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF REALITY (TATTVA-VIVEKA-PRAKARAṆA)

1

Introduction

Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya's *Pañcadaśī* is a classic manual of Advaita-Vedānta. Its subject-matter, as of all text-books on Advaita, is the doctrine of the non-difference of *Brahman* and *Ātman*. The content (*viṣaya*) and aim (*prayojana*) of the *Pañcadaśī* are indicated, as Rāmakṛṣṇa Paṇḍita points out in his lucid commentary, in its very first verse. The coordination of the words 'Śaṅkara' and 'Ānanda' signifies the non-difference between the cosmic Reality which is the bestower of all blessedness, and the *Ātman*, which is the most lovable and the most desired end. What is empirically known as the individual soul is none other than the transcendental Reality. The mistaken notion that the *Ātman* is finite and particular, that it is cribbed and cabined within a mass of flesh suffering from all the ills that an empirical outfit is heir to, is born of ignorance. Hence the supreme aim of the Vedānta is to dispel this darkness, viz. ignorance, and to disclose the truth of the non-dual Reality. The task of Vedānta is the destruction of the whole of amorous delusion. When the delusion is removed, the Truth shines in its own light. When the veils are lifted there is no more cause for grief. Stripped of all sorrow, the self attains 'the delight of life and mind, the fullness of peace and eternity.'¹ Thus the removal of unreality and the realization of eternal bliss is the twofold aim of Advaita. In as much as a book paves

the way for this ultimate end, it is useful. The pragmatic test of a treatise on Advaita lies in its use as a guide for the seeker after truth in his quest for the eternal. Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya who was a veritable 'forest of learning' provides in his *Pañcadaśī* such an invaluable introduction and guide to the *Advaita*-experience.

The *Pañcadaśī* is so named because it consists of fifteen chapters which may be divided into three groups of five chapters each. The first five (*vivekapañcakam*) give an exposition of the *sat* or Existence aspect of *Brahman*, the second five (*dīpapañcakam*) are devoted to the characterization of the Real mainly as *cit* or pure consciousness; and the last five (*ānandapañcakam*) expound the supreme *Brahman* as *ānanda*, immeasurable and infinite bliss.

2

Pure Consciousness that is Identical in all the three States of Experience

Tattvavicāra or an inquiry into the Real is an indispensable prerequisite of *Advaita*-experience. Before we can grasp the intricacies of Vedānta, we must be able to discriminate the eternal from the non-eternal. 'Lead us from the unreal to the real' is the prayer of the Vedic seer. The first of the four requirements that qualify a person for the study of Vedānta is *nityā*-*nitya-vastu-viveka*, discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal. The chaos of empirical life is due to the confusion between the real and the non-real. We regard the phenomenal as the permanent and the permanent as the phenomenal. Knowledge of the truth alone can destroy this mistaken notion. The first chapter of the *Pañcadaśī* entitled *Tattva-viveka* is an inquiry into the nature of the Real. In this chapter Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya propounds the Advaita view of Reality sanctioned by scripture and supported by reason. Revelation and reason are not contradictories. Intuition does not negate the intellect. It includes and transcends it. It is

not a-logical but supra-logical. Hence logic and life, rational cognition and intuitive experience, must go hand in hand. Advaita aims at a synthesis of the head and the heart. It is neither a barren intellectualism nor a mere mysticism. It is a *darśana*, an insight into the real, a vision of truth.

The synthetic method of the Vedānta is very patent in the manner in which Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya propounds his theme. He does not begin by quoting scripture. But on the contrary, the very first arguments that he advances in support of the doctrine of the non-dual Reality are logical and rational. To him, as to Śaṅkara, non-contradiction is the criterion of truth. The logical principle of non-contradiction may not be adequate to assert positively what Reality is; but it does prove negatively what it is not.

By an analysis of the three states of experience Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya demonstrates that pure consciousness alone is real, non-contradicted by any experience. In the state of waking the objects of experience vary and vanish, but their cognition is non-dual and identical. The objects of sense such as a tuning-fork and a bright light, and the stimuli that we receive from them, are different from one another because of their mutual exclusion and particularity. But the knowledge of the sensory objects which is other than the sensations is identical and undivided and hence not differentiated and dissipated. Pure consciousness is not a series of sensations. It is not a collection of particular perishing psychical presentations. 'The pure Self seems to be unaffected by the flotsam and jetsam of ideas which rise and vanish with particular moods.' Presentations by themselves yield no knowledge. But for the unitary principle that connects and controls them, they would be a chaotic mass. In dreams the objects of waking life are absent. There are present only the impressions of the waking state. The dream world is even more evanescent and phantastic than the waking world. But the pure consciousness that

witnesses the dream does not undergo change. If it were one consciousness that were awake and another that dreamt, then there would be no case of identity at all. But in actual experience we find that it is the same consciousness which remains as witness in both the states. Even in dreamless sleep there is consciousness, for when one rises from sleep one is aware of having had good sleep undisturbed by dreams. This, one knows from memory. Memory must have its root in past experience, for memory is only of presentations. There must be some one in sleep who is directly conscious of the absence of knowledge and is quiet, to whom this sleep and the consciousness of nothing are presented. In the state of deep sleep there is not the play of the external world nor the cinema of internal objects. But this non-existence of the world does not affect the witnessing principle. It is witness even to the nescience of sleep. Pure consciousness which persists in sleep, though different from its object which is ignorance, is not different from the consciousness which experiences the other two states. While the states of experience along with their objects change, consciousness remains the same. It is the real, and hence the *Ātman*. By its radiance all things shine. It is pure existence (*sat*) because it is beyond the measure of time, and intelligence (*cit*) because it is self-effulgent. Pure consciousness cannot become the object of any other experience, and so it is self-luminous. To say that it is its own object is a manifest contradiction, and the assertion that there is another consciousness which cognizes it lands us in infinite regress. How can the self-resplendent Reality become the object of any other cognition? How can the knower be known? The *Ātman* which is existence (*sat*) and intelligence (*cit*) is also bliss (*ānanda*), for it is the centre of supreme happiness. Existence, consciousness, and bliss are not predicates which are attached to the *Ātman*; they are its self-nature *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*. They are its essence, and not attributes. The *Ātman* is not *citdharmā*, as the Naiyāyika thinks, it is *citsvabhāva*. It is not that the *Ātman* has existence, cons-

ciousness, and bliss ; but it is *sat-cit-ānanda*. We have the testimony of scripture for the truth that the *Ātman* is *Brahman*. When the three states of experience are recognized to be non-eternal illusory superimpositions, the *Ātman*, freed from its limiting adjuncts, is realized to be identical with *Brahman*.

3

Īśvara and Jīva

The bliss-nature of the *Ātman* is not fully recognized by all, because there is an impediment in the way. Though there is an apprehension of the blissful nature of the *Ātman*, it is not clearly comprehended. *Avidyā* (nescience), which is an aspect of *prakṛti*, hides the real and clouds its felicity. *Prakṛti* is, in its unmanifested condition, the union of opposites. It is a 'string of three strands'. The three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, when they are in a state of equipoise united with the reflection of *Brahman*, are called *prakṛti*. When the equilibrium is disturbed there is *prakṛti-nāśa* (destruction of *prakṛti*), and the empirical world is produced. *Prakṛti* is the prius of creation, the womb of manyness. It is called pure when the *sattva* is predominant, and impure when the *sattva* is obscured by the other two *guṇas*. *Brahman* which is reflected in the pure-*sattva*-predominant *prakṛti* or *māyā*, and which gains control over it becomes the omniscient *Īśvara*;² and when the real is reflected in the impure-*sattva*-predominant *avidyā*, it is termed *jīva*. *Jīvas* are many

2. VS, (vv. 37 & 38): *iyam samaṣṭir utkr̥ṣṭopādhitayā viśuddha-sattva-pradhānā*.

"This aggregate of ignorance on account of its being associated with perfection (*Brahman*) has a preponderance of pure *sattva*." Consciousness associated with this is endowed with such qualities as omniscience, universal lordship, all-controlling power, etc., and is designated as the undifferentiated, the inner guide, the cause of the world and *Īśvara* on account of its being the illuminator of the aggregate of ignorance.

because of the different degrees of impurity. *Māyā* is the causal body (*kāraṇa-śarīra*) of *Īśvara*, whereas *avidyā* is the causal body of the *jīva* which because of its affection for *avidyā*, is designated *prājña*.³ The subtle body is the effect of the five elements which are themselves the manifestations of *prakṛti* with a predominance of *tamas*. By the command of God, ether, air, fire, water, and earth spring forth from *prakṛti*. From the *sattva* aspect of each element is produced each of the cognitive senses, and from the *sattva* particles of all the elements is derived the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*), which owing to a difference in function, is divided into two—*manas* (mind) which deliberates and *buddhi* (intellect) which decides. From the *rajas* constituent present in each of the five elements are derived, in serial order, the five conative organs; and the collective totality of the same *rajas* present in all the five elements is the progenitor of the five *prāṇas*. The five senses of cognition, the five of conation, the five *prāṇas*, *manas*, and *buddhi* together constitute the subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra*). When the *jīva* identifies itself with the subtle-body, it comes to be called *taijasa*; and when *Īśvara* bestows upon it his conceit (*abhimāna*), he takes on the name *Hiraṇyagarbha*. The difference between the *taijasa* and the *Hiraṇyagarbha* lies in that while the former is of the 'each' form, the latter is of the 'all' form.⁴ The gross body (*sthūla-śarīra*) is made up of the quintuplicated elements. The *jīva* which confounds itself with the physical body is known as *viśva*; and *Īśvara* who limits himself by all the gross bodies goes by the name *Vaiśvānara*. Though the two principles, the objective and the subjective, *Brahman* and *Ātman*, are identical in essence, they appear to be different and under different names. This perversion is the work of *prakṛti*.

3. VS (43 & 44): It is called *prājña* on account of its being the illuminator of individual ignorance.

It is called *prājña* as it is deficient in illumination on account of its association with a dull limiting adjunct.

4. See VS, 36, 40, 47, and 48.

4

Removal of Superimposition

The evolution of the world-order has been described not for establishing its reality but for proving that it is non-eternal. This method is known in Vedānta as *adhyāropāpavāda*, or an illusory attribution to be followed by subsequent withdrawal. The *jīva*, deluded by *avidyā* and identifying itself with the triple bodies, thinks that it is the enjoyer of the sweets and bitters of empirical life. It acts in order to enjoy and enjoys in order to act. Like the worms which are carried away in the current from one whirlpool to another the *jīva* is driven from birth to death and from death to birth in the cycle of empirical existence. An escape from this vicious circle is effected by the light of wisdom. When the *jīva* tears open the sheaths of ignorance, it realizes its inner reality. The five sheaths which are non-real (*anṛta*), inert (*jaḍa*), miserable (*duḥkha*), and manifold (*dvaita*) cover the *Ātman* which is real (*sat*), effulgent (*cit*), bliss (*ānanda*), and one without a second (*advaita*). The gross body is the *annamaya-kośa* (sheath made of food); the subtle body consists of three sheaths, *prāṇamaya*, *manomaya* and *vijñānamaya*; and the causal body is the *ānandamaya*. The *Ātman* is lost in this labyrinth of non-reality. To discover it we must discard the sheaths. By the methods of agreement (*anvaya*) and contrariety (*vyatireka*) the *Ātman* is to be differentiated from the five sheaths. In dream the gross body is negated but not the *Ātman*. The self remains, though the sheath of food is removed off the field. The subtle body is unmanifest in sleep, but the *Ātman* does never cease to exist. The self is not affected by the presence or disappearance of body and mind. That it is imperishable is shown by the fact that it remains constant when the gross and subtle bodies change and cease to be. The gross body which plays its chief role in the waking state disappears in dream, and the subtle body that is manifest in dream ceases to exist in sleep. But the *Ātman* is unaffected by the three states of experience. It

is the silent witness, eternal and everlasting. The causal body which is attendant upon the *Ātman* in the states of waking, dream, and sleep, vanishes in *samādhi* (state of absorption). The manifestation of the *Ātman* in *samādhi* when there is the non-manifestation of nescience is its *anvaya* (agreement). The non-manifestation of ignorance when there is the manifestation of the *Ātman* is its *vyatireka* (contrariety). In *samādhi* it becomes evident that even the *ānanda-maya* is not the *Ātman*. In the words of Śaṅkara, “*Ānanda-maya Ātman* is an effect, and not the unconditioned *Ātman*”.⁵ It is not the fullness of *ānanda*; it is counterfeit bliss. While the sheaths are finite and particular, the *Ātman* is infinite and eternal. Though sustaining the sheaths in the relative planes of existence, it is never identical with them. It is like a thread that courses through and holds together a collection of pearls.

5

Release, the End

The *Ātman*, when separated thus from the adjuncts that hide it, realizes its identity with *Brahman*. *Mokṣa* (release) is the achievement of this ideal. It is the realization of the truth enshrined in the major text, ‘That thou art’ (*tat tvam asi*). The way to reach the end is through inquiry. ‘The Self is to be seen, heard, reflected on, and contemplated.’⁶ In *samādhi*, the ills of *saṁsāra* disappear. When the transcendental Self is seen, all actions cease; the fire of wisdom consumes the deeds and their cause, ignorance. *Samādhi* is called *dharmamegha* (the cloud of *dharma*), for it showers truth, pours forth in torrents the nectar of virtue. Liberated from the shackles of *saṁsāra*, the self comes to its own. The knower of *Ātman* crosses all sorrow and never more does he return to empirical life and get entangled in the meshes of *māyā*.

5. *TU*, II, v, 1, Commentary.

6. *BU*, II, iv, 5.

CHAPTER TWO

INQUIRY INTO THE FIVE ELEMENTS
(PAÑCAMAHĀBHŪTA-VIVEKA-PRAKARAṆA)

1

The Triple Method

It is the aim of the *Pañcadaśī* to establish the doctrine of the non-dual Self through scriptural testimony, logical reasoning, and intuitive experience. Unaided 'learning' would be of no avail in the ascertainment of the *Ātman*. *Manana* or rational reflection is an indispensable aid to the final realization. Even in interpreting Scripture there are six rules laid down which reveal the need for the exercise of active reasoning. Of the six marks (*ṣaḍ-līṅga*) determinative of purport, the last but not the least important characteristic sign is *upapatti* or demonstration in the light of reasoning. It is this rationalistic tendency, which is at the same time not sundered from revealed intuition, that makes for the uniqueness and excellence of Advaita. Advaita is really 'a faith that enquires'.

Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya ably wields the weapon of the triple method of *śruti-yukti-anubhava* (revelation-reason-experience). In the first chapter he has demonstrated that the *Ātman* is *sat-cit-ānanda*, the timeless Real, self-luminous Bliss. While the states of consciousness vary and vanish, consciousness *per se* remains constant and unchanging. 'That which is constant in whatever is variable, that is different from the latter, as a string from the flowers (strung thereon)'.¹

1. *Bhāmatī* on *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*: *yeṣu vyāvartamāneṣu yadanu-vartate tat tebhya bhinnam yathā kusumbhyaḥ sūtram.*

The three states of empirical life are anything but permanent. They appear and disappear like pictures on a screen. But the fact that they are fleeting implies an underlying permanent reality. The *Ātman* is the witness of the states of waking, dream, and sleep. It is *avasthātrayasākṣī*.

Avidyā obscures the true nature of the real. The self is confounded with the not-self, the noumenal with the phenomenal, the eternal with the ephemeral. But as the reed is separated from the *muñja* grass, the *Ātman* can be discriminated from the obscurations of *avidyā*. The materialist Cārvāka considers the gross physical body to be the *Ātman*. By some of the Cārvākas the sense-organs are held to be the self. All of them mistake the non-real for the real. The *Ātman* is not an epiphenomenon, an appendage of the body. It is neither a bundle of bones nor a mental process, neither a colony of cells nor a system of electrons, etc. However much the scientist may try to modify his conception of matter and interpret it in terms of force and energy, electrons and protons, he will not be able to bridge the gulf that yawns between matter and spirit. The self is not molecular motion or radio-activity. It is not only metaphysical but also metaphysical. However subtle mind may be, it is also material. Mind, like matter, is subject to origination and destruction, and is sublated in the experience of deep sleep. That which comes into being at one time and goes out of existence at another cannot be the absolutely real. The psycho-physical organism is a superimposition upon the *Ātman*, and is a product of *avidyā*. The theory that identifies the self with *ānandamaya* cannot be sound.² In *samādhi*, *avidyā* is dispelled; and in sleep it becomes the object of cognition. Hence it cannot be the *Ātman*. The three bodies are not co-present with the *Ātman* and the *Ātman* is not co-absent with

2. VS: *prābhākaratārkikau tu "anyontarātmānandamayaḥ" ityādi śruter buddhyādinām ajñāne layadarśanāt aham ajñō'ham ajñānityādi anubhayāc ca ajñānamātmēti vadataḥ*, passage 129.

them. The self is contradicted by no experience, for it is of the very nature even of him who contradicts.³ It is *dehātaya-vilakṣaṇa*, other than the three bodies, the causal, the subtle, and the gross, which are but unreal adjuncts to it.

2

The Real is Non-dual

In the second chapter, *Pañcamahābhūta-viveka*, Bhāratī-tīrtha-Vidyāraṇya follows up the same argument and demonstrates that the Real is not the objective world, a product of the elements. Just as the *Ātman*, which is mistakenly called the individual self, is neither the triple states of experience nor the three bodies, so also *Brahman*, which is wrongly characterized as the objective self, is neither an offshoot of elements nor a compound thereof.

Bhāratī-tīrtha-Vidyāraṇya bases the argument and the conclusion of the second chapter on the scriptural text which says that in the beginning *sat* (Existence) alone existed, one only, without a second, *sadeva saumya idam agra āsīt ekam eva advitīyam*.⁴

The Upaniṣad passage proclaims that prior to creation all this existed as the non-dual *sat*. The entire cosmos which is reached through the six ways of knowing (*pramāṇas*) is denoted by the word 'this' ('*idam*'). The five elements with their distinctive properties, the cognitive and conative senses with their respective functions, the *antaḥkaraṇa* (internal organ) with its power of direction and control—all these are modifications of *māyā*, products of *prakṛti*. Mind is also material. Psychics is inverted physics. The doctrine of behaviorism, though absurd to a large extent, is not without

3. Śaṅkara, *BSB*, II, iii, 7: *ya eva hi nirākartā tad eva tasya svarūpam*.

4. *CU*, VI, ii, 1.

a modicum of truth. As Scripture puts it: "the *manas* is material, earthy; the *prāṇa* is sustained by water, and speech is of the nature of light".⁵ The gross and the subtle universe is an illusory imputation on the *sat*. It is a transfiguration (*vivarta*) of the Real. Prior to the creation of this non-real superimposition, there was only the *sat*, one without a second.

3

The Real is Relationless

The *sat* has neither external relations nor internal differentiations. It is unrelated to anything, for there is nothing else with which it can be related. Relations cannot be real, since they can be neither of the nature of things nor of the nature of attributes. Were relations of the nature of things there would be nothing to be related. If they are regarded as attributes, then these attributes must either be identical with or different from the things. If they are identical, then we are landed in the former alternative. If they are different, we must have a new relation between the thing and the ultimate which is itself a relation, and this will involve us in the process of infinite regress. *Omnis determinatio est negatio*. All determination is negation. The self which is the most perfect being cannot be delimited by determinations and relations. To limit it is to finitize it. It has nothing of a like kind or of a different kind, and has no internal variety.⁶ A tree, for example, has the internal variety of foliage, flowers, and fruits, has the relation of similarity to other trees and of dissimilarity to objects of a different kind like stones. The *sat* has no other thing which is similar to it or dissimilar to it, and has no

5. CU, VI, v, 4.

6. *sajātiya-vijātiya-svagata-bheda-rāhitya*.

internal differentiation. That the real is devoid of differences is asserted by the three words of the scriptural passage—*ekam, eva, advitiyam*, 'one, only, without-a-second'.

The *sat* has no internal modes, for it is not a whole-of-parts. Parts can be attributed only to inert matter. The *sat* is pure consciousness, *śuddhacaitanya*. It is the indivisible unitary principle. Assuming that it is a whole-of-parts, we must enquire whether the parts are intelligent or inert. If they are intelligent, are they different or non-different from the *sat*? They cannot be different, for the scriptural texts which proclaim the one Reality would then become invalid. If they are non-different from *Brahman*, they cannot be related to it as parts to the whole. If the parts are held to be inert, then the *sat* which is constituted of the parts must also be inert. That which is inert is subject to origination and decay, and hence cannot be *sat* or real. This leads us to the absurd position of stating that the *sat* is *asat*—a glaring case of self-contradiction. The Real is not a one-in-many, an identity-in-difference. It cannot even be said that name and form are the constituents of the *sat*. The name '*sat*' which is attributed to the real is for empirical purposes, for instruction which is through mortal words. *Sattā* or the 'Supreme Being' is the highest category that the human mind can grasp. All that the finite intellect can say of the real is that it is. *Brahman* can have no form, since it is immutable, eternal. '*Sat*', '*cit*', and '*ānanda*', being, consciousness, and bliss, are not parts of *Brahman*. They reveal its nature. If they are parts they must be mutually exclusive. When *sat* is excluded from *cit* and *ānanda*, it would be inert and miserable, and hence also *asat*. If consciousness were different from being and bliss, it would be non-being accompanied by misery, and so *acit* or insentient; sundered from *sat* and *cit*, *ānanda* would not be bliss but *duḥkha* (misery). *Sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda* are neither parts of *Brahman* nor its properties. Names and forms cannot be the limits of the *sat*, since prior to creation they are non-existent. The

real is devoid of internal difference ; and this is indicated by the word '*ekam*' in the text.

If particulars are the only realia, there would be many reals of the same kind. The *sat* cannot be many, for it would contradict the conclusions of scripture. If the *sat* is really manifold, is it limited or unlimited ? A limited real cannot be *sat*, and an unlimited real can only be one. With determinations, the *sat* cannot be ; without determinations, a plurality of reals cannot exist ; on the analogy of the three states we cannot argue that there are three reals corresponding to them. On account of *māyā*, the *sat* appears to be split and divided ; but really it can have no other akin to it. It has no difference of the same kind ; this is conveyed by the word '*eva*' indicating emphasis.

The *sat* has no contradictory instance. Contradiction is mutual negation. The non-existence of pot in cloth and the negation of cloth by pot are cases of *anyonyābhāva* (mutual exclusion). That in which there is the negation of another thing is the locus or *anyogī* of that negation ; and that of which there is negation is the *pratiyogī* or the counter-entity of negation. The cognition of non-existence (*abhāva*) can result only from the knowledge of the *anyogī* and the *pratiyogī*. To say that there is the non-existence of pot in the cloth we must possess a knowledge of the pot and the cloth both of which must be real. The counter-entity of the *sat* is *asat* or unreality, like the son of a barren woman or the horns of a hare. An unreal entity cannot be the *pratiyogī* of anything real. The *asat* is incapable of being the counter-entity of the *sat*. There can be no opposition to the *sat* of a non-existent and unreal thing. The word '*asat*' may be taken to mean the gross and subtle universe, and it may be contended that the world is existent and so capable of being the *pratiyogī* of the *sat*. This contention will not bear scrutiny, since *māyā* and its effects are like the objects of a dream and reflections in a mirror. Though non-real, they

appear ; but appearance is not reality. *Sub specie aeternitatis* the effects of *māyā* with their cause are unreal. From the standpoint of the real they are non-existent, *abhāva*.⁷ Hence there can be no entity different from, and opposed to, the *sat*. The self has no heterogeneous difference as well. This is asserted by the word '*advitīyam*' of the Upaniṣadic text. The *sat* is one without a second. It has no *genus* ; it possesses no properties, and it is unrelated to anything else.

4

Non-being is not the Real

The Mādhyamikas maintain that *asat* existed in the beginning. Non-being is the source and solace of this world. The cosmic process is like an illusory wheel of fire. Incapable of grasping the super-sensuous and the supra-rational, dependent solely on inferential reasoning and discarding the intuitions of scripture, the nihilists conclude that everything is void. They fail to recognize that there can be a real beyond the reach of speech and mind. The statement of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, "In the beginning there was non-existence"⁸ does not support the Mādhyamika view. What is declared here is not that non-being is the parent of the world. The text simply means that the world of names and forms was non-existent, i.e., remained undifferentiated before creation.

When it is said that 'non-being existed', does it mean that non-being is related to the real or that it is itself real? In either case we are faced with a contradiction. Unreality cannot be associated with reality, nor can it be itself real. Light can be neither dark nor co-ordinated with darkness.

7. Cp. *Gītā*, ii, 16 : Of the real there is no non-existence ; and of the unreal no existence.

8. *CU*, III, xix, 1 ; *VI*, ii, 1.

The *sat* and *śūnya* are diametrically opposed to each other. The world of names and forms is a superimposition on the *sat*. If the nihilist asserts that the non-being is also a superimposition on the Real, then he falsifies his own theory that nothingness is the ultimate category. The Mādhyamika may turn round and say that like non-being the name (*nāma*) and form (*rūpa*) of the *sat* are also superimpositions on it. But this objection of his is unintelligible. The *sat* has neither name nor form. Supposing that they are superimpositions, on what are they superimposed? Are they superimpositions on the *sat*, or on the *asat*, or on the world? The *sat* cannot be their locus. The name and form of a thing are not superimposed on itself. The *nāma* and *rūpa* of silver are superimposed not on itself but on the nacre. The *asat* cannot be the locus, for how can non-being be the substrate of anything? The world cannot be the locus of the superimpositions; because it is the effect and not the cause of the *sat*. It cannot be maintained that the name and form of the real need no locus whereon they can be superimposed. Nowhere do we see a delusion without a substrate.

The theory of the Mādhyamika that 'non-being existed' was shown to involve contradiction. The Mādhyamika now points out that even the statement '*sat* existed' has serious discrepancies. Are '*sat*' and 'existence' two different categories? Or, are they identical? If they are different, the doctrine of non-duality becomes false. If they are identical, then occurs the fallacy of idle repetition (*punarukti*). The Vedāntin replies to this objection by saying that repetition is not uncommon in the assertions of men. Very often we use such expressions as 'he does a deed', 'he speaks a sentence', 'he wears his daily wear'. To us who are accustomed to this kind of repetitive language, it is no fallacy on the part of scripture to instruct us in the same way as we talk. The next objection that the opponent raises is about the tense of the verb used in the Upaniṣadic passage '*The sat existed in the beginning*'. How can there be a beginning

for the real? The transcendent Reality is beyond the measures of time. But for the sake of the disciple who is limited by temporal conditions, the *sat* is spoken of as having existed prior to creation without any differentiations of name and form. In reality the *sat* is the eternal 'now'. Both questions and answers are made in the language which belongs to the realm of duality. In the language of the non-dual spirit there is no query, nor is there any reply. The real is too deep for the mind to fathom, too great for words to describe. It is neither external light nor internal ignorance. It is not an object of the senses. It is the indefinable Absolute.

Admitting the non-reality of the earth and other objects because they are observed to change and perish, the opponent asks the Advaitin how ether also can be declared to be non-real. According to the Vaiśeṣika, the four elements, earth, water, fire, and air, are atomic; but ether is indivisible and homogeneous. The rejoinder of the Advaitin is that however subtle ether may be, it is material and hence perishable. And the *siddhāntin* asks: If you are able to cognize the existence of ether without the earth, why does not your intellect grasp the *sat* without ether? Further, pure ether unrelated to the other four elements is not an object of experience. But the *sat* is the most intimately experienced by the enlightened and the ignorant alike. No one doubts his own existence. The man in the street may not realize that the real is consciousness and bliss, but self-existence is experienced by all. The supreme Reality is intuited with the utmost certitude in the serenity of silence. The experience of quietude cannot be a night of nothingness, for there one does not perceive non-existence or non-being. As the *Ātman* is realized in its native purity in the state of silence, so also the *sat* is intuited to be non-dual when the encumbrances of the name- and form- world are discarded.

The Nature of *Māyā*

The world is the product of *māyā*, which is the power of *Brahman*. *Māyā* in itself is devoid of reality and is inferred from its effects. As fire is inferred from the flames, so also from the manifestations of *māyā*, the latter is inferred. *Māyā* cannot be the ultimate Real since it has to depend even for its existence on the *sat*. It cannot be identical with the Real, for power and the possessor of power are not the same. Were the *śakti* (power) identical with the *sat*, then it would cease to be power or force as distinguished from the real. If the *śakti* is asserted to be unreal, is it unreal in the sense of void? Or, is it unreal in the sense that it can be sublated? The *śakti* cannot be *śūnya* since the opponent himself has admitted that *śūnya* is an effect of *māyā*. *Māyā* is *anirvacanīya*. It can be described neither as *sat* nor as *asat*. If *māyā* be of the nature of the Real, is it different from, or identical with, the *sat*? If it be distinct from the *sat*, there would be two entities, thereby invalidating the tenets of Advaita. If there be an 'other' opposed to the *sat*, the real would be limited and hence cease to be real. If it be declared that *māyā* is identical with the *sat*, it has been shown how it is impossible for power and the possessor of power to be identical. Further, if there is no *māyā* as distinct from the *sat* there would be no need for wisdom to sublimate it, no longing for liberation. If *māyā* be negated as *asat*, it cannot be the cause of the cosmos which is existent (*bhāva*). *Māyā* can be defined neither as *sat* nor as *asat*.

How can there be a middle-ground between the real and the unreal? A thing must be either real or unreal. The contrary of the *sat* is *asat*, and that of the latter is the former. By stating that *māyā* is other than *sat* we do not posit unreality of it in the sense of empty nothingness. It is not real in the sense that it does not bide for ever. That alone is real which is not sublated at any time. *Māyā* is

sublated by the light of wisdom. And so it cannot be real. At the same time it is not unreal in the sense of non-being or *śūnya*.⁹ *Māyā* is existent but not real. It is riddled with contradictions. Unreal the world is, non-existent it is not. ' *Māyā* is a feature of the central reality, neither identical with nor different from it '.¹⁰ It is neither real as *Brahman* nor unreal as the sky-flower. In the words of scripture, "There was in the beginning neither the *sat* nor the *asat*; but the darkness of *māyā* remained".¹¹

How then did darkness exist? How can existence be predicated of *māyā*? How was *māyā* related to the *sat*? There can be conjunctive relation only between two substances, i.e., substrates of attributes. *Brahman* is attributeless, and *māyā* which is a mixture of the three *guṇas* is of the nature of an attribute. *Brahman* cannot become the substrate of a quality. Hence no conjunctive relation is possible between *Brahman* and *māyā*. Between a substance and attribute, genus and species, doer and deed, material cause and its effect, there is the relation of inherence. *Brahman* is related to *māyā* in none of these ways; and so there can be no relation of inherence between them. Self-relation is known as *tādātmya-saṁbandha*, or the relation of identity. *Brahman* and *māyā* are not identical. Between them no *tādātmya* relation can exist. Because the scripture declares *Brahman* to be relation-less, no real relation is possible between it and *māyā*. But just as there is an unreal relation between the sky and the blue-colour, there is a superimposed relation of identity between *Brahman* and *māyā*. This peculiar relation has been called *anirvacanīya-tādātmya-saṁbandha*, undefinable relation of identity. Were *māyā* the same as *śūnya* then it would be different from the *sat*, creating a wedge in

9. *nāsadrūpā na sadrūpā māyā naivobhayātmikā
sadasadbhyām anirvācyā mithyābhūtā sanātānā*.—*Sūrya-purāṇa*.

10. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 570.

11. *RV*, X, 129.

the Real ; in that case, the void as against the Full, the *śūnya* as against the *sat* engaged in an eternal conflict would be the ultimate truth. *Māyā* has no self-existence. It is *mithyā* but not *śūnya*.

Does *māyā* exist in the whole of *Brahman* or only in a part thereof? It cannot cover the whole of *Brahman*, since the *jñānin's* realization is of the *māyā*-less *Brahman*. If it is maintained that *māyā* occupies a part of *Brahman*, then does the space occupied by nescience belong to *Brahman* as its part? Is that spatial attribute real, or only an unreal superimposition? If it be real, the scripture which proclaims that *Brahman* is without parts would be invalid, and *Brahman* itself would be finitized. If it be a superimposition, is it of the nature of the gross and the subtle universe, or of the nature of the *jīva* and *Īśvara*? Is it to be characterized as time, as *śūnya*, or as *māyā*? Or, is it any other thing different from these six categories? The spatial attribute of *māyā* cannot be identified with the universe which is an effect of nescience. It cannot be of the nature of *jīva* and *Īśvara* who are also limited by *māyā*. It cannot be time which is a manifestation of nescience, nor *śūnya* which is mere void. It cannot be of the nature of *māyā*, since then it would lead to the fallacies of mutual dependence, circular reasoning and indefinite regress. As there are no other alternatives, with nothing else can the spatial attribute be identified. Hence space cannot even be superimposed on the spaceless *Brahman*. But from the point of view of empirical existence, *māyā* must be taken as remaining only in a part of *Brahman*. The Vedas declare that all these beings, sentient and non-sentient, form only one fourth of *Brahman*, three-fourths of which are unobscured and self-effulgent.¹² In the *Gītā*, Śrī Kṛṣṇa observes that he exists, supporting this whole universe by a portion of himself.¹³ 'Pervading the whole world, He is

12. *RV*, X, 90, 1-3: *pādosya viśvā bhūtāni tripādasyāmṛtaṁ divi*.

13. *Gītā*, x, 42: *viṣṭabhyāhamidaṁ kṛtsnam ekāṁśena sthito jagat*.

ten inches in excess'.¹⁴ As the *Sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa puts it : ' *Brahman* transcends the cosmos which is but an effect, a modification '.¹⁵ Though *Brahman* is without parts and undivided, it seems to be divided and possessed of parts due to the unreal superimposition of *māyā*. Scripture which desires the welfare of the aspirant answers him who asks whether *māyā* occupies the whole or a part of *Brahman*, in his own language, superimposing particularity on the universal Reality.

6

The Function of Māyā

The *māyā-śakti* which is grounded in the *sat* superimposes modifications on it. It weaves out the phenomenal world to veil the real truth. The modes of *māyā* hide the unconditioned Absolute. The attributes of the elements which are the principal modes are superimposed on the *sat*. *Māyā* perverts the real and makes it a predicate of the elements. Lay people attribute spatiality to the *sat*, and the Tārkikas perceive reality in ether. This perversion is the work of *māyā*. But through discriminative inquiry the *sat* is differentiated from ether and other elements, and the delusion of mutual superimposition is destroyed. The *sat* and ether are different. Separated from the *sat*, ether is unreal like the dream-elephant. It appears, but is not real. If it is said that ether which is differentiated from the real, is of the nature of space, then, because it is contrary to the *sat*, it must be characterized as *asat*. Space is not real, but is 'contradictory appearance'. It is different from the *sat* in sound and sense. When through concentration, revelation,

14. That He is ten inches in excess is only a figure of speech. It means that Reality includes the world and at the same time transcends it.

RV, X, 90, 1-3: *sa bhūmim viśvato vṛttvā atyatiṣṭhad daśāṅgulam*.

15. *BS*, IV, iv, 19.

and reasoning, we discriminate clearly between ether and reality, ether would cease to appear as real, and the *sat* would no longer seem to be spatial. By the statement that ether is different from *Brahman* we do not predicate of ether any exclusive existence. Ether consists of two parts : the real and the unreal. By sublating the unreal in it, ether is seen to be in appositional relation with the *sat*. But then ether ceases to be ether for the *sat* alone exists. Through *bādhasā-mānādhikaraṇya*, apposition by sublation, the non-dual state is reached. Like ether, the other elements, air, fire, water, and earth, are also unreal superimpositions on the *sat*, and can be discriminated from it through rational inquiry and verbal testimony. When *māyā* and its creations are recognized to be *mithyā*, the *sat* is realized to be non-dual and eternal. The Vedāntin does not deny to the world its phenomenal existence. Empirically there are differences in the world. The *vyāvahārika* life cannot thrive without the particularity and partitions that are to be found in the universe. He agrees with the other schools of thought in saying that for all practical purposes differences do exist. Plurality is of pragmatic value ; but it has no transcendental validity.

7

Liberation in Life

*Jīvanmukti*¹⁶ or liberation in life is the fruit of this discriminative inquiry. Though to all outward appearance the released one engages himself in the affairs of the world he is never oblivious of his identity with *Brahman*. One who is established firmly in the *sat* is released from the shackles of the body. He is also a *videhamukta*. “Attaining this stead-

16. The doctrine of *jīvan-mukti* does not commend itself to Maṇḍana. The existence of *prārabdha* is an indication of the continuance of nescience. Freedom is freedom from nescience. When *avidyā* continues, how can there be liberation in life?

fastness, the *puruṣa* is not deluded. Retaining this steadiness in the self in the *antakāla* (last moment) he reaches *Brahma-nirvāṇa* or merges into *Brahman*.¹⁷ The word '*antakāla*' of the *Gītā* does not mean the death-event of the body. The destruction of the dual vision with the realization of the non-dual Reality is here referred to as the 'last moment'. Or, let the word be taken to signify the end of the physical body. Even at the time of departure from the mortal coil there is no return for the realized soul to the delusion which has already been dispelled. His wisdom suffers nothing when his body decays. The body does not bind him, nor does the mind mould him. He is ever free. As he is liberated in terrestrial life, so does he remain released even when he relinquishes it. He is ever centred in the Self, unaffected by the onslaughts of *māyā*. There is no more ignorance for him, no more delusion. The light of wisdom sublates the veiling power of *māyā* and destroys it. But owing to *prārabdha*, the power of projection, though sublated, is not destroyed. When the *prārabdha* perishes even this trace of nescience vanishes. The *jīvanmukta* lives in the world, but is not of it. The world does not worry him, and his empirical outfit does not corrupt him. *Mokṣa* is 'a condition, not to be attained after death, but to be realized here and now, if one so wills'. Release is realization of the Self.

Knowledge which is acquired through *pramāṇas*, like '*tat tvam asi*' can be destroyed only by a greater *pramāṇa* than they. A greater authority than the Vedānta is nowhere to be had. Perception is blind and conception empty. Neither of them can reveal the Self. *Brahman*-knowledge cannot be reduced to the syllogistic form 'The real was there already; it is not a creation of the effort of man, a manufacture of the human mind.'¹⁸ 'The real was there actually

17. *Gītā*, ii, 72.

18. Śaṅkara, BSB, I, i, 1: *bhūtaṁ brahma, na puruṣavyāpāra-tantram*.

confronting us, it was not conjured out of the resources of the mind.' The *Kena Upaniṣad* says that it is 'other than the known and above the unknown'.¹⁹ The supreme *Brahman* is not an object presented to knowledge, since it is the very condition of the possibility of knowledge. 'The eye does not go thither nor speech nor mind'.²⁰ *Pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, perception and reasoning, fail to take us to the truth. It is only through intuitive insight that the Real can be realized. Self-realization which is the fruit of such intuition suffers no destruction even in the throes of bodily death. The once-freed is eternally free.

19. *KU*, 3.

20. *KU*, 3.

CHAPTER THREE
INQUIRY INTO THE FIVE SHEATHS
(PAÑCAKOSĀ-VIVEKA-PRAKARAṆA)

1

The Method of Synthesis

The problem of method is vital to every system of metaphysics. The results of a philosophical inquiry depend not a little on the method that a philosopher adopts. The method and the material are interdependent. If we may make use of a Kantian distinction, we may say that method without material is barren, while matter without method is blind. Descartes is called the Father of Modern Philosophy because of his innovation in the field of metaphysical methodology. Kant calls himself the Copernicus of philosophy, because of the unique epistemology that he gave to the world.

“The diversity of our opinions”, says Descartes, “is not because some are more reasonable than others, but only because we conduct our thought by different ways, and do not all consider the same things”.¹ Of all the different ways of approach, the most important are the objective and the subjective methods. Those metaphysical systems which pursue the objective path land themselves in crass materialism and atheism. Though Descartes began with the method of ‘universal doubt’, and started his metaphysics with the postulate ‘*cogito ergo sum*’, he relinquished this position while actually building the superstructure of his system. The mathematical method of the Cartesian philosophers is mainly an objective method. It is because of this method that even

Spinozism lends itself to a materialist interpretation. In the East, the Vaiśeṣika system makes use, for the most part, of the objective method. With its analytic way of classifying the various phenomena of the universe, it leaves us with an infinite number of finite particulars.² But particulars cannot be the ultimate realia. A billiard-ball universe will satisfy no thorough seeker of truth. Of late this objective method has invaded even the realm of psychology. The Behaviourist materializes the mind, makes it a shadow of the flesh and explains its functions in terms of physics and physiology.

The subjective method is equally one-sided, and if pursued to its logical conclusion, would lead to subjectivism and skepticism. The history of the English empiricist school bears witness to this fact. The psychological method which Locke inaugurated led logically to the phenomenalist pluralism and skepticism of David Hume. The Buddha's way, in the East, was to a great extent subjective and psychological. Though he was launched upon his career of philosophic thought by an objective observation of human misery, in so far as his aim was to discover the cause and the cure of sorrow, the Buddha had to choose the subjective method of introversion and psychological analysis. And a thoroughgoing method of this kind involved him naturally in the position of a methodological agnosticism. There are certain systems which employ both the objective and the subjective methods, but in an unsynthesized fashion. The Sāṅkhya system, pursuing the objective method, traces all the manifold of sense perception to the primal source, *pradhāna* or *prakṛti*, the prius of creation; and through the subjective method of inquiry it arrives at a plurality of *puruṣas*. Because of a lack of synthesis the Sāṅkhya is left with *prakṛti* as opposed to *puruṣa*, and one *puruṣa* as distinct from another.

2. Though the Vaiśeṣika speaks of substances which are infinite like the *Ātman* and the *ākāśa*, it is illogical for the system to hold the view of a plurality of infinities.

The Upaniṣadic method is a synthesis of the objective and the subjective ways of metaphysical approach to truth. The terms ‘*ādhyātmika*’ and ‘*ādhidāivika*’ occur often and in a successive order in the Upaniṣads. The cosmic ether is spoken of as identical with the ether of the heart. ‘He who is in the *puruṣa* and He who is in the sun is one’ says the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*.³ Uddālaka in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* instructs his son, how from the *sat*, one only without a second, the world sprang forth. After describing in detail the process of the objective manifestation of the Self of the universe, Uddālaka turns with a dramatic swiftness and says that the Universal Self is identical with the self of Śvetaketu, his son. “That which is that subtle essence (the root of all), in it all that exists has its self. It is the True, It is the Self, and thou, O Śvetaketu, art That”.⁴ This is a typical instance of the synthetic method of the Upaniṣads and of the system of Vedānta which has its roots in them. It is through this method that the Advaitins reach the unitary Absolute which can be characterized neither as objective nor as subjective. And, Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya, who is one of the ablest exponents of the post-Śaṅkara Advaita, wields this weapon of synthesis in an excellent and eminent manner. In the second chapter he adopts the objective method and discriminates the *sat* from the elements and their evolutes. The *sat* is shown to be distinct from the *mahābhūtas* and their modifications. In the third chapter, *Pañcakośaviveka*, Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya establishes through a subjective analysis that the self is not a psycho-physical organism, that the sight of the *Ātman* is not to be lost in the sheaths that seem to encase it.

3. *TU*, II, viii, 1 ; III, x, 4.

4. *CU*, VI, viii, 7.

2

The Taittirīya Inquiry

The *Pañcakośa-viveka-prakaraṇa* bases its arguments on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* taking the cue from the text of the *Brahmānandavallī*, ‘yo veda nihitaṁ guhāyāṁ parama vyoman, so ’śnute sarvān kāmān saha’, ‘He who knows It placed in the innermost recess, the transcendental ākāśa, realizes all his desires with the omniscient *Brahman*’.⁵ After defining *Brahman* as *satyam*, *jñānam*, and *anantam*, existence, knowledge, and infinity, the *Brahmānandavallī* proceeds to say that *Brahman* is not ordinarily realized as such because it is hidden in the cavity of the sheaths, which are products of the unmanifest ākāśa. “In this cavity are hidden all the substances in all the three times because it is the cause and it is exceedingly subtle. *Brahman* is placed within this cavity.”⁶ The sheaths veil the *Ātman* from our view; and it can be realized only when the veils are lifted. The *Brahmānandavallī* of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* “which seeks to show with the help of knowledge that the individual self is *Brahman* which is within and beyond the five sheaths beginning with that made of food and ending with that made of bliss goes on to extract the substance within by divesting it of the five sheaths formed by ignorance, just as we should remove the many chaff-coverings from a *kodrava* grain”.⁷ By this process of discrimination the Self is realized to be separate from the sheaths. The coverings are the creations of ignorance. When the night of nescience is dispelled through the light of knowledge, the *Ātman* is realized to be the only Reality.

The *Bhṛgu-vallī* illustrates this principle by means of the story of Bhṛgu, the son of Varuṇa. Bhṛgu implored his father to teach him the knowledge of *Brahman*. Varuṇa gave

5. *TU*, II, i, 1.

6. Śaṅkara’s commentary on *TU*, II, i, 1.

7. Śaṅkara’s commentary on *TU*, II, ii, 1.

his son a formula and asked him to find out *Brahman* for himself. "That from which", he said, "these beings are born, that by which, being born, these beings live, and that they enter into at the end, know that; that is *Brahman*".⁸ Applying this formula, Bhṛgu found out that *anna*, *prāṇa*, *manas*, and *viññāna* could not satisfy the definition. He slowly penetrated deeper and deeper till he learnt the innermost *Ānanda* to be *Brahman*. The *Ātman* is not the physical body made of food; it is not the psychical self with its volitional, emotional, and cognitional activities; it is not even the bliss of sleep which is a product of ignorance. The *Ātman* is beyond the five sheaths, the modes of *māyā*.

3

The Five Sheaths

We have already said that the third chapter of the *Pañcadaśī* is an elucidation of the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* where the *Ātman* is described as hidden in the cavity of the five sheaths. The grossest of the sheaths is the *annamaya*, the physical body made of food; *prāṇamaya* is the sheath of the vital airs, and it is the energizer of the body; *manomaya* is the sheath of the mind; subtler than that is the *viññānamaya*, the sheath of the intellect with the power of cognition; and the subtlest of all is the *ānandamaya*, the sheath of enjoyment enveloped in ignorance. These five sheaths lie one within the other in a serial order; and that which is within takes on the form of that which is without, like mercury that is poured into a crucible. The *annamaya* sheath is born of the food assimilated by the parents, and it is sustained by food alone. This physical sheath is not the *Ātman*, for it comes into being at one moment and goes out of existence at another. That which is born is bound to perish, and that which perishes cannot be real. If the physical body is con-

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sidered to be the *Ātman*, then this body was not existent in the previous life. Yet in this life we reap the results of our past *karma*. The agent is denied, but still we observe the fruit of his actions. This would involve us in the fallacy known as *akṛtābhyāgama*, the influx of the unacquired. This body will not continue to exist in the next life. If the body were identical with the *Ātman*, there would be none to enjoy, in the life to come, the effects of the deeds done in the present life, since this body will be non-existent then. There occurs the defect of *kṛtanāśa* or the destruction of the acquired. The sheath of food is a modification of *māyā*. It cannot be the *Ātman* which is the supreme Intelligence. The *prāṇamayakośa* is the vitalizer of the physical body. It gives strength to it, impels the various senses to their respective functions. Even this sheath of *prāṇa* cannot be the *Ātman*, for it is inert, devoid of intelligence. The self is not a biological phenomenon. It is not an incessant flow of force, an unceasing stream of activity. It is absurd to speak of the self as pure duration or as the vital impulse. The *Ātman* is not an empirical category like that of the biologists. It is very often said that the self is the mind, the Idea. The mental sheath is that which identifies itself with the body and considers itself to be possessing a house, children, etc. The mind is subject to changing passions and passing moods; and so it cannot be the self. That which is a victim of modifications cannot be the changeless *Ātman*. Change implies imperfection, an inherent want. The *Ātman* is immutable and perfect. It is not the mind. It is not the finite monad of Leibniz or of James Ward. The *manas* is the *icchāśakti* or the power of desire. In the *Ātman* there can be no desire for it is *pūrṇakāma*, the fulfilment of all desires. The intellect which is a reflection of the supreme Intelligence remains dormant in sleep, and, on awakening, it fills the body upto the finger-tips. It is the doer of all deeds, possessing the power of cognition. It is the *viññānamayakośa* and not the *Ātman*. The intellect does not function in abnormal minds or during sleep. It is a victim to the vicissitudes of

time, and hence it cannot be the super-temporal. While enjoying the fruits of good deeds there is a certain mode of the mind turned inward which is a reflection of *Ānanda*. When that enjoyment ends, it rests in the form of sleep. This mode of the mind is termed *ānāndamaya*, the sheath of enjoyment. It is not the Self, for it exists only at certain times. Interpreting '*maya*' as '*prācurya*' (fulness), the theistic interpreters of the Vedānta and even the Vṛttikāra who preceded Śaṅkara identify the *ānāndamaya ātman* with the supreme Self. *Ānāndamaya* is 'fulness of felicity', and this, according to them, can only be the highest Self. But this way of interpreting the *Taittirīya* text does not suit the context. As Śaṅkara observes in his commentary, *ānāndamaya ātman* is an effect and not the unconditioned *Ātman*.⁹ *Ānanda*, bliss, is the fruit of knowledge and *karma*. *Ānāndamaya* is that which is made of that bliss. But this *ānanda* is not the Supreme Bliss which is *Ātman*. It is only an effect of *karma* and knowledge. The *ānāndamaya* is within the sheath made of knowledge. The termination '*mayaḥ*' is here used in the sense of modification or change, as in the case of *annamaya*, etc. Further, the Upaniṣad states that the *ānāndamaya* is 'reached' (*saṅkramaṇa*). Reaching is possible only of the things which are not *Ātman* and which are effects by nature. The word '*ānāndamaya*' occurs in a context where the other sheaths are described. *Annamaya* is a modification of food; and so *ānāndamaya* must also be a modification of *Ānanda*. It cannot itself be *Ānanda*. Further, scripture attributes head, hands, trunk, and so on, to the *ānāndamaya-Brahman*. But *Brahman* itself which is the uncaused cause of all things cannot have limbs. It is also said that *Brahman* is the supporting tail of this sheath; that which needs a support cannot itself be the prop of all things. Hence *ānāndamaya* cannot be the unconditioned *Ātman*. It is only the reflection of the Bliss which is *Ātman*. The original which is reflected is the supreme Self of the nature of Bliss.

The Self

The Universal Self is defined in the *Taittirīya* text as *satyam*, *jñānam*, and *anantam*, existence, knowledge, and infinitude. That Bliss which is reflected in the *ānandamaya* is the *Ātman*, since it is eternal and everlasting. That, whose nature, by which it is cognized, does not change, is *satyam* (truth). That, whose nature, by which it is determined, changes, is *anṛtam* or false. The bliss which is the *Ātman* is eternal, and hence it is *satyam*.

The five sheaths have been characterized as *anātman* (not-self). The *annamaya* is not the *Ātman*, because it is a modification of food. It has only a modal existence. The *prāṇamaya* is not the Self, since it is unintelligent and inert. It is blind force, a mere strife and striving. The *manomaya* is not the *Ātman*, for it is also a mode. It undergoes ceaseless change. The *vijñānamaya* is not the Self, because it ceases to function in sleep and other abnormal states. And the bliss of sleep cannot be the *Ātman*, since it is not permanent. Thus it is clear that the sheaths cannot be the Self. But the sheaths are experienced, while the *Ātman* is not experienced. How, then, can something which is not experienced be posited to exist? True, the *ānandamaya* and all other sheaths are experienced and nothing else is so experienced; but there must be something which, though itself being unexperienced, makes all other experience possible. And that is the *Ātman*. If it is an object of experience, then, there must be something else to experience it, and so on *ad infinitum*. So the *Ātman* cannot be an object of experience. It is the substratum of all experience. Because it is itself experience, it is not a fact of experience; and because there is nothing apart from it to know it, it is not an object of knowledge. "Where there is duality, there one perceives another, one smells another, one tastes another, one contacts another, knows another; but where all this is *Ātman*, who is there to

think, touch, and know whom? Who can know him by whom all this is known?... Who can know the knower?"¹⁰ Because the *Ātman* is not an object of experience, it is not non-existent. It is not a non-object of experience like the horns of a hare or the son of a barren woman. Nor is it like a pot which is not an object of experience when it is hidden by non-cognition. It is self-resplendent experience, and hence it is not an experienced object. The substances like sugar which transmit their qualities to others have no desire to enjoy those qualities themselves. Nor is there any other substance which can impart to them those traits. The Self is itself experience; it needs no other experiencer for its existence. It is self-luminous, and hence it requires no other external source of illumination. Even prior to all these worlds, it shines. It is after its effulgence that all shine. The world is made luminous by its light. "Here in this dream state this self is self-luminous."¹¹ "It shines prior to all this objective universe."¹² "When he shines, everything shines after him; by his light all this is lighted."¹³ These texts of scripture declare the self-luminosity of the *Ātman*. Yājñavalkya says to Maitreyī: "Who can cognize that by which everything is cognized; by whom can the knower be known?"¹⁴ The mind which is the instrument of knowledge, can grasp only external objects. It cannot know the knower even as the chisel cannot understand the carpenter. The *Ātman* can be known "neither by speech nor by the mind".¹⁵ "It cognizes the objects; and there is none else who cognizes it."¹⁶ The real which is of the nature of Intelligence is different from the known and the

10. *BU*, IV, v, 15.

11. *BU*, IV, iii, 9.

12. *NUTU*, 2.

13. *KAU*, v, 15.

14. *BU*, IV, v, 15.

15. *KAU*, vi, 12.

16. *SU*, iii, 19.

unknown. It is neither the manifest world of name and form which is presented to the senses ; nor is it the unmanifest *māyā*, unrevealed to sense-perception. It is neither the modes of *māyā* nor *māyā* itself. The experience of self-consciousness is an undeniable fact. Even to deny, there must be the one who denies. Doubt implies a doubter. Just as the words ‘Have I a tongue or not?’ are a source of ridicule, even so is the statement: ‘the *caitanya* is not known by me; it is to be known’. When all the objects of the world of which there is knowledge are discarded, the pure consciousness which remains uncontradicted is *Brahman*. The witness, *jñāna*, is realized in its self-nature, after the relinquishment of the five sheaths.

To say that only *śūnya* remains when the sheaths are discarded is impossible. Self-existence cannot become a matter of controversy. Nobody doubts his own existence. Descartes who began doubting everything could not doubt his own existence. ‘*Cogito ergo sum*’ is the first postulate of his philosophy. The dictum is not at the fag end of a syllogistic process. “Self-knowledge is far too primitive and simple to admit of an *ergo*. If the ‘I am’ depends on an ‘I think’, the ‘I think’ must also depend on another *ergo*, and so on, and it will land us in infinite regress.” “The man who calls this syllogism”, says Hegel, “must know little more about a syllogism, save that the word ‘*ergo*’ occurs in it. Where shall we look for the middle term? It was as a self-evident or immediate truth that the *cogito ergo sum*, the maxim on which the whole history of modern philosophy was built, was stated by its author.” “It is not an inference, but the expression of a unique fact. In self-consciousness, thought and existence are indissolubly united.” As for our existence, says Locke, we perceive it so plainly and so certainly that it neither needs nor is capable of proof. In Kant, the transcendental unity of apperception is the central postulate. “All knowledge and logic start with this first principle of self-certainty.” Self-knowledge is insepa-

rable from self-existence. Śaṅkara says that Self-knowledge which is neither logical nor sensory is the pre-supposition of every other kind of cognition. It is beyond proof, since it is the basis of all proof. If a person asserts that *Brahman* is unreal, then he is predicating his own unreality ; for he is no other than *Brahman*. The Self is indescribable. It is not an object of sense. It cannot be known through logical reasoning. Though it is not cognized, it is intimately intuited. Spinoza describes intuitive knowledge or *scientia intuitiva* as consisting not in 'being coincided by reasons but in an immediate union with the thing itself'. Pascal makes a distinction between two ways of thinking, the mathematical (*l'esprit geometrique*) and the finer, nobler way (*esprit de finesse*). It is only the latter kind of knowledge that can take us to the ultimate truth. Truth is lived and not known. Intuition is integral knowing, synthetic insight. It is neither immediate sensation nor mediated thought. It is the highest kind of experience, the experience of Self. Because the *Ātman*, without being an object of senses, is immediately intuited, it is self-luminous and self-revealing.

We have already said that the *Ātman* is defined by scripture as *satyam*, *jñānam*, and *anantam*. The Self is real, intelligent, and infinite. These adjuncts are intended to define and not to qualify the *Ātman*. A qualification serves to distinguish the qualified from all others of the same species ; a definition, on the other hand, serves to distinguish the defined from the whole world. The Self is real, since it is the substratum of all changes. Being is reality ; becoming is unreal. This may be construed as tantamount to saying that *Brahman* is the cause, and hence also inert like clay. To meet this objection scripture declares that the *Ātman* is knowledge, pure consciousness. The word '*jñānam*' means knowledge and not 'having knowledge' ; for it is an adjunct of the word '*Ātman*'. The Buddhists also admit that the real is consciousness, but their conception of intelligence is that it is momentary and moving. The *kṣaṇikavijñānavāda*

holds that *viññāna* or consciousness is perpetual movement, ceaseless change. But the *Ātman* cannot be reduced to change and movement. It cannot be a flux. So scripture adds that the Self is not only reality and consciousness, but also infinity, *anantam*.

That is real which cannot be sublated. Non-contradiction is the mark of reality, as contradiction is the sign of unreality. Bradley says: "Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion.... Our standard denies inconsistency, and therefore asserts consistency. If we can be sure that the inconsistent is unreal, we must logically be just as sure that the reality is consistent. Reality is known to possess character, but this character is at present determined only as that which excludes contradiction."¹⁷ In sleep and *samādhi*, the gross and the subtle universes are negated; but the Self remains as the witness of this negation. There is no state or moment in which the Self ceases to be the witness. It is nowhere contradicted; hence it is the real. When the various objects are removed from a room, the formless ether remains. Even so, that which remains when all things are negated is the Self. If it is said that nothing is left when everything is contradicted, there must be at least that consciousness which knows that nothing remains. It is this consciousness that is termed in the Vedānta as the *Ātman*. Call it *śūnya* or *sākṣī*, the Self confronts us as the most stubborn fact. There can be a difference, only in the words which are uttered to define the Absolute. All attempts to define it are bound to be futile. It is on account of the inherent contradiction of finite words, that scripture, instead of describing what the *Ātman* is, proclaims what it is not. This method is sometimes spoken of as being defective and barren. Oldenberg in his work on the *Upaniṣads* makes a distinction between the Upaniṣadic philosophy and the Kantian metaphysics and

suggests as parallels to the former the teaching of Plotinus, the Sufis and the Christian mystics like Eckhart. But he forgets that the “cognoscendo ignorari” of Augustine, the “Neti, Neti” of Yājñavalkya, the “weder dies noch das” of Eckhart, are “far more sure indexes of spiritual humility, and consequent possession of reality, than the self-satisfied and half-halting dictates of an Agnosticism on the grounds of Pure Reason, which must destroy knowledge in order to make room for faith”.¹⁸ The method of negation is not really one of bare negation without significance. All that can be characterized as being of ‘this’ nature, can be relinquished as unreal. The *Ātman* cannot be particularized. It can be described only as being ‘not this’. Thus we have seen that the Self is reality and pure consciousness.

Infinity is threefold: infinity in space, in time, and in substance. *Ākāśa* is a spatial infinity, but it is limited by time and other substances. The Self transcends time, and it is not limited by any other thing. Because it is all-pervasive, it is not conditioned by space. Because of its eternal nature, it is not crushed by time. Since it is not different from anything else, it is not limited by other substances. It is eternal, all-pervasive, the substratum of all things, the subtlest of the subtle. “Like ether it penetrates all, and it is eternal.” “It is the eternal of all eternals, the supreme spirit of all sentient beings.”¹⁹ “All this is indeed *Brahman*; *Brahman* is all this.”²⁰ Space, time, and other objects are unreal modifications of *māyā*, and there can be no limitation caused to *Brahman* by them.

18. R. D. Ranade, *Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy* (Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1926), Preface, p. 9.

19. *KAU*, v, 13; *SU*, vi, 13.

20. *MAU*, 2.

The Self is Brahman

The *Ātman* is identical with *Brahman*. "That *Ātman*, the real, is *Brahman* itself; *Brahman* is the *Ātman*. There is nothing to be doubted here. The *praṇava*, the real, is *Ātman* alone. The *Ātman* which is *Nṛsiṃha* is *Brahman*."²¹ The *Ātman* is called *Nṛsiṃha* by scripture, because it is the destroyer of the bonds of the humans who are crippled by transmigratory life. The Self is *Brahman*.

The universal and unitary Self appears to be split up as *Īśvara* and the *jīvas*. But in reality the *Īśvaratva* and the *jīvatva* are unreal superimpositions of the adjuncts, viz., *māyā* and the five sheaths. The sheaths were shown to be modifications of *māyā*. The *māyāśakti* belongs to *Īśvara*. It produces the world, regulates and governs it. Because of the reflection of Intelligence in it, it seems to possess consciousness. It appears to be alive and animating. *Brahman* seems to attain *Īśvaratva*, because of its apparent association with this *śakti*. When the five sheaths are superimposed on the Self, it becomes the *jīva*, the empirical self. But the principle, which appears as *Īśvara* when it is in association with *māyā* and as the *jīva* due to the superimposition of the sheaths, is the same *Brahman*. This is comparable to a person becoming father to one and grandfather to another. Apart from the son and the grandson, that person is neither the father nor the grandsire. When we discard *māyā* and its effects and perceive their non-reality, *Brahman* is realized to be pure and infinite.

One who knows *Brahman* thus becomes *Brahman*. "The knower of *Brahman* reaches the highest."²² Reaching *Brahman* is realizing it to be oneself. "He who knows for

21. *NUTU*, 9.

22. *TU*, II, i, 1.

certain the supreme *Brahman* realizes that he is himself *Brahman*.”²³ The Self is not born, nor does it perish. And since the knower of *Brahman* is identical with it, he escapes the shackles of birth and death. Never does he return to this empirical existence.

23. *MU*, III, ii, 9.

CHAPTER FOUR
INQUIRY INTO THE WORLD OF DUALITY
(DVAITA-VIVEKA-PRAKARAṆA)

The fourth Chapter is devoted to a discriminative knowledge of the world of dualities which is a creation of *Īśvara* and the *jīva*. When the world is known to be a non-real superimposition, then the bonds of the *jīva* will break. The fetters of the *jīva* are forged by ignorance, and to remove ignorance, the cause of misery, we need the light of wisdom.

1

Māyā, the Creatrix of the World

It cannot be said, as some Mīmāṃsakas assert, that the *jīvas* themselves are the authors of the world through the latent potency called *adrṣṭa*. This view of the Mīmāṃsakas, contradicts the authority of the scriptures. The *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad* of the Black *Yajur-veda* asks us to understand *māyā* as the primal nature or material cause of the world, and the wielder of that *māyā*, namely, *Brahman*, as the Supreme Lord who creates the world. The *Aitareya Upaniṣad* of the *Ṛg-veda* says that prior to creation there was the *Ātman* alone. It thought 'Let me procreate', and through its desire all these worlds came forth. In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, the order of creation is traced to the *Ātman*. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* of the *Sāma-veda* proclaims: "In the beginning the *sat* alone existed, one only without a second. It desired 'Let me become many', and it created the elements and their effects." In describing the process of world-creation, the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* of the *Atharva-veda* employs the analogy of the sparks issuing forth from fire. As from fire sparks are born, so from the *Akṣara* (the Imperishable) are created the manifold existents, both inert and intelligent. Fire that is

not fed by fuel is not conditioned by limitations ; and it does not give rise to sparks. The self that is not limited by the adjuncts, *māyā* and nescience, is impartite intelligence. It is not productive of the dualities of the world. But the specific nature of the intelligence as conditioned by *māyā* and *avidyā* creates the world. We hear from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* of the White *Yajur-veda* that this world of names and forms has its roots in *Brahman* which is the expressed sense of the word '*avyākṛta*'. Prior to creation, the world was unmanifest and there was only *Brahman*. All the percepts of our present experience are posterior to creation. They are manifest in the forms of *Virāṭ* and other objects. All these beings—sub-human, human, and superhuman—came from the *avyākṛta* which alone existed prior to their production. These scriptural texts declare that *Brahman* entered into these dual throngs in the form of the *jīva*. The immutable self became as it were the subject of modifications. The Scriptures speak of the self's entrance only in a figurative sense. The proprietary rights which it seems to exercise over the perishing body and mind are born of ignorance. The imperishable comes to be talked of in empirical usage as the finite *jīva*. And it is called the *jīva* because it is the sustainer of life. The intelligence which is the fundamental substrate, the subtle body, and the reflection of intelligence in it constitute what is known as the *jīva*. Just as the pot-ether, the pot with water, and the reflection of the cosmic ether in it constitute the content of the pot, so also the *jīva* is a complex of the substrate intelligence, the internal organ (*aṇṭahkaraṇa*) its limiting adjunct, and the reflection of intelligence obtained in it.

Māyā which is the power of the Lord has, besides the potency of creating the world, the power to delude the *jīva*. It is due to this delusion that the *jīva* imagines itself to be finite and particular. It forgets its infinity and blissful nature. Identifying itself with the psycho-physical organism, it becomes the experient of the sweets and bitters of life.

The Lord is the creator of this world of sentient and insentient beings.

2

World created by Jīva

The world created by the *jīva* is expounded in the *Saptānnabrāhmaṇa* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. It is stated there that through knowledge and action the *jīva* brought forth the seven ingredients of enjoyment. Those seven are : rice, etc., which form the food for men, *darśa* and *pūrṇamāsa* which belong to the *devas*, milk, the food for animals, mind, speech, and *prāṇa* of the *jīva*. These seven ingredients are no doubt created by the Lord ; for they form a part of the world of which *Īśvara* is the originator, sustainer, and destroyer. Though they owe their existence to the Lord, the character of their enjoyability is due to the *jīva*. *Īśvara* is the ground of their existence ; the *jīva* is the subject of their experience. The world of the seven ingredients is the offspring of *Īśvara*, and the object of enjoyment for the *jīva*. This is comparable to a damsel being the daughter of her father and the wife of her husband. The desire of the Lord in the form of the function of *māyā* is instrumental in the production of the world ; the desire of the *jīva* in the form of a mental mode is the instrument to enjoy the world. It cannot be asserted that the enjoyability of an object is inherent in its existence, and that therefore the agency of the *jīva* is not intelligible. Though a ruby is a single object, it arouses in its experients different feelings and different emotions. These differences in experiencing the same object are due to the different modes of the mind. One person, obtaining the ruby, is overjoyed ; another, not obtaining it, gets angry ; a third who is a saint is unaffected by these changing passions. If the experiential quality is inherent in the existence of the ruby, then it must evoke in everyone the same kind of response, which it does not. Hence, it is the *jīva* that has the agency in respect of the experiential quality

of the object. One and the same woman takes on different roles with regard to different persons. She is daughter to her father, wife to her husband, sister to her sisters and brothers, and so on. It cannot be said that the knowledge of the woman varies, and not the woman herself; for a variance in knowledge is dependent on a difference in the known. There are two women here, one made of flesh, etc., and the other constituted by mind. The visible woman of flesh and blood is the creation of the Lord. But the psychical woman is a projection of the *jīva*. Though there is no variation with regard to the physical person, the psychical woman differs in deference to the different individuals with whom she is related. It cannot be contended that there is no psychical self in waking consciousness where the physical universe alone is patent and that mental modifications are useful in abnormal experiences like delusions, dreams, and day-dreams. In waking life there is the physical object. But it is through the mind that the object is cognized. What actually happens in the cognition of an object is this: The mind goes out to the object through the channels of the senses and takes on the form of the object. In the words of Śaṅkara: Just as the molten metal that is poured into the mould takes on the shape of the latter, the mind that pervades (or grasps) an object with form assumes the form of that object. Or, even as the light of the sun takes on the shape of the object which it illumines, the intellect that manifests all objects assumes the form of the object which it reveals. The Vārttikakāra observes thus: From the knower arises the instrument of knowledge. On reaching the object to be known the *pramāṇa* assumes the generic form of the object. Now, we have two forms for every object of cognition—the psychical and the physical. If the object of knowledge be the pot, then we have the mud-pot and the mind-pot. The mud-pot is perceived by the modification of mind, whereas the mind-pot is cognized by the witness. The mud-pot is a creation of the Lord; the mind-pot is a manufacture of the *jīva*.

3

Causality of the World: Different Views

Differences prevail regarding the doctrine of the causality of the world even among the upholders of Advaita. All the Advaitins are agreed in maintaining that the material causality of *Brahman* consists neither in origination nor in transformation, but only in illusory manifestation. Yet, as to what aspect of *Brahman* gives rise to this illusory world, the Advaitins have different answers to give. Some followers of the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* say that the pure *Brahman* alone is the material cause of the world. The author of the *Vivaraṇa* holds that the material cause is only that aspect of *Brahman* which is *Īśvara* as qualified by omniscience, etc., and associated with *māyā*. There are some who assert that the *jīva* alone is the material cause. *Īśvara*, the subjective world and the objective universe are all the objects of its creation. To some Vedāntins, *Brahman* is the material cause of the entire empirical world, but the *jīva* is the cause of the fictitious world of dreams. Some who maintain the identity of *māyā* and *avidyā* propound the theory that God is the material cause of the objective world, and the *jīva* of the subtle subjective world. Others who hold that *māyā* and *avidyā* are not identical say that the Lord is the cause of the macrocosmic objective world, while the *jīva* is the cause of the microcosmic subjective world (mind, etc.). 'Since the universe of ether, etc., is a transformation of *māyā* located in the Lord, in respect of that, the Lord is the material cause. Since, however, the internal organ, etc., are products of the subtle elements produced by the *jīva*'s nescience in conjunction with the gross elements which are the evolutes of the *māyā* located in the Lord, in respect of them there is material causality, of both the *jīva* and the Lord.'

Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya seems to uphold the last mentioned view. According to him, *Īśvara* and the *jīva* are the joint creators of the world. But there is this difference :

while *Īśvara* is the principal author, the *jīva* is only a subsidiary parent. In respect of the existence of the world, *Īśvara* is the ground ; whereas in respect of the enjoyment, the *jīva* is the locus. And the nature of the creation of the *jīva* is psychical rather than physical.

4

Jīva's Bondage

The *jīva* is bound by its own offspring. It forges its own fetters. The object of its enjoyment which is psychical in nature throws it into transmigratory existence. Through co-presence and co-absence it can be shown that bondage is dependent on the mental manufacture of the *jīva*. The polarities of life like gaiety and grief stand or fall with the created world of the *jīva*. These polarities which constitute the bonds of the *jīva* do not depend on the external world created by the Lord. Though there are no external objects in dreams, the dreaming subject is bound ; and though the external objects exist during the states of *samādhi*, swoon, and sleep, they do not bind the subject of these states. Hence the principle of co-presence and co-absence is not applicable to grief and gaiety in relation to the world created by the Lord. The polarities of empirical existence are but creations of the mind. A father, being falsely informed that his son in a far-off land is dead, weeps. Even though the death of the son be a fact, so long as the news does not reach the father, he does not grieve. Elation and depression are dependent on the mind. They do not really rest on external facts. It is the mental world created by the *jīva* that binds it. It is the mind that maketh a hell of heaven and a heaven of hell.

If the mental world alone is the cause of bondage and if bondage be not dependent on the external world, then of what use is the external world ? The *jīva* has to do with its own world of mind. It is revolving as it were in a circular

panorama from which it cannot get out. What the *jīva* is conscious of is only its mind and the modifications thereof. Is this not subjectivism akin to that of the Buddhist *viññāna-vādin*? Is not Advaita, then, Buddhism in disguise and its author a crypto-Buddhist? These fears are not well-founded. Advaita is not subjectivism. Though the immediate sense of bondage is the mental world, the cause of the world of mind is the external world. So far as the empirical level of existence is concerned, the Advaitin is a realist in the sense that he posits the existence of the external or extra-mental world as the source and substance of the world of mind. In fact, even mind, according to the Advaitin, is material, a superfine and subtle product of the five elements.

Even accepting the argument of the opponent that the existence of external objects is futile, the Advaitin can defend his position against the charge of subjectivism. To say that the external objects are useless is not equivalent to the negation of their existence. The criterion of reality is not pragmatic. Utility is not the test of truth. It is a well-known fact that the avenues of cognition do not have usefulness as their end. While the subjectivists deny the external objects altogether, the Advaitin accepts their relative existence although he may or may not agree to the statement that they are futile.

5

Knowledge: the Means to Release

Now, it has been said that bondage is born of the mind. If the fetters be mere creations of the mind, then may not the control of mind as laid down by the Yoga system bring about release? Why then should *Brahman*-knowledge be declared to be the means to liberation? The Advaitin replies that the Yogic control of mind cannot yield lasting release. The tail of the dog looks straight so long as it is held straight. But as soon as it is let off it assumes its natural

curl. The attempt to achieve release through the method of Yoga is analogous to the above example. Final liberation is not the fruit of mind-control. It can be achieved only by *Brahman*-knowledge. The essence of the Vedāntic teaching is that the cognition of *Brahman* is the only direct means to the realization of ultimate release. The *Upaniṣads* declare: "Knowing the divine, he is released from all bonds; knowing the blissful, he reaches perfect peace".¹ To free oneself from pain without the cognition of *Brahman* is as difficult as to roll the sky as a sheet of skin. It is possible for the followers of Advaita to know the non-dual *Brahman* by realizing the non-reality of the world created by the Lord, although the dualities of that world be not destroyed. As the rays of the sun are not different from the sun itself, as the appearance of the snake in the place of the rope has no other substrate than the rope, the world created by the Lord has no other ground than *Brahman*. Like the snake, it is an appearance and is not real. Knowing in this manner the apparent nature of the world, the Advaitin realizes the Absolute. The presence or the absence of the world does not affect the knowledge of *Brahman* or the absence thereof. It is not the existence of the world that is the cause of ignorance and misery so much as the belief that it is real. If the non-manifestation of the world be the cause of *Brahman*-knowledge, then all beings at the *pralaya* and individuals during sleep must be realizing the bliss of *Brahman*. But they do not get rid of nescience and become blessed with the vision of the Absolute, because they do not possess the light of the wisdom got from the preceptor and from the sacred lore. Further, it is improper to be cross with the world created by the Lord, for instead of being an obstacle to the realization of the truth, it is an aid to it. Just as the existence of the pot does in no way affect the knowledge of its clayishness, so also the world manifested by the Lord does

1. *SU*, i, 8.

not stand in the way of realizing that it has no reality apart from *Brahman*. On the contrary, the preceptor and the scripture who form a part of the created universe are valuable aids to the perception of the Truth.

6

Twofoldness of Duality created by Jīva

The duality created by the *jīva* are two-fold—those that are prescribed by scripture and those that are prohibited by it. Those that are enjoined by scripture ought not to be relinquished till the onset of wisdom. The enquiry into the nature of *Brahman* which is identical with the self is the mental world that is enjoined by scripture. Study, contemplation and rational consideration of the implications of scripture are mental operations, and as such they are the creation of the *jīva*. They are to be given up when the real is known, but not till then. If it be said that enquiry is to be conducted for all time on the basis of the statement of the *śruti* which says that ‘time should be spent in Vedāntic enquiry till sleep and till death’, the Advaitin replies that this passage of scripture is intended to prohibit thoughts about desire, etc., and not to enjoin the study, etc., of scripture by one who has realized the self. This is evident from the prior half of the *śruti* passage which declares that no room should be given to desire, etc., which are contrary to the bliss of release-in-life. There are scriptural texts which proclaim that even the *śāstras* must be relinquished after the intuition of *Brahman*. “The wise one, after studying the scriptures and pondering often over their meaning, and realizing the supreme Self, ought to relinquish them, as one would leave off a burnt-up fire-brand.” “The learned one, after gaining a good training in the scriptural studies and realizing the Truth by mediate cognition and intuitive knowledge, should leave off all the sacred lore, even as the one who gathers grains would discard the cumbersome straw.” “The hero who longs to realize the Self should intuit *Brahman*

and remain firm therein. He should not give room for the activity of the mind by ruminating over the meaning of sounds." "Realize only the one Reality; and leave all other words, both scriptural and non-scriptural. The knower must make his speech dissolve in the mind." All these Upaniṣadic texts declare that even the world enjoined by scripture ought to be given up when the Absolute is intuited.

The non-scriptural duality is of two kinds—dull and intense. Desire, anger, etc., come under the former category, while day-dreams fall under the latter. Both these kinds ought to be discarded even prior to the dawn of knowledge; for we hear from *śruti* that calmness (*śama*) and equanimity (*samādhāna*) form part of the qualifications which are to be acquired before the cognition of *Brahman* could be had. And after the attainment of *Brahman*-knowledge also the two categories of non-scriptural duality are to be shunned in order to achieve liberation-in-life; for to a person who is bound by desire and the like there cannot be the joy of freedom.

If it be said that the supreme goal of man is the escape from the throes of birth and death which can be achieved only by a release at the time of the destruction of the body, and if the utility of liberation-in-life be questioned, the Advaitin retorts: 'If you deny liberation-in-life for fear of leaving the enjoyments of this world, then be satisfied with the happiness of heaven, at the end of this earthly life. And the final release must also be shunned by you, since it will deny you heavenly pleasures'. But it may be urged that the pleasures of heaven are not eternal and so they are not to be striven after. Then, even desire and other sources of misery which form the basis of worldly enjoyment and consequent pain are to be relinquished, because they are contrary to the supreme end of life.

It may be thought that there is nothing wrong if an aspirant in the path of *jñāna* does not leave off harmless

desires which are instrumental to the enjoyment of his *prārabdha*, and that if he has freed himself from positively harmful wishes he can enjoy the objects of this world. But this is not a correct line of reasoning. A *jñānī* is he who has transcended the path of works; and he cannot be free from works if he has not discarded all his desires. Desire is the seed of deeds. And it is by destroying the seed that the offshoot can be totally made to perish. If a person has not renounced all desires even after knowing the truth, then he will land himself in a life of chaos fraught with the danger of degradation and death. He would descend to the animal level, living a life of instincts and impulses. If the *jñānī* were to be led by the lure of his instincts, then, as Sureśvara says, there would be no distinction between him and the dog which lives upon filth. Prior to knowledge he had to experience only his mental worries, but now after acquiring knowledge if he has not renounced his desires, he has to put up with the chidings of the people. The truth is that there can be no knowledge unless even the trace of desire vanishes. The seeker of Truth must renounce all worldly desires; and then he will be adored by all.

The way to renounce desire is to refrain from longing for the worldly objects. If the object of desire be recognized as perishable and as a source of pain, there will be no desire for it. The external objects can lure us only so long as we run after them in the hope of getting happiness. But when on enquiry we find that they are not the real source of happiness, all their charm will fade and we shall cease to pursue them.

The mental functions like desire are to be renounced because they are productive of pain; but why should harmless occupations of the mind such as day-dreams and idle musings be prohibited? It is true that the latter kind of mental operations is not directly the source of misery; but it is, nevertheless, the root of pain since it is the cause of desire and other defects. Śrī Kṛṣṇa says in the *Gītā*:

“Attachment to objects is formed in a man who constantly thinks of them. From attachment springs longing, and from longing anger grows”.²

7

Stillness of Mind

It is possible to still the idle musings of the mind by *nirvikalpa-samādhi*, and the latter is easy of accomplishment through *savikalpa-samādhi*. This is the *yoga* method of quieting the mind. The other method of mental conquest, namely, the prolonged uttering of the *praṇava*, is adopted by those who live in solitude, who are rid of the defects of the internal organ such as desire and who have known the truth. When by these methods the tendencies of the mind are conquered, there will reign the stillness of silence, the joy of peace. Sage Vasiṣṭha described this state of supreme felicity to Rāma thus: “By the knowledge that there is no external object to be cognized, if the mind be emptied of all modes, then there is attained the highest freedom and unsurpassable bliss”. “The scriptures have been sufficiently studied; and their implications have been understood by people through discussions and instructions. But the highest abode is not reached except through the state of serenity which is without even a trace of mental tendencies.”

There may arise, sometimes due to *prārabdha* even in the mind which has been rendered quiet, tendencies to modification. But these get curbed by themselves, since there is the force of prior practice and spiritual perfection. The person who has conquered the projecting tendencies of the mind and who has intuited the Self, is declared to be identical with *Brahman* by those who know the truth. As sage Vasiṣṭha puts it: “He who has realized his inner nature to

be pure intelligence, leaving off both knowledge and non-knowledge, is himself *Brahman*, and not a knower of *Brahman*. This supreme state of liberation in life is attained by excluding the mental fabrication of the *jīva* which is the source of pain. In this manner the present chapter has achieved its purpose by discriminating the world created by the *jīva* from that manifested by the Lord, and by declaring that the former alone binds the *jīva* and screens his vision from the ultimate truth.

CHAPTER FIVE
INQUIRY INTO THE MAJOR TEXTS
(MAHĀVĀKYA-VIVEKA-PRAKARAṆA)

1

Identity of Self and Brahman

The *Mahāvākyaviveka* is an exposition of the purport of the four *mahāvākyas* (major texts) which constitute the quintessence of the Upaniṣadic teaching. According to Advaita, the principal doctrine of the Upaniṣads is that of the identity between the self and *Brahman*; and this doctrine is enshrined in the heart of each of the four Vedas. If the Vedas be compared to a tree and the Upaniṣads to its fruit, then the *mahāvākyas* can be characterized as the juice of the fruit. It is through the "hearing" of the purport of the *mahāvākyas* that *Brahman*-knowledge can be gained. The *avāntaravākyas* or intermediary texts give us knowledge of the *Saguṇa-Brahman* which is the cause or ground of the world. The *mahāvākyas*, on the other hand, reveal to us the *Nirguṇa-Brahman*, which is the same as the Self.

2

"Consciousness is Brahman"

The *mahāvākya* that forms the essence of the *Aitareya Upaniṣad* of the *Ṛg-veda* is 'prajñānam brahma,' 'Consciousness is Brahman'. Here the word 'prajñāna' indicates the consciousness which is conditioned by the internal organ. It is on the basis of that consciousness that the sense-organs function. It is by its power that the sense of sight perceives objects, the sense of hearing hears sounds, the sense of smell perceives odours, the sense of speech performs its function, and the sense of taste discriminates the palatable from the

unpalatable. It is the immutable intelligence, *kūṭastha-caitanya*, which is at the back of all experience.

The word ‘*brahma*’ signifies the intelligence which is identical in all beings, the gods, men, animals, and others. “This *Brahmā*, this *Indra*, this *Prajāpati*, all these gods, these five great elements, earth, air, ether, water, fire, and all these small creatures, these others, the seeds of creation and these egg-born, womb-born, sweat-born, sprout-born, horses, cows, men, elephants, and whatever else which breathes and moves and flies and is immovable; all this is guided by intelligence and is supported by intelligence; the universe has intelligence for its guide; intelligence is the basis; intelligence is *Brahman*.”¹ It is declared by the *Upaniṣad* that the intelligence in all the beings is the same. This intelligence is the self. This intelligence is *Brahman*. And so, the self is *Brahman*.

3

“*I am Brahman*”

The *mahāvākya* of the *Yajurveda* which is found in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is ‘*aham brahmāsmi*’, ‘I am *Brahman*’.² The word ‘*aham*’ implies the self which is by nature infinite and all-pervasive, and which remains as the witnessing principle of the functions of the intellect in all beings such as men, and others. The meaning of the word ‘*brahma*’ is the same reality which is unconditioned by the empirical categories of space-time, etc.; and the verb ‘*asmi*’ indicates the relation of identity between the self and *Brahman*. The self within is the same as the self without.

1. *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, VI.

2. *BU*, I, iv, 10.

4

“ *That thou art* ”

‘ *Tat tvam asi* ’, ‘ *That thou art* ’, is the *mahāvākya* of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* of the *Sāma-veda*.³ This *Upaniṣad* declares that prior to creation there was only the *sat*, one only, without a second. But the creation of which the *Upaniṣad* speaks is neither an origination *de novo* nor an actual transformation. On the contrary, it is only an illusory manifestation. And so, on inquiry we find that the *sat* is even *now* the same as it was prior to creation. It is devoid of differences, is non-dual, and undivided. What is called modification is but a name. The self neither modifies, nor is it modified. It was, is, and will be the same *sat* without a second. The word ‘ *tat* ’ of the *mahāvākya* implies that *sat* which is the changeless Absolute.

The implied meaning of the word ‘ *tvam* ’ is the self which transcends the body, senses, and the mind of the one who hears the *mahāvākya*. The eligible person who ‘ *hears* ’ the *mahāvākya* realizes that the self is not the collection of body, sense-organs, mind, etc. The self is neither a physical entity nor a psychical phenomenon. It is the intelligence which transcends both body and mind.

The verb ‘ *asi* ’ puts the other two words in the relation of apposition and thereby indicates identity between them. The self which is illusorily seen to be conditioned by body, etc., and *Brahman* which is mistakenly thought to produce the universe, etc., are non-different.

5

“ *This Self is Brahman* ”

The *mahāvākya* of the *Atharva-veda* which is declared in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* is ‘ *ayam-ātmā brahma* ’, ‘ *this self is*

Brahman'. The word '*ayam*' describes the nature of the self to be self-luminous and immediately cognizable. The 'self' is the locus of the assemblage of factors beginning with egoity and ending with the body. It is the witness-intelligence, the inner ruler, immortal.

The word '*brahma*' indicates the reality which is the substrate of all things. What we see as the world is the work of *māyā*. In reality there is no other entity except *Brahman*. It is the sole and the whole reality. That *Brahman* is the self-luminous self.

6

Identity by Implication

All the *mahāvākyas* declare the same truth, namely, the oneness of *Brahman* and the self. Each of the sentences has two words, at the least, one of them signifying the individual self and the other the universal reality. The expressed meanings of the words do not convey the doctrine of identity. The individual self conditioned by the finite intellect and limited by ignorance cannot be the same as the omniscient and omnipresent *Īśvara*. But when we take the secondary implications of the words into consideration we realize that both the words in each of the *mahāvākyas* mean the same reality. When the self and *Īśvara* are stripped of their extraneous adjuncts, *avidyā* and *māyā*, they are realized to be identical. This is achieved by exclusive-non-exclusive secondary implication. When the qualities of the *jīva* like limited knowledge, etc., and those of *Īśvara* like omniscience, creatorship, etc., are recognized to be mere superimpositions, then both of them are realized to be identical. The self, in truth, is not different from *Brahman*.

CHAPTER SIX
ELUCIDATION IN THE LIGHT OF
PICTURE ANALOGY
(*CITRADĪPA-PRAKARAṆA*)

1

Analogy of Painting

Employing the analogy of a painted canvas, the *Citrādīpa* explains the natures of the *jīva*, *kūṭastha*, *Īśvara*, and *Brahman*. Just as there are four states of a painted canvas, four states are to be discerned of the supreme Self also. The canvas is first of all bleached, then stiffened with starch, sketched with lines, and finally painted over; even so the self has four stages: pure intelligence, *antaryāmin*, *sūtrātman*, and *virāṭ*. In the example, the canvas which is by nature white, is first bleached; then it is stiffened with starch, sketched with outlines, and filled in with paint. Even so, the self which is by nature intelligence, becomes *antaryāmin* when it is associated with *māyā*, *sūtrātman* when it creates the subtle universe, and *virāṭ* when it is the cause of the gross universe. And in the self all the created beings from *Brahmā*, the highest, down to a blade of grass are like the painted figures on the canvas. The intelligent beings are analogous to the painted human figures with painted clothing. The human figures drawn on the canvas appear to be many, each with a clothing which is a painting in a painting. Even so, the intelligent beings like gods and men who are super-imposed on the self appear to be manifold, each with a reflection of intelligence. They are not the immutable intelligence because they are subject to transmigration. They are but the shadows of the Self which is immutable and impartite. To speak of the self as transitory and transmigratory is out of ignorance. It is just like saying that the colour of the painted clothing is that

of the canvas itself. It was stated above that intelligent beings alone possess the reflection of intelligence. The non-intelligent does not manifest the self which is intelligence. The hills and dales painted on the canvas are indeed not endowed with clothing as the human figures are.

To think that the transmigratory state of existence is ultimately real is delusion. It is termed *avidyā* which can be removed by knowledge. Knowledge is the recognition that transmigration belongs to the *jīva*, who is but a reflection of the self and not to the *ātman* which is immutable and eternal; and this knowledge is obtained through inquiry. When the notions of *jīvahood* and the world are sublated through inquiry, the self alone remains as the unsublatable real. By the sublation of the notions of *jīvahood*, etc., their non-apprehension is not meant. What is intended is the determination of their falsity. Otherwise there is the contingency of release without effort in sleep and swoon. Even by the statement that "the self alone remains" what is meant is the determination that the self is real, and not the non-recognition of the world. Otherwise, liberation in life would never be possible.

Knowledge born of inquiry is two-fold—mediate and immediate. When immediate knowledge is obtained, there is an end to inquiry. To know that 'Brahman is' is mediate knowledge; and to know that 'I am Brahman' is immediate intuitive experience. Inquiry is the means to intuition. It is through inquiry into the nature of the self that an insight into the real can be gained.

2

Analogy of Ether

Intelligence (self) can be classified into the immutable (*kūṭastha*), *Brahman*, *jīva*, and the Lord (*Īśvara*). It is analogous to the classification of ether into pot-ether, ether at large, water-ether, and cloud-ether. The pot-ether is the

ether conditioned by the pot ; and the ether not so conditioned is called the ether at large. The reflection of the cloud-cast and starry sky in the water which is in the pot is referred to as the water-ether ; and the cloud-ether is the reflection of ether in the water-particles of the cloud-region. Though water is not directly seen in the clouds, it is inferred from the fact that clouds are the cause of rain ; and where there is water in the proximity of ether, there must be the reflection of the latter in the former.

Like the fourfold classification of ether, the four aspects of intelligence can easily be discerned. The intelligence which is defined by the two bodies, subtle and gross, is called *kūṭastha*, immutable, because while being the substrate of those bodies, it is immutable like the anvil. The reflection of intelligence in the intellect which is superimposed on the immutable is the *jīva*. The *jīva* is so called because it is the sustainer of the vital airs. It gets itself involved in misery and metempsychosis. It veils the immutable self even as the water-ether hides the entire ether of the pot. This is described in the scriptures by the term 'reciprocal superimposition'. The *jīva* is superimposed on the *kūṭastha* and *vice versa*. It does not distinguish itself from the *kūṭastha* ; and this indiscrimination is beginningless primal nescience.

Nescience is two-fold—that which projects, and that which obscures. The hiding-power of nescience is the cause of the statement "The *kūṭastha* is not manifest, it is non-existent". The non-intelligent person says that he does not know the immutable self. This is the experience of nescience. He also asserts that the self is not manifest, that it is non-existent. This is due to the veiling power of nescience.

An objection may here be raised. How is it possible that *avidyā* and the self-luminous self should exist together ? Surely, darkness and light cannot keep house together ! To say that the self-luminous intelligence is veiled by nescience is a contradiction in terms. The self and *avidyā* are contra-

dictories ; and one of the contradictories must be false. If *avidyā* be denied, then there would be no question of the existence of its veiling power and the projection of this world of woes. All these being denied, there would be no need for the light of wisdom and consequent release.

Doubts such as these are dispelled by the fact of experience. The logic of life is greater than the logic of thought. A thousand arguments cannot transform a pot into a cloth. We experience nescience ; and hence it cannot be denied. The self cannot be doubted, since it is the very being of him who doubts. When there is no faith in one's own experience, then there would be no ground even for logic. Logic must be grounded in life. Reason must have its basis in experience. To the one who disregards the evident facts of experience, logic would be of no avail. If logic is required for the sake of intelligibility and clarity of thought, then it must function in accordance with the data of experience. It cannot contradict them. Experience testifies to the fact of *avidyā* and its power to veil. And so, it must be argued that nescience is not the enemy of the self. If nescience be opposed to the self how, then, is it experienced ? The real opponent of nescience is discriminative knowledge. It is seen in the case of the enlightened knower that *avidyā* is dispelled by knowledge.

3

Kūṭastha and Cidābhāsa

Just as silver is superimposed on nacre, on the *kūṭastha* which is veiled by nescience there is the superimposition of the reflection of intelligence together with the two bodies. This is the work of the projective power of *avidyā*. The 'this'-element and existence which are inherent in nacre are observed in silver also ; the self-hood and reality which are inherent in the *kūṭastha* are seen in the case of projection too. But, as the dark exterior and triangularity are hidden

in the case of nacre by ignorance, even so in *kūṭastha* its nature as being unattached and blissful is veiled. As in the example, that which is superimposed goes by the name of silver, that which is imposed on the *kūṭastha* is known as 'I'. Just as on seeing the this-element of nacre, a person thinks that it is silver, perceiving himself, he thinks that he is 'I'.

It may be said that 'self' and 'I' convey the same meaning, while 'this' and 'silver' do not; and so the example does not hold good. But this objection is not sound. Just as 'this-ness' and 'silver-ness' are different, 'self-hood' (*svatva*) and 'I-ness' (*ahantā*) are also distinct. The one is general and the other is particular. While the general element is common, the particular element is inconstant. Empirical usages like 'Devadatta himself goes', 'You yourself see', 'I myself am not able' testify to the fact that selfhood is the element which is common. In 'this is silver', 'this is cloth', '*this*' is the general element; so also '*self*' underlies all observations with regard to 'he', 'you' or 'I'.

Let 'self-hood' be distinct from 'I-ness'. What has this to do with the *kūṭastha*? If this objection be raised, we reply: the meaning of the word 'self' is the *kūṭastha*. If it be said that 'self-hood' is that which prevents 'other-ness', then to us who maintain that the *kūṭastha* is the self, its prevention of an 'other' is the contingency of the acceptable. The words '*svayam*' and '*ātmā*' have the same connotation. They are synonyms, with no difference in meaning. Therefore both of them are not found together in empirical usage. Both '*svatva*' and '*ātmatva*' exclude an 'other'.

If it be said that '*svayam*' and '*ātmā*' cannot convey the same connotation, since it is seen that '*svayam*' is used even with regard to inert objects like pot, etc., as in 'the pot *itself* does not know', then, we say that such usage is no contradiction. Because there is the existence of the self even in

pot, etc., 'svayam' is used even in respect of them. If there be the self in the sentient and the non-sentient alike, why should there be the difference between them at all? If thus it be asked, our reply is that the difference is due to the existence or the non-existence of the reflection of intelligence. The *kūṭastha* is ever and everywhere present; and the distinction between the inert and the sentient is not its work. The difference is the creation of the reflection of intelligence which has the intellect for its locus. Just as the intelligent is a superimposition on the *kūṭastha*, the non-intelligent too is a delusive appearance in the same.

'Self-hood' (*svatva*) is not the only concomitant of 'I', 'you', etc. 'That-ness' and 'this-ness' are also observed to accompany them everywhere. And so, they too connote '*ātmatva*'. If thus it be said, we reply: it is not so. 'That-ness' and 'this-ness' accompany '*ātmatva*' also; hence it is not possible that they should themselves constitute '*ātmatva*'. 'That-ness' and 'this-ness', 'selfhood' and 'otherness', 'I' and 'you' are reciprocal counter-entities. The self which is not the 'other' must be understood as the *kūṭastha*; the 'I' which is the counter-entity of 'you' is superimposed on the self. Though the 'self' and 'I' are distinct like the 'this' and 'silver', those who are deluded perceive identity between them. The superimposition of identity is the product of *avidyā*; and when *avidyā* is discarded through knowledge, its effect, delusion is also destroyed.

Now, it may be objected that the effects of *avidyā* are not removed even when there is the dawn of knowledge; for in the case of him who has realized the identity of the self and *Brahman*, there is not seen invariably the destruction of his body. Obscuration and identity which are the products of *avidyā*, we reply, are removed by knowledge alone, but projection depends on the *karma* which has already begun to take effect. It is only when the momentum has spent itself that projection can be destroyed. Nor is it a contradiction to say that the effect remains for a while even after the

removal of the cause. The Logicians (Naiyāyikas) say that even after the destruction of the cause, the product remains for a moment; and this is quite possible according to the Vedāntin also. The Logicians (Naiyāyikas) assert the existence of the product only for a moment after the destruction of the cause; but this assertion is in respect of things like thread, etc., whose existence can be measured in terms of a few days. In the case of the delusion, however, which cannot be measured in terms of time, by 'moment' we must understand a suitable length of time. Just as the potter's wheel revolves even after the potter stops propelling it, and desists from doing so only when the momentum that he has given it is fully spent, so also the projections of *avidyā* continue to exist so long as the *prārabdha* is unspent. While the assumption of the Logician is without any sound evidence, ours is not so. The Vedāntic view is supported by scripture, logic, and experience.

4

The Nature of Self

Now, it has been established that the identity between the *kūṭastha* and the *cidābhāsa*, the immutable self and the changing 'I', is a product of nescience. The men of the world and Logicians alike are deluded because they disregard the declaration of scripture and cling obstinately to their rational powers alone. Even some of those who have studied scripture are not able to overcome this delusion because they study scripture to support their own preconceived notions and not to understand the purport of the *śāstra*. They pick up a word here and a word there and distort the intention of the sacred teaching.

The Lokāyata and those who follow them uncritically declare that the self is the assemblage of factors beginning with the *kūṭastha* and ending with the physical body. They reach this conclusion through the only means of valid know-

ledge they recognize, i. e., perception. To make their theory appear plausible they cite also the scriptural passages where the doctrine that the self is the sheath of food is declared, and where the episode of Virocana is related.

Some of the Lokāyatas are dissatisfied with this view. The physical outfit cannot be the self; for when the *jīva* deserts it, it is observed to perish. Hence the self must be different from flesh and bones. The senses which are different from the physical body constitute the self. This is evident from such worldly usage as 'I hear', 'I speak', etc. It cannot be said that the senses are non-intelligent and hence cannot constitute the self. In scripture we read of the dispute of the senses. If the senses were non-intelligent, surely, they could not dispute!

The worshippers of Hiraṇyagarbha, however, say thus: Even though the sense of sight, etc., may perish, the *jīva* survives, but he dies when the vital airs desert him. Therefore *prāṇa* is the self, not the senses. There is also the scriptural declaration that while the senses go to sleep, the *prāṇa* is wide awake; and the sheath made of *prāṇa* is very well described in scripture. The passages that could be cited are: "In the city of this body, the *prāṇas* are awake", "the senses during sleep dissolve in *prāṇa* and arise from it to wakefulness; hence it is great", "The other inner self is made of *prāṇa*".

The Upāsakas (followers of the Nārada-pāñcarātra system) think that mind or *manas* is the self. The *prāṇa* is not the enjoyer while the *manas* is. It is declared in scripture that mind alone is the cause of the bondage and release of men; that there is the other inner self of the nature of mind. Therefore mind is the self.

The Vijñānavādins hold that momentary consciousness is the self. It is patent that the *vijñāna* is the root of the mind. The internal organ is twofold—of the mode 'I' and

of the mode 'this'. The former is *viññāna*, while the latter is *manas*. The notion of 'I' is the ground of the notion of 'this'. Without the notion of 'I' the notion of 'this' is not produced. *Manas* is grounded in *viññāna*. Since *viññāna* is cognized to be produced and destroyed every moment, it is momentary, changing; and since it is its own evidence, it is self-luminous. The Āgamas declare that this *jīva* is the sheath of *viññāna* and that the entire *saṃsāra*, including origination, destruction, pleasure, etc., belongs to it.

The Mādhyamikas assert that *viññāna* which is momentary and evanescent like the lightning cannot be the self. Since nothing else is left, the self is *śūnya*, nullity. It is the night of nothingness, an abysmal void. There is the authority of scripture which says that this world was non-existent in the beginning. The entire universe is a myth and a fancy. It is a fabrication in nothing, a misreading of the real, i. e., *śūnya*.

There can be no delusion without a locus. Nothing can come out of nothing. Hence the self which is the witness of even 'nothing' must be admitted to be existent. Otherwise there cannot even be a talk about nothing. So the Logicians, Prābhākaras and Bhāṭṭas hold that the final doctrine of the Veda is that there is the *ānanda-maya* which is more fundamental than the sheath of *viññāna*, and that it is the self.

There is dispute also with regard to the size of the self. Is the self atomic? Or, is it infinite in size? Or, is it of medium size? Disputants support one or the other of these views and cite as their evidence scripture and logic. The Āntarāṅgas assert that the self is atomic, since it runs even in the subtlest of veins. The scriptures declare that the self is 'smaller than the atom, greater than the greatest', 'This atomic self is to be known by the mind', 'It is subtler than the subtlest, eternal'. Other passages there are which say, 'The *jīva* is to be understood as a hundredth of one-hundredth part of the end of a hair'.

The Jainas argue that the self is of medium size, since intelligence is observed to pervade the whole body from head to foot. The scriptural evidence is the passage: 'That self entered the body upto the very ends of the nails'. As for what was said that the self runs in the veins, it should be understood in a figurative sense. It is only a portion of the self that enters the veins. The same self is able to occupy different bodies of different sizes. This is possible because the limbs of the self grow and decay. So the Jainas hold that the self is of the size of the body, and assumes the shape of the body which it inhabits.

If the self be of the size of the body, it cannot be eternal. It must be subject to decay and destruction. If it be composed of parts, like pot, etc., it must perish. Then there would be the defects caused by the destruction of the acts done without yielding their effects and the occurrence of the fruits of those which are not done. Therefore, the self is all-pervasive. It is neither atomic nor of medium size. Like ether, it is all-penetrating and partless.

There is dispute also with regard to the nature of the self. Is it intelligence, or non-intelligence or intelligence-cum-non-intelligence? The followers of Prabhākara and the Logicians regard the self as non-intelligent. Like ether, the self is the substrate of qualities, and its quality is intelligence. The substance and quality are not identical. Hence the self cannot be the same as intelligence. Intelligence is not the only quality of the self. There are other attributes like desire, aversion, effort, virtue, vice, pleasure, pain, and their residual impressions, etc. These qualities are not inherent in the self. The self comes into contact with the mind owing to its *adr̥ṣṭa* in the form of acts which have begun to bear fruit; and from this conjunction arise the attributes. When during sleep the *adr̥ṣṭa* is destroyed, the attributes also leave the self. The self is called intelligent, because it possesses intelligence, desire, aversion, and effort. It is different from the Lord, since it is the agent of vice and virtue and the enjoyer of pain, pleasure, etc.

If it be asked how the self which is all-pervasive could go to the other world and return to this world, the Prābhākaras and Logicians reply that the 'going' and 'coming' of the self are to be taken in a figurative sense. As the self is believed to move about in this world because it is endowed with a body, so also in the other world its movement is intelligible since it is equipped with a body suitable for the enjoyment of the fruit of its deeds. As here in this world, pleasure, etc., are products of *karma*, so in the other world, desire, etc., are produced in the heavenly body by the deeds of the self. Thus movement is intelligible in the case of the all-pervasive self. The evidence for this is the entire section of the Veda dealing with works. The real nature of the self is non-intelligence. It is the *ānandamaya* sheath which remains over in sleep.

The followers of Bhaṭṭa hold that the *ānandamaya* which is the self is not mere non-intelligence; but it is intelligence *cum* non-intelligence. Though consciousness is not manifest, yet it is inherent in the self even during sleep. If intelligence were absent from sleep, then for one who wakes up from sleep, memory would be unintelligible. The memory 'In sleep I was unconscious' can arise only from the experience of unconsciousness in sleep. It is declared in scripture that in sleep there is no loss of the seer and the sight. Hence like the glow-worm, the self is a composite of light and darkness, intelligence and inertness.

The self which is without parts cannot be a composite entity. Therefore the Sāṅkhyas assert that the self is intelligence. A double nature is unintelligible in the case of the homogeneous self. That the self is non-intelligent was refuted in criticizing the view of the Prābhākaras and the Logicians. So, by elimination, the Sāṅkhyas say that the self is intelligence. The element of inertness belongs to the nature of *prakṛti* which is 'a string of three strands'. Goodness, activity, and inertness are its constituents. It creates the whole universe for the sake of the bondage and release of

the intelligent self. *Puruṣa*, though by itself inactive, is lured by the activity of *prakṛti*. Bondage and release do not really belong to the self. They are due to the want of discrimination between the intelligent *puruṣa* and the non-intelligent *prakṛti*. In order to account for the distinctness of bondage and release, the Sāṅkhyas admit of a plurality of *puruṣas*. So long as *puruṣa* is ignorant of its real nature, it plays into the hands of *prakṛti*. It identifies itself with *prakṛti* and its products, and tastes the sweets and bitters of life. But when it realizes its true nature, it is released from bondage. The *smṛtis* declare that *prakṛti* is the prius of creation. It is termed *avyakta*, the unmanifest. It is also evident that the self is unattached, that it is devoid of the modifications which have their source in *prakṛti*.

The products of *prakṛti* are due to the latter's proximity to *puruṣa*. Just as iron filings move in the proximity of a magnet, *prakṛti* begins to be active in creating this world in the proximity of *puruṣa*. But the followers of the Yoga system think that it is God who directs the course of *prakṛti*. The God of Yoga is only a *primus inter pares*. He is a *puruṣaviśeṣa*, a superior *puruṣa*. The testimony for the assumption of a God as separate from *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* is the passage which says that 'He is other than the *jīvās*'. 'He is the lord of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, he is the lord of all attributes.' The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* describes 'the inner ruler' in detail.

5

The Nature of God

Even with regard to the nature of God, disputants there are who differ with one another in their views. Exercising the powers of their intellects, they argue in different ways ; and every one of them distorts the scriptural texts in order to fit into the procrustean bed of his pre-formed theory.

Patañjali, the exponent of the Yoga system, says that the Lord is a *puruṣaviśeṣa* who is unconnected with blemishes, acts, fruits, and their residual impressions. Like the *jīva*, he is also intelligent, and without any attachment. If, like the *puruṣa*, God be unattached to anything, how can he be the 'prime mover' of *prakṛti*? The follower of Yoga has a ready answer to give. God is not an ordinary *puruṣa*; he is a *puruṣaviśeṣa*, a super-man. It is because of his supremacy that he directs the universe, controls the course of creation. Otherwise, there would be no order in the universe. The world would be a chaos, not a cosmos. Bondage and release would cease to have any meaning. The universe would be like a kingdom without a king, an army without a captain. Of the Lord, scripture declares the directorship of the universe. "For the fear of him wind blows; for the fear of him move the sun and the stars."¹ Since God is without the blemishes which pertain to the *puruṣa*, he can well be the controller of the universe. It is no doubt true that even the *puruṣas* are by nature undefiled; but since they do not discriminate themselves from the products of *prakṛti*, it was said that blemishes, deeds, etc., pertain to them.

The Naiyāyikas question the view that the Lord who is without attachment is the director of the universe. They regard the attributes of the Lord, cognition, effort, and desire, to be eternal. *Īśvara* differs from the *jīvas* only in the nature of his attributes, not otherwise. His attributes are eternal while those of the *jīvas* are not. "He has desires which come true, resolves which are real."

If the Lord be characterized as possessing eternal qualities like cognition, etc., then the origination of the universe must be eternal. Therefore the worshippers of *Hiraṇyagarbha* identify God with the object of their worship. *Hiraṇyagarbha* is conjoined with the subtle body. In the *Udgītha-brāhmaṇa*,

the greatness of *Hiraṇyagarbha* is very well described. Though conjoined with the subtle body, he is not identical with the *jīva*, since he is free from desire, *karma*, etc.

The subtle body is nowhere seen to be independent of the gross body. Hence the worshippers of *Virāṭ* describe God as the *Virāṭ*. "He has a thousand heads; he has his eyes everywhere."

If the possession of innumerable hands and legs be the criterion of Godhead, then even such insignificant creatures like worms may be gods. So some people regard the four-faced *Brahmā* as God. Worshipping him for the sake of progeny, they assert that there is no God other than he. They cite also the scriptural text "Prajāpati created all beings".

The lotus-born *Brahmā* came from the navel cavity of Lord *Viṣṇu*. Hence *Viṣṇu* alone is God. So say the *Vaiṣṇavas*.

Viṣṇu was unable to find out the feet of Lord *Śiva*. *Śiva*'s greatness far excels that of *Viṣṇu*. *Śiva* alone is the Lord, not *Viṣṇu*. So the *Śaivas* say.

Before conquering the three worlds, *Śiva* worshipped *Gaṇapati*. So, the *Gāṇapatyas* say that *Gaṇapati* is the supreme Lord.

Others hold quite different views. Each is wedded to his own theory, and discards all other alternatives as unsound and irrational; and each bases his arguments on the authority of *mantras*, *arthavādas*, and *kalpa* works. The conceptions of God vary from the sublime to the ludicrous. There are people who regard God as the *Antaryāmin* and there are also those who worship stocks and stones. We see people in the world worshipping even trees and plants.

Though these conceptions are varied, to him who bases his view on scripture, supported by reasoning there can be only one conclusion about the nature of God. The true concept of God is, at the same time, in conflict with none of the theories above noticed. "Know *māyā* to be *prakṛti* (primal cause) and God to be the *māyin* (arch-juggler). By the *jīvas* who are his limbs the whole earth is pervaded."² Thus if the mode of determining the concept of God be in accordance with the declarations of scripture, no conflict will be set up with the views of others which are but partial visions.

6

Māyā

Māyā which is the material cause of the universe is of the nature of nescience. The evidence for this statement is experience itself. The products of *prakṛti* are experienced to be inert and delusive by all people from the wise to the ignorant. Inertness, indeed, is that which constitutes the nature of pot, etc; and where the intellect is made blunt, that is called delusion. *Sub specie temporis* all persons experience delusion and ignorance. Though immediately and universally experienced, *māyā* is indeterminable. Logic cannot determine the nature of *māyā*, which is neither real nor unreal. *Māyā* is not unreal, because it is manifest; it is not real, because it is sublated. Thus to logic *māyā* is a riddle. But *sub specie aeternitatis* it is unreal. From the point of view of knowledge, *māyā* is that which is not. To those who have realized the purport of scripture it is not real at any time. For them there is no *māyā* at all. To the logicians it is like the Sphinx, indeterminable. It can be described neither as real nor as unreal. To the lay men of the world *māyā* appears to be real. Thus *māyā* is of three forms, unreal, indeterminable, and real.

As the painted canvas presents or hides the pictures as it is spread out or folded, so too *māyā* presents the existence or the non-existence of the world. *Māyā* is not independent because it depends on intelligence for its appearance. It is independent at the same time, because it presents the unattached self to be otherwise. It turns the immutable self into the mutable forms of the world. It produces the *jīva* and *Īśvara* as the reflections of intelligence. But these productions do not affect the *kūṭastha* in the least. Without in any way changing the nature of the self, *māyā* creates the world. Nor is this impossible for *māyā*; for *māyā* is so named only because it is capable of accomplishing the impossible. As liquidity is to water, heat to fire, and hardness to stone, the attribute of accomplishing the impossible is natural to *māyā*. *Māyā* appears to be strange and wonderful only as long as its inner workings are not known. It ceases to be a riddle when its inherent contradictions are realized. *Māyā* itself is a great interrogation; hence it is fruitless to question about its nature. *Māyā* whose body is wonder is a riddle to be solved by knowledge. Instead of questioning the nature of *māyā*, the wise seek knowledge whereby *māyā* can be removed. It is needless for the patient to know the details of his disease. His objective is to be free from the malady, and he must so direct his efforts whereby its end can be brought about. But if the patient be thoroughly ignorant of his disease, if he thinks that his disease is his state of ease, then there would be no activity on his part for its removal. He must first know that he is suffering; only then could he strive to be free from pain. *Māyā* must be known to be *māyā*. Men of the world regard it as a reality; and so, for them there is no problem at all, and they do not consciously strive to get rid of it. It is only when *māyā* is cognized to be the cause of misery and metempsychosis that there is seen activity to achieve its removal. The general characteristics of *māyā* must be known, though its details defy all attempts at definition. That which is not possible to be defined or determined while being the object of clear perception is

called *māyā* in empirical usage, e. g. the *fata morgana*. People call a fact *māyā* when that fact defies their rational powers. This world appears not clearly to our consciousness; but its nature is beyond the possibility of determination. Hence without any partiality it must be regarded as *māyā*. Enquiry into the nature of the world is a thankless task. Even the learned men flounder and fail. They are at a loss to answer such questions as these: how from the vital fluid are the body, senses, etc., created? How do they become conscious? If it be said that it is natural for the vital fluid to create body, senses, etc., how is it known to be so? Co-presence and co-absence do not exist between vitality and body, etc. Impotent vitality does not procreate. Therefore the *Svabhāvavādin's* theory is not valid. There is no causal relation between vitality and body, etc. The only last resort is "I know not what". Investigation regarding the causal relations and connections of the facts of the world leads us into, and not out of ignorance. It may give us worldly knowledge; but it cannot lift us out of nescience. It is on account of the puzzling nature of the world that the wise compare it to the *fata morgana*. What greater magic is there than this world? The semen in the womb springs to consciousness; it is invested with various limbs; it passes through the stages of infancy, youth, old age, etc.; it eats, drinks, speaks, smells, hears, and moves. Can there be a greater miracle than this? Like human organisms, even trees, etc., puzzle our wits. How small is the seed, and how big the tree that comes out of it? Hence the whole universe is *māyā*, indeterminable. As for the logicians and others who take a pleasure in recounting the various categories of the world, they are well criticized in the *Khaṇḍana*, etc., by philosophers like Harṣamiśra. Those categories which cannot be thought of are not amenable to reason; the world, indeed, is beyond the scope of the mind. Indeterminability or unthinkableness is inherent in *māyā*. *Māyā* in its causal state is experienced in sleep. The worlds of waking and dream are resolved therein. Like the seed

which contains the entire tree, the causal state of *māyā* in sleep, though subtle, bears within it the entire universe. In that *māyā* all the residual impressions of the world are preserved.

Intelligence is reflected in the residual impressions of the intellect. It is not clearly experienced because its reflection, like cloud-ether, is indistinct. But the existence of the reflection can be inferred. *Māyā* which is the cause and which has the reflection of intelligence transforms itself in the form of the intellect. Hence in the intellect the reflection of intelligence distinctly appears. “*Māyā* creates within itself *jīva* and *Īśvara* as reflections”,³ so declares scripture. The difference between the *jīva* and *Īśvara* is like that between the water-ether and the cloud-ether. The one is distinct while the other is indistinct. *Māyā* is like the cloud; the residual impressions of the intellect are like the particles of water in the cloud; and the reflection of intelligence is like the reflection of ether in the water-particles.⁴ The *cidābhāsa* which is the controller of *māyā* is *māyin*, the supreme Lord. He is the omniscient inner ruler, the source of the universe. Scripture declares that the *ānandamaya* is *Īśvara*.⁵ He is the over-lord, the supreme governor of the universe. That he is omniscient is the scriptural declaration; and the meaning of scripture cannot be refuted by argument. Further, for *māyā* everything is possible.

No man is powerful enough to change the world which the Lord creates. Not a sparrow falleth without his consent. He is the Lord of all, the supreme controller. The residual impressions of the intellects of all beings are gathered in nescience during sleep. Through them the entire world is

3. *NUTU*, 9.

4. See Note A at the end of this chapter.

5. See Note B at the end of this chapter.

objectified. Hence the *ānandamaya* is called omniscient. His omniscience is not immediately experienced, because the residual impressions are mediate in character. On the basis of the omniscience found in all the intellects, it must be inferred to exist in all the impressions also. *Īśvara* is the inner ruler of the four sheaths and the gross elements, etc.; he is called the *antaryāmin*. “While remaining in the intellect he impels the intellect to inner activity; he is unperceived by the intellect, and he has the intellect for his body”, so the Upaniṣad declares. “As the threads which are the material cause of the cloth exist in the cloth, this *Īśvara* who is the material cause of all takes his abode in all beings.” The threads are subtler than the cloth; the shreds are subtler than the threads; and the Lord is the subtlest of all. He is not perceptible like the threads and the shreds, because he is the innermost core of all beings. His existence is to be known through reason and revelation. Just as the cloth is the body of the threads, since they exist in the shape of the former, the body of *Īśvara* is the entirety of creation since he exists in all the creatures. Just as the spreading out, shrinking, etc., of the cloth depend upon the spreading out, shrinking, etc., of the threads, the modifications of the world depend upon the modifications of the inner ruler. Śrī Kṛṣṇa says in the *Gītā*: “O Arjuna, causing all beings, which are mounted (as if) on a machine, to revolve by *māyā*, *Īśvara* remains in the region of the hearts of all beings.”⁶ All the beings are *viññānamayas*; and they remain in the heart; for it is indeed there that *Īśvara* who is their material cause attains transformation. Body, etc., which constitute the prison of the soul is spoken of as the machine; and the soul’s conceit in it is its being mounted thereon. Entry into activities, prescribed and prohibited, is referred

to in the *Gītā* by the word ‘*bhramaṇa*’ ‘revolving’. *Īśvara* gets himself transformed by his power of *māyā* into the forms of the *jīva* and its activities. This is how the cosmic revolution runs. This is how the Lord conducts the course of the universe. In the words of the sacred teaching : “I know what is virtue, but there is no activity on my part in respect thereto ; I know what is vice, but I cannot desist from it. I do as I am directed by the divine *antaryāmin* who has his seat in my heart.” But this does not mean determinism ; free will is not a fiction. It cannot be said that there is no use of the efforts of man. If man be a puppet in the hands of another force not his own, then ethics and the effort of man would have no meaning. If he be a victim to the drive of a tyrannical destiny, he cannot be held responsible for his actions. The opposite theory of chance and free will is equally untenable. It lands us in chaos and confusion. It is no doubt true that the Lord directs the deeds of man ; but the self of man is no other than the Lord himself.

When it is realized that *Īśvara* manifests himself even in the form of man, it becomes quite intelligible how his direction is commensurate with the free will of man. Further when it is understood that *Īśvara* is not the agent of actions but only the witnessing controller, it is clearly perceived that he is in reality unattached to anything. Scriptures and the traditional code declare that by the knowledge of the non-attached nature of the self release is attained ; and the declarations of the scriptures and the traditional code cannot be set aside, for the Lord has said that they are his commands. For the fear of him, the sun, moon, and stars carry out his commands, the wind blows and the fire burns. He is not only the inner principle ; he is all-powerful and the over-lord. “By the commands of this immutable *Brahman* the courses of the sun and the moon are fixed.” “The self which has gained entrance into the hearts of all the *jīvas* directs them.”

God and His Creation

The Lord is the proprietor of the world ; for he is the cause of its creation and destruction. The creation and destruction of the world are only its evolution and involution, manifestation and dissolution. Just as the cloth which is rolled up is unfolded, the Lord manifests the entire universe which lies latent in his being. This unfoldment or manifestation is due to the deeds of the creatures that constitute the world. Again, when the deeds and their products are exhausted, the Lord withdraws the world unto himself. This is called the deluge or cosmic destruction. Like day and night, waking and sleep, opening and closing of the eyes, day-dreams and state of silence, are the creation and dissolution of the world.

What is creation? Is it origination *de novo*? Or, is it transformation? Both the views are defective. The self which is without a second cannot originate something out of nothing. Nor is the transformation of the self which is without parts intelligible. What is called creation is but illusory manifestation. When creation and destruction are defined as illusory manifestation and disappearance, the defects of the other theories are avoided. The same Lord is the cause of both the intelligent and the inert beings. Through the aspect of the reflection of intelligence he is the cause of the former ; and of the latter he is the cause through the aspect of the inert *māyā*.

It may be said that it is incorrect to say that the cause of the world is *Īśvara*, the wielder of *māyā* ; for Sureśvara, the author of the *Vārttika*, has attributed the causality of the world to the supreme Self. The self which has the *tamas*-predominant *māyā* as the adjunct is the cause of the body, etc., and when it has intelligence as its predominant aspect, it produces the reflections of intelligence. The creation of

both the intelligent and the inert is effected through the instrumentality of impressions, knowledge, and *karma*. Thus the Vārttikakāra has said that the supreme Self is the ground of all beings; not the Lord.

This is not so. The intention of Sureśvara is not to attribute causality to the supreme Self, but only to prove that through the establishment of the reciprocal superimposition of *Īśvara* and *Brahman*, the latter is erroneously regarded as the cause of the world. There is also the scriptural passage: "That *Brahman* which is reality, knowledge, and infinity—from that ether, air, fire, water, earth, plants, food, body, etc., sprang forth." We discern superficially in the text causality being attributed to *Brahman*; and reality being asserted of the cause. Therefore, it is patent that reciprocal superimposition between *Brahman* and *Īśvara* is therein declared. Just as the cloth stiffened with starch is taken to be the cloth qualified by starchiness as an attribute, so also the oneness of *Brahman* and *Īśvara* is due to reciprocal superimposition. The ignorant do not find any difference between the ether at large and the cloud-ether; even so, those whose understanding is superficial perceive *Brahman* and *Īśvara* to be identical.

When through the marks of discerning the purport, viz., initial and concluding passages, etc., we inquire into the truth, we realize that *Brahman* is unattached and that *Īśvara*, the *māyin*, is the progenitor of the world. The determination of the unattachedness of *Brahman* begins with the passage "Reality, knowledge, and infinity" and concludes with the text "Whence speech returns". "The *māyin* creates the universe. There the *jīva* is well-bound by *māyā*": thus declares another passage. Hence it is clear that it is *Īśvara* that creates.

Īśvara, who is the *ānandamaya*, thought, "Let me become many": and he became *Hiraṇyagarbha*. It is just like sleep being transformed into dream. The nature of creation

cannot be definitely described. Some of the *smṛti* passages describe creation as proceeding by stages; others assert a simultaneous creation of all things. Both the views are valid. As the dreams come either in an orderly or disorderly way, so the creation of the world proceeds either in a serial order or all of a sudden.

Hiranyagarbha, the thread-self, is called the subtle vesture. He is of the form of all the *jīvās*; for he has conceit in all of them. He possesses the powers of action, knowledge, etc. Just as early in the morning or late in the evening the world appears to be immersed in twilight, so in the state of *Hiranyagarbha* the universe is presented in an indistinct manner. Just as the cloth stiffened with starch is sketched fully with lines, the form of the Lord is invested with the subtle bodies, the non-quintuplicated elements. Like the grains which shoot their sprouts, the Lord who is the seed of the universe attains in the state of *Hiranyagarbha* the tender stage of the sprout. He is the seed of the worlds, he is the sprout of the spheres.

Virāṭ is the full-blown stage of the universe, comparable to the world in the noon-day glare, the canvas filled in with paint or the grains which have borne their fruit. In the *Viśvarūpādhyāya* of the *Yajur-veda* and in the *Puruṣa-sūkta*, *Virāṭ* is described to be of the cosmic form comprising all the beings from the highest Brahmā down to a blade of grass. He is the mighty Lord whose crown is the heaven and footstool the earth:

“Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man,
A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.”⁷

All the things are his visible forms. Each being is a fragment of his cosmic vesture. The *Antaryāmin*, the *Sūtrātman*, *Virāt*, *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu*, *Rudra*, *Indra*, *Agni*, *Vighneśvara*, *Bhairava*, *Mairāḷa*, *Mārikā*, divinities and demons, the twice-born, the warrior, the merchant, and the śūdra, cows, horses, and birds, trees like the aśvattha and the banyan, grains of all kinds, water, stone and sticks—all these are but chips of the same wood. Different people worship the one or the other of these and reap their due reward. As the Lord is worshipped, so does he yield the fruit. As is the inner craving so is the resultant reward : The excellence or otherwise of the reward depends upon the faith or the lack of it in the devotees as also upon the quality of the object of worship.

8

Knowledge, the Means to Release

Be the object of devotion the highest *Brahmā* or be it the inert stone, it can yield only perishable fruit. Release, however, can be gained only by the knowledge of the real nature of *Brahman*, not otherwise. The fictitious world of our dreams vanishes only on awakening. The world of all beings, divine and human, intelligent and inert, is a dream imposed upon the reality of *Brahman*, which is one without a second. Even *Īśvara* and the *jīva* are included in the self-feigning world-fiction, the magical product of *māyā*. They are projected by *māyā*, and they in their turn create their spheres. The cosmic scheme which has its source in the divine contemplation of the Lord and its solace in its return to him is ordained by him. The cycle of metempsychosis which begins with the waking experience and comes to an end in release is the product of the *jīva*. The cosmic world is the creation of the Lord ; of the individual world the *jīva* is the progenitor.

Those who do not know the real nature of *Brahman*, which is without a second and without attachment, dispute

over the natures of *Īśvara* and the *jīva*, who are the figments of *māyā*. The seers of truth revel in the sight of those who are released, and sympathise with those who are pilgrims on the path; but with the deluded they do not even converse. The theists, including the worshippers of grass, stones, etc., and the yogins, dispute over the nature of God. The Materialists, the Sāṅkhyas, and others are deluded with regard to the nature of the *jīva*. So long as they do not cognize the reality of *Brahman*, there is no release for them, nor is there happiness which is the gift of true knowledge. There may be for them grades of pleasure in their own field; but all that pleasure appears to be the opposite of happiness to the enlightened. The dream-created difference between the wealth of kingdoms and the woes of beggary does not affect the person who has risen from his dreams. Both appear to him to be fictions. The seer knows no distinction between worldly pleasures and pains; for in both of them he sees the sting of misery.

Since disputation over the natures of *Īśvara* and the *jīva* is not the path that leads to release, those who aspire for the goal of freedom should not wend that way. They should inquire into the nature of *Brahman* and acquire the knowledge thereof. *Brahman*-knowledge cannot be obtained through the physical and the psychical sciences. It can be achieved only through the science of the Self. Inquiry into the natures of God and the *jīva* may be necessary for a keen understanding of the nature of *Brahman*; but the inquirer should not stop with the former, for that is not his final doctrine. He must acquire the lower knowledge only to unlearn again.

It may be said thus: "The Sāṅkhyas define the *jīva* as the all-pervasive, unattached intelligence; the Yogins define *Īśvara* to be all-pervasive and unattached. The meaning which these philosophers give is identical with the purport of the words 'that' and 'thou'. Then, why should the concepts of God and the *jīva* be abandoned?" To this the

reply is : In the doctrine of the Vedānta ' that ' and ' thou ' are not different. Further, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga conception is defective in many ways. The Sāṅkhya view of the plurality of *puruṣas* and the Yoga concept of God as *primus inter pares* are glaring examples of self-contradiction. The Vedāntic doctrine uses the words ' that ' and ' thou ' only in order to establish the fact that both of them denote a single reality.

The deluded people perceive difference between *Īśvara* and the *jīva*. If the Vedāntin undertakes an inquiry into the natures of *Īśvara* and the *jīva*, it is only to refute the alleged difference between them. The example of the four-fold division of ether was given in order to elucidate the doctrine of identity, and to teach that the apparent division in the homogeneous self is the product of ignorance. Water-ether and cloud-ether are dependent on their respective adjuncts, water and cloud ; their substrates, pot-ether and ether at large, are unaffected by the adjuncts ; they are pure and unmodified. *Īśvara* and the *jīva* are conditioned by their adjuncts, *māyā* and the intellect ; but their substrates, *kūṭastha* and *Brahman*, are pure and undefined.

Thus in the investigation into the natures of *Īśvara* and the *jīva*, the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga systems are no doubt useful. But in that sense even the Lokāyata doctrine that the physical body is the self is helpful. Points of difference between the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya-Yoga systems, there are many. The latter fight shy of their own logic, and stop short of its inevitable conclusions. Quite irrationally they maintain the doctrines of the plurality of *puruṣas*, and of the reality of the world. The Yoga upholds the theory that *Īśvara* is quite different from the world and the *jīva*. If these three wrong notions be discarded, then the Sāṅkhya-Yoga systems would be in perfect agreement with the Vedānta. If, as the Sāṅkhyas maintain, release be the fruit of the knowledge that the *jīva* is by nature *unattached*, then, even by the knowledge that garland, sandal-paste, etc., are real one may claim to be released ; for in truth non-attach-

ment, like reality, is a characteristic of the Absolute alone. What the Vedānta proclaims is not that the perishable *jīva* and other empirical objects are unattached and real, but that *Brahman* alone is real and unattached. If it be objected that though the unreality of garland, etc., is true, to say that the *jīva* is bound by attachment is not valid, we reply that it is not so. Even as garland, etc., are unreal, the *jīva* is attached to the world and *Īśvara* by virtue of its inherent relations to them. *Prakṛti* procures for the *jīva* attachment, and *Īśvara* impels it to activity; and so long as the causes of attachment and activity are not discarded, there can be no release for the *jīva*. If it be said by the follower of the Sāṅkhya system that activity and attachment are products of nescience, then he would be embracing the doctrine of *māyā*. With the Vedāntin he would have to agree that primal nescience, which is of the nature of an existent, is the cause of the world and that it is removable only by the light of *Brahman*-knowledge.

It may be said that on the Advaita theory of a unitary self the restriction of bondage and release is unintelligible, and that the view of a plurality of *ātmans* rectifies this defect. This is not sound; for *māyā* is the principle which places the restriction even on one and the same self. *Māyā* makes the impossible possible; hence it is no wonder that it should be the agent of both bondage and release which are not real in the absolute sense. When it is declared that bondage is unreal, then, even release must be fictitious; for there can be release only for the bound. The *smṛti* declares the supreme truth: "There is no destruction, no origination; there is none who is bound, none to indulge in religious practices; there is no one who longs for release nor is there any one who is released".⁸

Māyā is the *Kāmadhenu* whose calves are the *jīva* and *Īśvara*, drinking freely the milk of duality; but the real is non-dual, homogeneous and eternal. Even the distinction between the *kūṭastha* and *Brahman* is not real; it is but nominal. Indeed, there is no difference between pot-ether and ether at large. Ether is the same whether in the pot or out of it. There is no difference in *Brahman*; there is no distinction in it. The *sat* without a second, which existed prior to creation, exists even now in the same condition and will continue to be so at the time of release too. It was, is, and ever will be, one without a second. Where there is only one, *māyā* presents plurality and deludes the human minds. The delusion of duality and the travails of transmigration are the products of nescience. Even some of those who have realized the futility of *māyā* and the sole reality of *Brahman* are observed to be involved in empirical affairs; but their activity is dependent only upon such of their past deeds which have begun to take effect, and they do not identify themselves with their actions. Of them, it is true to say that they live *in* the world but are not *of* it.

The conviction of the deluded is that the transmigratory existence which belongs both to this world and to the next is absolutely real; they assert that the non-dual self neither appears nor exists. The conviction of the knowers, on the contrary, is quite the reverse. To them the existence of the self is the surest of all facts, and its experience most intimate and undeniable. While the ignorant feel that they are bound, the enlightened know that they are ever free.

9

Self-Inquiry

If it be said that the non-dual is not the object of immediate experience, we reply that it is not so; for the non-dual reality manifests itself in the form of self-luminous intelligence. If it be said that the non-dual self does not

manifest itself in its entirety, then this defect is common even to the world of dualities which is not presented in its entirety. If partial manifestation be true of the latter, then even of the former it is true. If it be said that while duality is cognized, there can be no non-duality, the Vedāntin might say as well that while non-duality is patent, the dual throngs cannot be real. Duality is unreal, because it is of the nature of *māyā*; hence by elimination the real non-dual *sat* alone shines. Understanding the world to be of the form of indeterminate *māyā*, the absolute reality of the non-dual self is to be realized. Even after such determination, if the world of duality presents itself, inquiry must again be conducted so that the delusive character of the world may be clearly discerned. This inquiry cannot be painful, for it is the cause of the removal of all pain. There can be no time limit to it; for with the rise of *Brahman*-knowledge it ceases by itself. A person may be fed up with empirical learning; but he cannot be tired of self-inquiry and self-knowledge. If it be said that one experiences hunger, thirst, etc., even after gaining *Brahman*-knowledge, we reply that there is a difference. The attitude of the enlightened soul towards those activities is thoroughly changed. After enlightenment he loses all conceit in them; they remain only as the functions of egoity. If there be the contingency of the superimposition of hunger, etc., on the self-intelligence through unreal identity, then by discriminative knowledge the superimposition is to be removed. If, on account of beginningless residual impressions, superimposition occurs all of a sudden, the right antidote to it is keen and constant discrimination. Because the delusiveness of the world of duality is determined through discrimination, it cannot be said that the knowledge of the illusory character of the world is the product of reasoning; for the nature of the world is unthinkable, indeterminate, and it is cognized only by the all-witness self. Like the world, even the self is unthinkable; but the former is unthinkable because it is delusive in nature, and the latter because it is eternal and ever-present. Since there is no

experience of the prior non-existence of intelligence, the intelligence-self is eternal. The prior non-existence of duality, however, is experienced by the self. "It is the witness of darkness, witness of everything." The world of duality which has prior non-existence is a product like pot, etc.; but its production is unthinkable and illusory like magic.

Intelligence is immediately experienced; and the world's illusoriness is experienced by intelligence; hence it is a contradiction to say that the non-dual self-intelligence is not immediately experienced. There are some people who know this truth and yet are dissatisfied. Their dissatisfaction is born of insufficient inquiry. There are learned men even among the Cārvākas and others; but their belief in the theory that the body is the self is the outcome of their incomplete learning and un-finished inquiry. If it be said that the Cārvākas, etc., do not have clear discrimination because of the defects of their intellects, then even others who are dissatisfied remain in that condition because they have no insight into the real purport of the sacred teaching.

10

Fruit of Inquiry

The fruit of inquiry is declared by scripture thus: "When the desires which reside in his heart leave him, then this human becomes immortal; and here he attains *Brahman*."⁹ The removal of the roots of all misery and pain, viz., *avidyā*, *kāma*, and *karma*, and the realization of identity with *Brahman* are the fruit of self-inquiry. The desires are of the form of the knots of the heart; for, the remaining portion of the *śruti* reads: "When all the knots of the heart are cut". Desire arises, when through

ignorance, egoity is identified with the intelligence-self; and this identification is spoken of as the knot of the heart. If the intelligence-self be not identified with egoity, then even by a thousand desires there would be no harm done to the knowledge of the self and the state of release. There are three kinds of superimposed identity. The superimposition of identity between the reflection of intelligence and egoity is natural; the identity between the present body and egoity is the product of previous deeds, and it will be dissolved when the deeds have spent their effect; the third kind of identity is that between egoity and the intelligence-self. It is the third that binds, and brings misery and pain. When the third knot is cut by the sword of knowledge, the first two would be ineffective to cripple the soul. Even after the knot is cut there may arise desires on account of the *karma* which has begun to take effect. But it does not affect the self since it is recognized to belong to egoity. Just as the disease of the body and the destruction of trees, etc., do not condition the self, desire, etc., which are inherent in egoity do not affect the intelligence-self. If it be said that even prior to the cutting of the knot the self was unattached, it is quite true. The self was, is, and ever will be untouched by blemishes. But it is just this knowledge of the self that is called the cutting of the knot. The ignorant do not know that the self is unattached; they are bound by the knot of ignorance. The enlightened know the truth; and hence they are free from the knot. There is no difference whatever between the ignorant and the enlightened in the matter of the activity of the body, senses, mind, intellect, etc. Between a boy who does not study the *Veda* and a student of the *Veda* there is no difference in the matter of food, etc., but the only difference is that which is created by the non-study or the study of the *Veda*. Even so, the difference between the ignorant and the enlightened depends upon the non-knowledge or the knowledge of *Brahman*. "The knower does not hate the pains that befall him; nor does he desire the pleasures that have forsaken him. He remains like one

indifferent to both pleasure and pain.”¹⁰ Thus the *Gītā* describes the state of him who has cut the knot of ignorance. It cannot be said that the verse of the *Gītā* is injunctive of indifference ; for there is the contingency of the futility of the particle ‘*vat*’ (like). The *Gītā* does not recommend a state of inertia to the knower. The body, mind, etc., of the enlightened seer do not stop functioning. If they did so, then *Brahman*-knowledge would not be a blessing, but only a disease ; and those who regard *Brahman*-knowledge as a wasting malady are indeed dunces par excellence. If it be said that according to the traditional code, knowers like Bharata were without any activity, then, according to a well-known scriptural passage, the *jñānin* eats, sports, and amuses himself, and yet is unaffected by his activities. Bharata and others did not remain without food, etc., like stones and stocks ; for fear of attachment they were indifferent to the affairs of the world. Indeed, he who has attachment is troubled, and he who is free from attachment enjoys happiness ; hence by him who desires happiness attachment of every kind must be relinquished. The uninformed find no difference between the activities of the ignorant and the enlightened ; and they regard the latter as indistinguishable from the former. But that is not the intention of scripture. The activities of both the *ajñānin* and the *jñānin* may be alike, but there is a wide gulf between them in respect of their attitudes to those activities.

This is the final doctrine. Non-attachment, knowledge, and withdrawal of the senses are helpful to one another. Mostly they are found together ; and only in rare cases they are seen apart. The cause, nature, and product, however, of non-attachment, etc., are different. By a thorough inquiry into the purport of the sacred teaching this is clearly to be understood. The sight of defects, the desire to be free from them, and independence of the objects of enjoyment are

respectively the particular cause, nature, and product of non-attachment. Hearing, contemplation, and meditation are the cause of knowledge. Knowledge is of the form of the discrimination between the real and the illusory. Its fruit is the non-rise again of the knots of the heart. Control, etc., restraint of the intellect, and the reduction of activities are respectively the cause, nature, and product of *uparati*. Of the three, non-attachment, knowledge, and *uparati*, knowledge is the principal since it is the direct instrument to release; the other two are auxiliaries to it. If all the three are at the same time on the verge of fruition, then it must be due to a great store of merit; but in some cases owing to previous demerit, one or the other of them gets obstructed, and when the obstruction is removed there is the free flow of the triple stream. Even though non-attachment and *uparati* be complete, if knowledge be obstructed, then there would be no release. But one whose way to knowledge is so obstructed need not despair. On the strength of his austerities he attains the status of the virtuous whence the way is easy to the haven of knowledge. On the other hand, if knowledge be complete, release is certain, although the other two auxiliaries may be arrested on account of obstruction. The visible pain of this world may pertain to him whose knowledge is complete but whose non-attachment and *uparati* are incomplete, but, nevertheless, he is assured of release.

Non-attachment consists in regarding even the *Brahmaloka* as but a straw. Knowledge will be complete when it is realized without a shadow of doubt that the true nature of the self is *Brahman*-hood. The limit of *uparati* is complete forgetfulness like unto that of sleep.

Desire, etc., are dependent on the acts which have begun to bear fruit; hence they cannot obstruct the path to release. Those who are released are found to indulge in activities; but in fact, it is not they that act. Their *prārabdha* produces activity so that it may spend itself out.

Though their activities may differ according to their different *prārabdhas*, knowledge is common to them all as also release.

This is the central theme of the present chapter. Like the pictures on the canvas, the world is imposed by *māyā* on the self-intelligence. Discarding the world, the pure intelligence must be realized. By reading this chapter and understanding its purport one can well see how the universe is illusory and how the non-dual *sat* alone is absolutely real.

NOTE A

Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya states that the reflection of intelligence in the residual impressions of the intellect is *Īśvara*. This view, according to Niścaladāsa, is not sound. He argues in the *Vṛttiprabhākara* as follows:—What is the adjunct of *Īśvara*? (1) Is it bare nescience? (2) Or, is it nescience which is conjoined with impressions? (3) Or, is it residual impression alone? (1) If it be the first, then it contradicts the statement that *Īśvara* is the reflection of intelligence in the nescience which is conjoined with the impressions of the intellect. (2) On the second alternative, it is useless to say that the reflection is in nescience which is conjoined with the impressions of the intellect. If it be said that the impressions of the intellect are admitted to be the attribute of nescience so that *Īśvara's* omniscience may be accounted for, it does not stand to reason. By the presence of the *sattva* constituent in nescience itself *Īśvara's* omniscience is intelligible; and so there is no need for the assumption of residual impressions. Moreover the impressions of the intellect cannot account for omniscience. Each of the impressions cannot be all-cognizant. Omniscience will be intelligible only when all the impressions go to constitute the attribute of nescience. This is possible only at the time of deluge, *pralaya*. Hence, to say that nescience qualified by the impressions of the intellect is the adjunct of *Īśvara* is not sound. (3) If bare impression be the

adjunct of *Īśvara*, (a) is the reflection in each of the impressions *Īśvara*? (b) or, is *Īśvara* the reflection in all the impressions? (a) On the first, since the impressions of the intellects of the *jīvas* are numerous there must be many *Īśvaras*, and since each of the impressions has only the finite soul as its object, the reflection of intelligence in it cannot be omniscient. (b) If it be said that in all the impressions there is only one reflection and that is God, except at the time of *pralaya*, simultaneous existence of all the impressions is not possible.

Therefore, the adjunct of *Īśvara* is bare nescience. Even in the *Pañcadaśī* at other places *māyā* is declared to be the adjunct of *Īśvara*. Nescience is the adjunct, and not the impressions of the intellect. By 'residual impression' what is meant here is the *sattva*-constituent alone of nescience. It is called *vāsanā* so that it may be easily understood by the readers. Or it may be for the purpose of instructing that *jīva* and *Īśvara* are non-different, that the nescience of sleep is said to be not different from the cosmic nescience.

NOTE B

Niścaladāsa criticizes the view that the *ānandamaya* is *Īśvara*. The internal organ which is qualified by the gross reflection in waking and dream is called *viññānamaya*. The same *viññānamaya jīva* in a subtle state in sleep is called *ānandamaya*. If the *ānandamaya* is *Īśvara*, then in waking and dream there would be no *Īśvara*, since from these two states the *ānandamaya* is absent. And further, there must be a separate *Īśvara* for every *jīva* in sleep. In all the Vedāntic texts the *jīva* is vested with five sheaths. Vidyāranya himself has declared so in the *Pañcakośa-viveka*. Hence, if we accept the view that the Lord is the *ānandamaya*, there would be conflict with the scriptural texts.

In the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, omniscience and omnipotence are attributed to the *ānandamaya*. But even thus it cannot be identical with the Lord. The intention of the *Upaniṣad* is this : The *jīva* is of three forms, *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, and *Prājña*; and *Īśvara* is also of three forms, *Virāṭ*, *Hiraṇyagarbha*, and *Avyākṛta*. *Jīva*-hood for the *Hiraṇyagarbha* and the *Virāṭ* is declared in the *Upaniṣads*. The purport of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* is to teach that the three forms of the *jīva* are not in reality different from the three forms of the Lord. And so, the attributes of *Īśvara*, like omniscience, etc., are taught to be the qualities of the *ānandamaya* as well. The purport of the *Upaniṣad* is not that the *ānandamaya* is *Īśvara*, but that both the *jīva* and the Lord are to be thought of as non-different. Vidyāraṇya's intention is also the same. For, in the *Brahmānanda*, he declares that the sheath of *ānanda* is one of the states of the *jīva*.

CHAPTER SEVEN
ELUCIDATION OF CONTENTMENT
(TRĀPTIDĪPA - PRAKARAṆA)

The *Trāpti-dīpa* is devoted to a description of calm contentment and supreme satisfaction that are consequent upon *Brahman*-knowledge. In its march from ignorance to enlightenment the self is said to pass through seven stages. The seventh and the final stage is the state of release where there is the supreme felicity, the peace of eternity. The present chapter gives us a glowing account of the final state of felicity as also of the steps that lead thereto. It is in the form of a commentary on the scriptural text which declares: "If the *puruṣa* knows the self as 'this am I', then desiring what and for whose desire should it suffer along with the body?"¹

The import of this scriptural passage is, in the present chapter, clearly explained, whereby it becomes patent how the one who is released in embodiment enjoys the state of satisfaction.

1

Nature of Creation

As an introduction to the explanation of what the word '*puruṣa*' stands for, an account of the nature of creation is given. Creation, according to Advaita, is illusory manifestation. It is neither real transformation nor production *de novo*. *Māyā* is the prius of creation. It shows forth illusorily the *jīva* and the Lord as mere appearances. The *jīva* and the Lord are superimpositions,

and by them are all other things superimposed. Scripture declares: “(*prakṛti*) creates the *jīva* and the Lord as reflections; it becomes both *māyā* and nescience”.² Both the *jīva* and the Lord are non-real manifestations; they are the products of *māyā*; and in their turn they produce the entire universe. The macrocosmic universe which begins with the ‘thought’ of the Lord and ends with his ‘entry’ in the form of the *jīva* is the product of the Lord. Scripture declares: “It thought: ‘let me become many’,”³ and then, “the self having entered in the form of the *jīva*,” etc.⁴ The cosmos has its origination in the Lord’s contemplation and finds its completion in the production of *jīva*-hood. Of the entire external world of animate and inanimate objects, the Lord is the artificer. Of the internal world of transmigratory existence which begins in the state of waking and ends in release, the *jīva* is the author. The *jīva* is the progenitor of its own microcosmic world. “That *jīva*, being deluded by *māyā* and depending on the body, creates everything. In waking it alone finds satisfaction in the manifold objects of enjoyment like woman, food, drink, etc.” In the state of waking the *jīva* delights itself with external objects. “Even in dream which is the world produced by its own *māyā*, the *jīva* is the enjoyer of pleasure and pain.” If in waking the *jīva* sports with the external world, in dream the sphere of its ravings is the internal world of fiction and fancy. “During the time of sleep when everything is dissolved, it obtains happiness suppressed by *tamas*.” “And again due to conjunction with the deeds of the past birth, the same *jīva* dreams and wakes. The *jīva* who sports in these three spheres, of it, indeed, is the entire manifold born.” The *jīva* is tossed from one birth to another, from one state to another, like the weaver’s

2. *NUTU*, 9.

3. *CU*, IV, ii, 3.

4. *Ibid*, VI, iii, 2, 3.

shuttle, without cessation. It lives in the cocoon of its own making. From death to death it travels by the force of its delusion. But when it frees itself from the shackles of ignorance, it is no more taunted by transmigration; there is no longer any misery for it. "That which shines in the world of waking, dream, sleep, etc., that *Brahman* I am; knowing thus (he) is released from all bondage." Release which is brought about by knowledge is the end of transmigration. Of the transmigratory life which begins in waking and comes to a close in release, the *jīva* is the agent. It forges its own bonds, and finally frees itself from its own fetters.

2

Puruṣa

Having described the nature of creation, the meaning of the word '*puruṣa*' is explained. The self of the nature of immutable non-attached intelligence is the locus of delusion. The same self as reflected in the intellect owing to reciprocal superimposition is spoken of in the *śruti* as the *puruṣa*. The bare *jīva* is not meant by the word '*puruṣa*'. The *jīva* as based on the self alone is eligible for release, etc. In fact, no delusion is experienced without a locus thereof. When the *jīva* as conjoined with the locus-element takes hold of the delusion-element, it begins to have the conceit 'I am the subject of transmigration'. The presentation of illusory silver is dependent on the substrateness of nacre. Only in conjunction with the this-element of nacre is the delusion-element of silver presented. But when the delusion-element is discarded, when the substrate becomes the principal factor of experience, then there is the realization as 'I am the non-attached intelligence-self'.

It may be objected that as the non-attached self is not the object of the cognition 'I' it does not stand to reason to use the word 'I' in respect of it. This objection is not

sound. The word 'I' has three senses. One of them is the principal and the other two are secondary. The principal usage of the word 'I' is with regard to the combined form of the immutable self and the reflection of intelligence. Due to reciprocal superimposition, the vulgar identify the immutable with the reflection, and designate this combined form as 'I'. But those who know the truth discriminate between the permanent self and the perishing reflection. When they talk in terms of scripture they use the word 'I' in respect of the former. And in empirical usage they designate the latter as 'I'. Though the same concept is used for both of them, they do not confound the two. When in empirical usage the enlightened say 'I go', etc., what they mean by the concept 'I' is the reflection of intelligence as distinct from the immutable self. But from the point of view of scripture they use the concept 'I' in 'I am non-attached, I am the intelligence-self', etc., only in respect of the bare immutable self. The denotation of 'I' through secondary implication is the eternal self.

It may be said that since knowledge as well as ignorance belong only to the reflection of intelligence and not to the self, it cannot be asserted of the self that it *knows* as 'I am the immutable'; and that it is ridiculous to say that the knowledge 'I am the immutable' belongs to the reflection of intelligence, for the reflection is not the prototype, the shadow is not the substance. This objection is not sound. There is no reality for the reflection apart from that of the prototype. The reflection of intelligence is of the nature of the immutable alone. Since its being a reflection is only apparent, its immutability alone remains as the eternal reality. According to the *ābhāsavāda*, the locus of the reflection of intelligence is the immutable intelligence defined by the internal organ. The reflection which is superimposed is not different from the substrate of superimposition. When the reflection-ness of the reflection is sublated, the immutable alone remains. Between *Brahman* and the immu-

table there is apposition in the principal sense ; and between the immutable and the reflection of intelligence there is apposition through sublation.

If it be said that even the cognition 'I am the immutable' is illusory, since it belongs to the illusory reflection of intelligence, it is a contingency of the acceptable. When it is known that the rope-snake is unreal, the reality of its movement is nowhere admitted. If the snake be a fiction then its movement must also be a fiction and not a fact. When it is declared of the reflection of intelligence that it is illusory, its knowledge must also be illusory. Indeed, one cannot eat the cake and keep it too.

It is no doubt true that even the cognition 'I am the immutable' is illusory. But this knowledge is quite efficient to remove transmigration and its attendant misery. Both the establisher and the sublater must belong to the same genus as their object. The dream-appetite can be satiated only by the dream-food. No amount of real food can satisfy the hunger felt in the dream. Similarly empirically felt needs can be satisfied only by empirical remedies, not otherwise. There is a saying in the world : "Offer oblations to suit the *yakṣa*". As is the ailment, so should the remedy be. An illusory disease can be removed by an illusory antidote. Dream is destroyed by the dream-created tiger. In the same way, knowledge, though illusory, is capable of destroying ignorance and its consequent misery of transmigratory existence. There is no discrepancy whatever in the *puruṣa*, which is related to the immutable, discriminating itself from the immutable and cognizing as 'I am the immutable'. This is the truth taught in the scriptural passage by the word '*asmi*' (I am).

3

Seven Stages

The scriptural text speaks of the self as 'this', because the self is to be immediately experienced. Just as we have

clear perception of the body as ‘I am a *brāhmaṇa*’ etc., we should have cognition, more immediate than the immediacy of perception, of the self as ‘I am the immutable self,’ etc. Śaṅkara in the *Upadeśa-sāhasrī* says: “He for whom there is, like the cognition of the body, knowledge of the self which is the sublatter of the body-cognition, is released even without his will.”⁵

If it be said that the word ‘this’ indicates the natural immediacy of the self, let it be so ; since the self is the self-luminous intelligence, it is ever immediate. The immediacy and self-luminosity of the self do not really conflict with our ignorance of it. Mediacy and immediacy, knowledge and ignorance, both of them are intelligible in respect of the self. Once ten companions, after crossing a swollen river, counted themselves. The man who counted without reckoning himself counted only nine. Though his person was most immediate in existence to him, nay, identical in existence with him, he did not know that he was the tenth. A passerby who happened to observe the un-necessary commotion that prevailed among these comrades accosted them with the words: “There is among you the tenth man”. Then he addressed the man who counted and said “you are the tenth”. The pilgrimage in ignorance is analogous to the travel of these comrades. Though the self is most immediate and intimate we are in thorough ignorance with regard to it. The statement ‘There is no self’ very common among the ignorant is comparable to the sobs and sighs of the man who counted and said ‘There is not the tenth person ; he is not to be seen’. This is a product of ignorance ; the learned call it the obscuration brought about by ignorance. The ten travellers not finding the tenth person began to weep and shout ‘The tenth man was drowned in the river,’ etc. The crying, etc., of these comrades are referred to by those who know as ‘projection’,

a product of ignorance. The words of the passerby "The tenth man is not dead; he is here" gave them mediate knowledge like the knowledge of heaven, etc. When the trustworthy person counted them and said pointing to the man who had originally counted 'You are the tenth', then there was immediate cognition of himself which put an end to the state of misery which they were in. There was mirth in the place of gloom, peals of laughter in the place of pain and misery. In the example given above seven stages are discernible: ignorance, obscuration, projection, mediate knowledge, immediate experience, the removal of misery, and contentment. These seven stages can be observed in the pilgrimage of the self.

The reflection of intelligence with its mind attached to transmigration does not know the reality of its existence, namely, the self-luminous immutable. This is its ignorance of its own inner nature. This is the starting point of its progress to perfection. The reflection incidentally says: "There is not the immutable; it does not appear", and proceeds to assert: "I am the agent; I am the enjoyer". The former is due to obscuration, and the latter is due to projection. The existence of the self is first obscured, and then qualities like agency and enjoyership which are not inherent in the self are superimposed on the self. Either due to scriptural testimony or due to the grace of the preceptor there is at first mediate knowledge in the form "The immutable exists"; and then through inquiry there results the immediate experience: "I alone am the immutable". These two are the fourth and the fifth stages in the quest for truth. When there is the immediate experience of the true nature of the self, there is the relinquishment of the assemblage of misery and pain like agency and enjoyership; and there dawn supreme happiness and divine contentment, for what is to be done has been done and what is to be attained has been attained. This is the two-fold fruit of the tree of knowledge—the removal of misery and

the reaching of bliss. These, then, are the seven stages: ignorance, obscuration, projection, mediate cognition, immediate experience, release from misery, and unexcelled bliss. These seven are the states not of the self, but of the reflection of intelligence, and in them are included both bondage and release. Of them, the first three, viz., ignorance, obscuration, and projection are together the cause of bondage. Ignorance is that state of indifference which exists prior to inquiry in the form 'I do not know'. Non-knowledge is the cause of the empirical usage of indifference. Inquiry conducted on wrong data yields the conclusion 'The self does not exist; it does not appear'. This empirical usage of what is contrary to truth is the product of obscuration. The form of the reflection of intelligence which possesses two bodies is called the projection. The host of misery, like agency, etc., called transmigration which is the cause of bondage, is the product of the projection of ignorance. Although both ignorance and obscuration are established prior to projection, they belong to projection alone, and not to the self. Even prior to the actual production of projection there is its impression; hence there is no contradiction in stating that ignorance and obscuration are the states of projection, i.e., the reflection of intelligence. It cannot be objected that since ignorance, etc., are superimposed on *Brahman* they are the states of *Brahman*, for all states—not only these—are superimposed on *Brahman* alone. If it be said that the states subsequent to projection as expressed by the statements, "I am the transmigrating individual; I am enlightened; I am free from misery; I am contented", appear to be inherent in the *jīva* and not in *Brahman*; then even the prior states of ignorance and obscuration, "I am ignorant; the existence and presentation of *Brahman* are not seen by me," etc., appear certainly to be inherent in the *jīva*. Equally with the other states even ignorance and obscuration seem to be dependent on the *jīva*. The preceptors have taught that *Brahman* is the abode of ignorance because it is the substrate

of the latter. Ignorance is here declared to be the state of the *jīva* because of the conceit of the *jīva* in ignorance.

The twofold knowledge—mediate and immediate—removes ignorance; and with the destruction of ignorance perish its products, the two kinds of obscurations: “It does not appear; it does not exist”. By mediate knowledge is destroyed the cause of the obscurations of the existence of the self; and by immediate experience is removed the other obscuration, namely the non-appearance of the self. Since the superimposition of the *jīva*-hood is discarded with the destruction of obscurations, the entire transmigration—misery which is another name for it—consisting of agency, etc., is removed without a trace. When, thus, all misery is dispelled and the self’s nature of eternal freedom is revealed, and as there is not even the remotest possibility of the revival of misery, there is unexcellable bliss, unalloyed happiness.

A discussion of the seven states had to be entered upon because the scriptural text which is being commented on in the present chapter purports to teach that immediate experience and removal of misery are dependent on the *jīva*.

4

Mediate and Immediate Knowledge

It was said that the significance of the word “this” is to indicate that the self is the content of immediate experience. The meaning of immediacy here is twofold. The self is said to be immediate because it is self-luminous; it is a content of immediate experience because it is cognized by a mode of the intellect. Immediacy in the sense of the self-luminosity of the self does not conflict with the mediate cognition of the self. The self does not cease to be self-luminous when it is mediately cognized; for even the

mediate cognition is of the form that the self is self-luminous. When there is not the cognition "I am *Brahman*", but when there is the cognition "*Brahman* exists", it is called mediate knowledge. This mediate knowledge is not illusory, because its sublation cannot be demonstrated. It can be sublated only by the evidence which says, "*Brahman* does not exist"; but such evidence is nowhere found. Hence it is wrong to maintain that mediate knowledge is illusory. If it be said that the mediate knowledge is illusory because it does not have the specific nature of *Brahman* for its content, then even the cognition of heaven whose content is only the general form as "heaven exists" and not the specific form as "this is heaven" must be illusory. Then it may be said that mediate knowledge is illusory because it has for its content *Brahman* which is the content of immediate experience. This is not true. Even the mediate knowledge does not present *Brahman* to be mediate. The knowledge under discussion is said to be mediate because it does not give us direct intuitive experience of *Brahman* in the form "This is *Brahman*". If it be said that mediate knowledge is illusory because it does not apprehend an element of its content, then even the cognition of pot, etc., must be illusory because the entire pot is never perceived. Though unlike the pot *Brahman* is without parts, it seems to be endowed with parts which are ultimately to be excluded. The elements or parts which are to be excluded are the element of non-existence and the element of non-appearance. The former is removed by mediate knowledge and the latter by immediate experience. That a content, though immediate, can be mediately known is well exemplified by the story of the ten travellers. When the trustworthy person tells the travellers that there is the tenth man, he is not deluding them. Similarly, the statement "*Brahman* exists" is not erroneous. In both the cases there is the obscuration of ignorance.

A bare statement yields only mediate knowledge. But when the meaning of the statement is inquired into, the

specific nature of the content becomes explicit with the result that there arises immediate experience. When the full purport of the sentence "The self is *Brahman*" is cognized after a thorough inquiry, *Brahman* becomes the content of immediate experience. In the example of the travellers also we find that there is the experience of the immediate presence of the tenth person only after an enquiry. When the trustworthy person is questioned as to who the tenth man is, he counts all the ten and reveals to them the tenth man who was all the time there alone. The cognition which is thus obtained after inquiry is never destroyed. No longer could the travellers harbour the belief that one of them had perished in the floods. Similarly, in the case of *Brahman* there is at first the mediate knowledge of its existence from the scriptural statements like, "In the beginning this was *sat* alone one only without a second", etc. Then, the major texts like 'That thou art', when their purport is clearly understood, reveal the immediacy of *Brahman*. Never more does this knowledge that the self is identical with *Brahman* attain inconstancy. Since the immediacy of *Brahman* is well established, there is no fear of losing the intuitive experience of *Brahman*. That there is mediate knowledge from mere statement and immediate knowledge from the statement whose meaning has been inquired into is illustrated in the episode of Bhṛgu of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. Understanding *Brahman*, at first, mediately through its characteristic of being the cause of origination, etc., Bhṛgu came to have immediate experience of *Brahman* through a searching and prolonged inquiry. Though, in this case, Bhṛgu's parent did not instruct his son in the words "That thou art", etc., he pointed out to him the field of inquiry, namely, the five sheaths. Through repeated inquiry into the nature of the sheaths, Bhṛgu came to realize that Bliss is *Brahman* and that the self is identical with *Brahman*. After declaring 'reality', 'knowledge', and 'infinity' to be the essential characteristics of *Brahman*, scripture shows that the same infinite *Brahman* is to be known as lying in the cave of the sheaths.

The episode of Indra in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* is a similar instance in point. Indra, after knowing mediately the characteristics of the self as indicated in the passage, "That self which is devoid of defect, rid of the ravaging effects of age, free from death and misery, etc.," approached his preceptor four times with a view to acquire intuitive experience of the self. The *Aitareya Upaniṣad* indicates *Brahman* mediately in the passage "In the beginning, this was the one only self; nothing else existed", etc., and later by the method of superimpositions and subsequent removal, the *Upaniṣad* imparts an intuitive experience of *Brahman* as being of the nature of intelligence. Mediate cognition of *Brahman* results from all the minor texts of scripture; from the inquiry into the purport of the major texts is derived the immediate experience of *Brahman*. This view is not without support from the preceptors and pioneers of Advaita. Śaṅkara in his *Vākyavṛtti* states that the major texts are for the sake of the establishment of the immediate experience of *Brahman*. Hence it is wrong to contend that the major texts do not yield immediate insight into the truth. Through inquiry into the purport of the major texts one realizes the identity between the self and *Brahman*. The intelligence defined by the internal organ which is the abode of the word and concept of 'I' is indicated by the word 'thou' in the major text. *Īśvara* who is defined by *māyā*, who is the source of the world, whose characteristics are omniscience, etc., who is conditioned by the quality of mediacy and who is of the nature of reality, etc., is indicated by the word 'that'. When we consider merely the expressed senses of the two words we find that they contradict each other. To one and the same object we would then have to attribute both immediacy and mediacy, finitude and infinitude. Hence, discarding the first meanings of the words, we must probe into their secondary implications. The kind of secondary implication which is applicable to the major texts like 'That thou art' is that which is obtained by relinquishing a part of their primary meaning. As in the case of the judgment 'This is

that person', in respect of the major texts also the exclusive-non-exclusive implication is to be resorted to. In such cases as these, the express sense either of the related or of the qualified is not intelligible. The sense of the major texts is declared by the learned to be the impartite reality which is of the one consistency of intelligence. The inner intelligence which shines as the witness of all intellects is the self which is unexcellable bliss. There is no other entity besides it. It is all-that-which-is. When in this manner there is the cognition of the identity between the self and *Brahman*, then alone is removed the non-*Brahman*hood of the sense of 'thou'; and as a consequence, the mediacy of the sense of 'that' ceases. When the non-*Brahman*hood of 'thou' and mediacy or remoteness of 'that' are removed, there is gained the intuitive insight into the nature of the self which is the fullness of bliss, the sole reality which is without a second. Those who assert that there is only mediate knowledge from the major texts do not really know the purport of scripture. They are quack doctors of philosophy, not real knowers of the truth. Setting aside the final doctrine of scripture, it may be argued that logic tells us that from a sentence only mediate cognition results; that, for example, from a statement about heaven we get only an inferential knowledge about heaven. The argument takes the following syllogistic form: The major text gives only mediate knowledge; because it is a sentence; like the sentence about heaven. This syllogism is not valid, for the *probans* is inconstant in the case of the tenth man in the episode of the travellers. From the statement "You are the tenth man" there certainly results immediate knowledge. Hence, it is not established that because the major text is a sentence it yields only mediate knowledge. It may be said that if the *jīva*, which is itself immediate, desires the immediacy of *Brahman*, the established immediacy which is inherent in it may perish. But this fear is without any ground, because what the opponent regards as a defect is really a contingency of the acceptable. The individuality of *jīva* is not desired to be

maintained. On the contrary, it is the destruction of its individuality that is sought after.

It may be said that the immediacy of the *jīva* is intelligible because the *jīva* is defined by an adjunct, but not that of *Brahman* because *Brahman* is devoid of adjuncts. This objection is not valid. That *Brahman* is devoid of adjuncts is not established. The cognition of *Brahman* has for its content only that which is defined by adjunct. Until there is final freedom from the shackles of the body, the adjuncts are not removed. The difference between the adjuncts respectively of the *jīva* and of *Brahman* is this, that while the *jīva* is conjoined with the intellect, *Brahman* is free from such conjunction. Conjunction with the intellect is the adjunct of the *jīva*, while non-conjunction with the intellect is the adjunct of *Brahman*. Now, it may be asked: "A positive fact like the conjunction with the intellect is certainly an adjunct; but how is a negation such as the non-conjunction with the intellect an adjunct?" To this objection, the reply is: the definition of adjunct is this: 'That which is the cause of difference which exists so long as the product lasts is an adjunct'. This definition applies equally to the affirmation and the negation of the conjunction with the intellect. As is affirmation, so is negation an adjunct. Gold is no doubt different from iron. But there is little difference between them when they become the fetters of a man. Conjunction as well as non-conjunction with the intellect are adjuncts in so far as both of them serve to differentiate the *jīva* from *Brahman*.

That negation is not bare negation, that equally with positive assertion it is instrumental to *Brahman*-knowledge is declared by all the preceptors of Advaita. The function of the Vedāntas is twofold, i.e., through the exclusion of the not-that and through direct affirmation. The exclusion of the not-self is as essential as the positive assertion about the self. A contention may be raised here: "If the Vedāntas

teach *Brahman* through excluding the universe, how could there be the cognition through apposition in the form 'I am *Brahman*', since the sense of 'I' which falls on the side of the not-self is also to be excluded?" To this contention the reply is: Since only a part of the sense of 'I' is relinquished, the statement 'I am *Brahman*' is quite intelligible through exclusive-non-exclusive implication. By renouncing the internal organ, the intelligence-witness-self which remains, is seen to be of the nature of *Brahman*. In the statement 'I am *Brahman*', by the word 'I' is meant the self which is free from conjunction with the internal organ.

5

Brahman-knowledge: Pervasion by Intellect

The witness, though self-luminous, is in common with the other things pervaded by a mode of the intellect alone. Nor is this tantamount to the relinquishment of the final doctrine of the self-luminosity of *Brahman*. The authors of the sacred teaching have excluded only the pervasion by the fruit, namely, the reflection of intelligence in the mental mode. Not the reflection, but the mental mode is capable of apprehending the self. The not-self is apprehended both by the mode and by the fruit, the reflection of intelligence, which is present in the mode. By the mode of the intellect, ignorance is destroyed; by the reflection of intelligence the pot is presented. But in the case of *Brahman*, though for the sake of the removal of ignorance the pervasion of the mode is required, there is no necessity for the reflection since *Brahman* shines by its own light. It is a light that was never on sea or land. It lends its lustre even to the luminaries of the firmament. The reflection of intelligence is important to illumine its prototype. For the perception of pot, etc., both the light of the eye and the lamp-light are required; but for the perception of lamp none except the eye is needed. As in the mode that apprehends the pot, etc., even in the mode which is of the form of *Brahman* there is present the

reflection of intelligence. But in the former case the reflection which is not identical with the pot manifests the pot, while in the latter instance the reflection does not appear to be different from *Brahman*. Like the lamp-light in the presence of the noon-day sun, before the mighty effulgence of *Brahman* the borrowed light of the reflection fades into nothingness. Need it then be said that it is powerless to produce in *Brahman* the excellence called manifestation? The text “Knowing that to be distinctionless, infinite, devoid of *probans* and example, not the object of the instruments of knowledge, and beginningless, the enlightened are released”⁶ declares of *Brahman* that it is not pervaded by the fruit. The word ‘*aprameya*’ indicates that *Brahman* is not apprehended by the reflection. The text “By the mind alone is this to be attained; there is no plurality whatsoever”⁷ clearly states that *Brahman* is pervaded by the mode of the intellect.

6

Need for Repeated Inquiry

It was said that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text which is being commented on in the present chapter attributes to the *jīva* the states of immediate experience and removal of misery. The words “If he knows the self as ‘this am I’” indicate the direct experience of the nature of *Brahman*. Though immediate experience is the legitimate result of the study of the scriptural texts, hearing or studying them once is not enough. The *sūtrakāra* says (IV, i, 1) that ‘Repetition (of the mental functions of knowing, meditating, etc., is required) on account of the text giving instruction more than once.’ Repetition is needed in order to deepen the knowledge once gained. Śaṅkara says, “Hearing, etc., along with calmness,

6. *Amṛtabindu Upaniṣad*.

7. *KAU*, iv, 11.

etc., are to be practised in such a way that the knowledge of the sense of the sentence 'I am *Brahman*' becomes firm." For various reasons the knowledge from the scriptural texts once heard or studied is prone to be weak. First, there is a variety and multiplicity of scriptural texts which may give rise to doubts. Secondly, since the sense of the major texts which is of the form of the impartite non-dual *Brahman* is non-empirical, there may arise a sense of its impossibility. Lastly, the conception of the contrary in the form of conceit like agency, etc., tends to weaken the knowledge of the truth once gained. As these three factors work in concert to make *Brahman*-knowledge appear slender and superficial, to match their strength scripture must be studied over and over again. Repeated 'hearing' serves to dispel all doubts as to the intentions of scripture. In the section dealing with works, due to differences among sub-sections and differences among desires, various works are enjoined. From this it may be inferred that even in the section about knowledge conflicting statements are to be found. To remove such a possible doubt, repeated study is necessary. Hearing or study is the cognition that for the entire Vedāntas the sole purport is *Brahman*. In the *Samanvayādhya* of the *Brahmasūtra* the nature of hearing is clearly explained. *Manana* or reflection is the process of making the meaning of the Vedāntas intelligible by finding out adequate arguments. Reflection removes the contingency of the impossibility of the sense of Vedānta and presents it as a perfect possibility. This is declared in the second chapter of the *Brahmasūtra*. Due to long practice ranging over a period of innumerable births there arises every moment the cognition that the body is the self; similarly also the notion that the world is real. Such conceptions of the contrary vanish when there is one-pointed meditation. This is achieved, even prior to the instruction about the truth, through meditation. That one-pointedness of the mind is the result of meditation is patent from the fact that the enquiry into meditation on the qualified *Brahman* is found in the sacred teaching of the Vedānta.

If a person has not practised meditation prior to the instruction about *Brahman*, in his case the notions of the contrary are removed by the practice of *Brahman*, i.e., by pondering over the truth of the identity between *Brahman* and the self. The wise call that to be the practice of *Brahman* which consists of thinking about *Brahman*, hearing about *Brahman*, and speaking about *Brahman*. The *śruti* enjoins that a *brāhmaṇa* who is a hero in the realm of the spirit should know *Brahman* and gain steadiness in that knowledge, and that he should not fritter away his energy in directing his thoughts to other things. His whole attention must centre round the self. Lord Kṛṣṇa strikes the same note when he says in the *Gītā*: “Those people who think of me and meditate on me without interruption, to them who are steadfast I convey what they lack and preserve what they already have.”⁸ Both scripture and the traditional code enjoin the constant one-pointedness of the intellect in the self so that the conceptions of the contrary may cease. Those are conceptions of the contrary which, obscuring the real nature of things, project the cognition of their contraries. When a youth regards his parent as his foe, he is harbouring in his bosom the conception of what is contrary to truth. The ultimate truth is that the self is not the body and that the world is an appearance. The conception of the contrary of this truth is that the body is the self and that the world is absolutely real. Since this conception is destroyed only by the conception of the truth, the distinction of the self from the body and the illusoriness of the world must be constantly meditated upon. It may be asked whether there is not any rule to be observed in conceiving the nature of the self as distinct from the body and contemplating the illusoriness of the world, as there is in chanting of spells or meditation on the visible image. The reply is that there is no rule

whatever in regard to contemplating the real, for this contemplation has a visible fruit. Chanting of spells and meditation on an image have for their fruit some unseen results. Hence, they are governed by rules and regulations. But *Brahman*-knowledge is not a hypothetical fruit like the attainment of heaven. It is, like the activity of eating, conditioned by no hard and fast rule. A man who is hungry does not care for conventions. He is not bound by rules as the man who chants the spells is. The only aim of his endeavour is to appease his appetite. He may eat or not eat ; or he may indulge himself in some other activity ; but all the same his only object in view is to satisfy his hunger. Chanting of spells is not like the activity of eating. Chanting is governed by rules which, if not observed, lead to obstacles. If the chanting be done in a way quite contrary to the rule, great harm is wrought. Instead of beneficial effects, baneful results are reaped. The conceptions of the contrary, on the other hand, are, like hunger, the cause of visible misery. To vanquish this misery any means can be employed without any regard as to rules and regulations. The means to the vanquishment of misery was pointed out already. It is the thinking, hearing, and talking of *Brahman*. Even in the case of steady concentration on *Brahman* there is not the compulsion that the mind is to be quelled, as there is in the case of meditation on visible image, etc. Meditation is defined as the uninterrupted flow of the mind which has for its sphere, the visible image. Here the strict rule is that there should not be vacillation in the mind. Patañjali defines *yoga* as the process of controlling the modifications of the mind. Mind-control is of prime importance in meditation. Meditation is the technique of mind-control. The mind is noted for its feverish activity and propensity for wandering. The shafts of the mind are swifter than even the cyclonic wind and the speed of the light-waves. The mind is often compared to a maddened monkey drunk deep of the intoxicant of desire and roaming in the wilds of sense-objects. Arjuna

reflects this idea when he says to Kṛṣṇa in the *Gītā* : “ Verily, the mind, O Kṛṣṇa, is restless, turbulent, strong, and unyielding ; its control, like that of the wind, I consider to be very hard to achieve.”⁹ Difficult though it be, it is, nevertheless, possible to curb the current of the mind. The flow of the mental stream can be arrested by constant effort and continued endeavour. Vasiṣṭha in the *Vāsiṣṭha* says to Rāma that the control of the mind is more difficult to achieve than emptying the ocean, unearthing the mighty Sumeru, or extinguishing a raging conflagration. The achievement of this difficult feat, namely the control of the mind is the *raison d’etre* of meditation. In the contemplation of *Brahman*, however, there is nothing to be compelled, no force whatever. Not only is there no restriction with regard to thinking, talking, etc., of *Brahman* ; a raw mind is struck with wonder at the variety of ways in which the nature of *Brahman* has been declared in stories and scriptures. But from the path, stories do not deflect him, whose mind has culminated in the cognition “ The self alone is intelligence ; the world is illusory.” The roots of knowledge which support him are too firm to allow him to be tossed by every passing gust of desire. But strong as the roots are, the tree is uprooted by the stronger storm. The operations of agriculture, merchandise, menial service, etc., activity in the spheres of poesy and logic and such other occupations distract the mind from contemplation ; for these avocations do not remind one of the truth. They tend more to obscure the real than reveal it. Activities like eating, etc., do not, however, impede the progress of the man who contemplates the self. They do not totally throw the self into the limbo of oblivion. They are not incompatible with the contemplation of the self. Even if the flow of contemplation be interrupted for a moment, subsequently it regains its former swiftness. There is nothing very

harmful in the bare forgetting of the truth for a while. The acme of misery lies in the conceptions of the contrary. Though the activities like eating, etc., may be the cause of forgetting the truth for a time, they do not project the contrary notions; and as the memory of the truth follows immediately after the cessation of such activities, there is no lease of life given to the notions of the contrary to protrude themselves. But indulgence in logic, etc., are not on a par with activities like eating, etc. For the man who practises the other arts there is no need for remembering the truth. Since poesy, etc., are contrary to the knowledge of the truth, they subvert what is true and distract their votary from the path of true knowledge. "Know that one self alone; leave off all other speech; it is the bund of immortality,"¹⁰ declares a scriptural text. "Do not ponder over many words. It is only the exhaustion of speech."¹¹ Distracted attention would lead one nowhere. All activities must cease if *Brahman*-knowledge is to be made unshakable. Learning of scriptures other than the Vedāntas does not help the seeker after truth. On the contrary, it pulls him down, serving only as a dead-weight. Food, etc., cannot be given up, because without them the *jīva* cannot live. This is not the case with non-Vedāntic study. Such study lures the aspirant very easily away from *Brahman*-knowledge. The contention that house-holder saints like Janaka were knowers of *Brahman*, though engaged in the management of worldly affairs, is not relevant. They had attained perfection in *Brahman*-knowledge. Like the rock of ages, they stood firm and fixed in the knowledge of the self; and no allurements would be powerful enough to draw them away from their post. But those who are only on the way to perfection should not expose themselves to this hazard. A growing

10. *MU*, II, ii, 5.

11. *BU*, IV, iv, 21.

plant requires a fencing, whereas a stately tree can rely on its own resources.

7

Knowers of Brahman and World Affairs

The knowers of *Brahman* engage themselves in the affairs of the world, knowing full well that the world is illusory. Their action is caused by their past deeds which have begun to bear fruit. Unconcerned, they do what *prārabdha* goads them to do. Though in the world, they are not of the world. Holding their heads in solitude, they delegate their hands to society. They are not affected by the effects of their deeds. Their deeds may even appear to be wrong and questionable. They may appear to act in undesirable ways. But their actions are not intended by them ; and they are in no way hindered by their occupations. *Karma* is imperious in its course. There is none who can oppose its current. Those who know that *prārabdha* can be destroyed only by enjoying its effects submit to it without being scorched by its heat. The enlightened and the ignorant alike have to reap the consequences of their *prārabdha*. Both have to walk in a path strewn with thorns. But while the enlightened walk with shoes on, the ignorant have no such protection to enable them to pass unhurt. The vulgar are led astray by their whimsical moods, whereas the wise regard themselves as witnesses and not victims of their moods. Two travellers wend their way on the same road ; and both of them are equally fatigued. One of them knows that the destination is near, and so he quickens his pace in the hope of reaching it soon. But the other is heavy of heart, and not knowing that his place of rest is nigh, he plods on with dragging steps.

The person who has well intuited the self is not troubled by the notions of the contrary. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text speaks of such a person when it says, 'desiring what

and for whose desire should he suffer along with the body'. Where there is the cognition of the illusoriness of the world, there is no room for the distinction of the subject who desires and the object of desire. When the utter bankruptcy of the world is realized, the trinkets of the world cease to bear any fascination for man. And if there be no subject to desire and no object to be desired, all misery comes to an end, like the lamp unfed by oil. A man who knows the truth about the *fata morgana* is not bewildered by it. The exquisite world of fancy created by the magician does not lure those who know it to be such. Without being deceived by it, they cast a smile at its exquisiteness and unreality. Similarly the man who understands through inquiry the adventitious and apparent character of the beauties of the world does not set any value on them. Beholding their defects, he desires to relinquish them. That the world is full of misery is patent on its very face. There is misery in gathering the objects of the world; there is misery in preserving them. When they perish there is misery again. The world is miserable through and through. The things which we regard as the most beautiful in the world are not really beautiful. Even the most ravishing woman in the world is no more than a mass of flesh and a bundle of bones. Defects and ugliness of the things of the world such as these are clearly indicated in the scriptures. A man who constantly ruminates over them can never be deluded. He is not caught in the meshes of *māyā*; and there is no misery for him. If there be a discernment of the defects of the worldly objects, there cannot arise any desire to enjoy them. A person, though harassed by hunger, does not long to eat poisoned food. If even the person who is extremely hungry should shun poison, how could a man who is satiated with sweet dishes ever think of taking it? He who has drunk deep of the nectar of *Brahman*-knowledge, how can he long for a sip of hemlock from the fatal cup of the world?

If at any time the *jñānin* should desire for sense-enjoyments owing to the presence of *prārabdha*, he would not enjoy them with any satisfaction or ardour. He would approach them with supreme discontent; and his relish is comparable to that derived from having to eat the faeces. A house-holder saint who has faith in the teaching of scripture and in the words of the preceptor, though experiencing the objects of the world, does not attach himself to them. He feels sorry that his *karma* has not yet come to an end, and goes about his business without any liking for it. The discomfort which the *jñānin* feels is not a burning born of *samsāra*; on the contrary, it is the expression of his non-attachment, of his aversion for the objects of the world. The *sāmsārika* heat is the product of illusory cognition. Ignorance is the source of the misery of transmigration. The *jñānin* who has transcended nescience is not affected by the ruffle of the empirical life. If he be discomfited at any time, it is due to his dislike for the objects of sense. That he is not in tune with the enjoyment of the world is patent from the fact that he gets disgusted with it very soon. Desires do not multiply in his case. Desire is like a burnt seed, impotent to produce the sprout. In the case of the ignorant, desires do not die with enjoyment. Fulfilled desires bring in fresh ones. Like fire fed by fuel, they grow from more to more. But enjoyment which is combined with discernment does not breed fresh desires. The sun of knowledge scorches the seed of desire, making it ineffectual to sprout forth and yield fresh fruits. A thief does not deceive a friend who knows him to be a thief. The *jñānin* knows the treachery of desires, and he is not victimised by them. He becomes the master of desires, and not their slave. His mind which is controlled by contemplation does not run after the objects of sense. A modicum of sense-enjoyment seems mountain-like to him. A prince who is freed from captivity is satisfied with a village given to him. But a king who is not pestered by foes casts his greedy eyes on neighbouring principalities.

The *jñānin* is a man who is free from the prison-house of the world. Even an insignificant portion of worldly enjoyment suffices to satiate him.

8

Prārabdha : Three Kinds

“Now, if the enlightened see only defects in the objects of the world, how could *prārabdha* evoke in them desire for enjoyment?” The reply to this will be clear when we realize that *prārabdha* is of three kinds: (1) that which generates desire, (2) that which yields enjoyments, even though not desired, and (3) that which originates enjoyment due to the desire of another.

The pilferer, the glutton, and the adulterer know that their respective acts would only lead to disaster. But driven by the force of the *prārabdha* which generates desire they indulge in activities which undermine them. Such deeds cannot be prevented even by the Lord. For the Lord himself has declared in the *Gītā*: “Even a man with knowledge acts in accordance with his nature; the creatures pursue nature; what can restraint do?”¹² All men act according to the impressions of their past deeds, both good and bad. Even the Lord does not prevent the course of *prakṛti*. The *prārabdha* will end only when its force is spent. If there be any other way by which it can be discarded, then personalities like Nala, Rāma, and Yudhiṣṭhira would not have subjected themselves to hazards and hardships. Nor is non-intervention on the part of the Lord incompatible with his omnipotence; for even the determinate nature of *prārabdha* is a necessary element in the scheme of the Lord.

That there is a kind of *prārabdha* which is preceded by non-desire is evident from the conversation between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna. Arjuna asks Kṛṣṇa: “Prompted by what does the *puruṣa* walk in sin, even without his desire, O Vārṣṇeya, as if impelled by force?” To this Kṛṣṇa replies: “It is desire, it is anger, born of the constituent of *rajas*: of great appetite and very sinful; know this here to be the foe.”¹³ It is the drive of desire which goads a man to action even without his will. It drags him to sinful ways and degrades his moral sense. Natural tendencies and propensities compel man to conform to them even against his wishes. Kṛṣṇa declares in the *Gītā* “Bound, O son of Kuntī, by your own deeds, born of your own nature, you shall helplessly do out of delusion what you (now) desire not to do.”¹⁴

The nature of the *prārabdha* which yields consequences due to the desire of another is as follows: when a particular act is neither desired nor undesired by the agent, it so happens sometimes that the agent is obliged to do that act in deference to the wishes of another person. This is a case of the *prārabdha* which is preceded by the desire of another. The deeds of the enlightened one fall under this category. He knows the defectiveness of the world, and yet he is obliged to act.

9

Brahman - knowledge and Prārabdha

“If desire due to *prārabdha* be natural even to the knower of truth, why then does the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text deny the possibility of desire in his case in the words ‘desiring what’, etc. The text unambiguously declares the non-existence of desire in him who knows the truth. How

13. *Gītā*, iii, 36-37.

14. *Gītā*, xviii, 60.

can this assertion be reconciled with the fact that he comes to possess desires due to the residual effects of his *prārabdha* ? ” To this objection the reply is: the *Bṛhadāranyaka* text does not deny the existence of desires in the case of one who knows the truth. It declares only the sublation of desires. Desires there are even for the enlightened ; but they are unproductive of further effects. Like fried grains, they are impotent to produce fresh shoots. The desire of the knower is unproductive because he knows the unreality of the object of his desire. Just as fried grains are useful for eating and not for sprouting, the desires of the knower of the truth give him a little enjoyment, but they do not entail in their train any more of their kind. The deeds which have begun to bear their fruit perish when they have borne their fruit. Since *prārabdha* is the cause only of enjoyment, it dies with the destruction of its product. There can be misery only when there is the delusion that the object of enjoyment is real. The person who possesses true knowledge is devoid of such delusion ; and hence he is not worried by his *prārabdha*. The delusion that the object of enjoyment is real is of the form : “ Let not this enjoyment perish. Let it increase more and more. Let there be no obstruction to it. On account of it I am, indeed, fortunate. ” This delusion is overcome by the knowledge which enables a person to transcend both likes and dislikes. Though enjoyment is common to the enlightened and the ignorant alike, the latter come to grief while the former do not. The deluded people are very much grieved because they wish for impossible things. They desire the permanence of things which are impermanent. They wish to squeeze happiness out of the objects of enjoyment which are by nature the source of misery. The wise men, on the contrary, know the illusoriness of sense-enjoyment. Withdrawing their desires from sense-objects, they enjoy only such of those which are the result of their *prārabdha* and do not come to grief. Observing the world to be of an impermanent and indeterminable nature, comparable to

the dream and the *fata morgana*, how can the knower of truth be attached to it? Who, except those who are perverse, will drink poison after knowing its fatal consequences? The man who watchfully experiences both waking and dream should constantly ponder over the points of similarity between them. The world is no better than a dream. When the fictitious character of the world is well cognized, attachment to the objects of the world ceases along with the cessation of the cognition of reality in them.

“If the knower of truth knows that the world is but an illusory appearance, if he sees no reality in the objects of sense, how is enjoyment possible to him? The enjoyment of a thing is dependent on the knowledge of the thing to be real. The cognition of the unreality of a thing and the enjoyment thereof are mutually incompatible.” The reply to this objection is that the enjoyment of an object is not dependent on the object being real. There can be the experience of illusion even after the knowledge of its illusoriness. The *fata morgana* appears equally to those who know its unreality and to those who take it to be real. The enjoyment born of *prārabdha* does no harm to him who does not forget that “this world of duality is, like the magician’s world, indeterminable in nature.” There is the restriction that true knowledge gives us the clear memory of the illusoriness of the world. But there is no rule that it is incompatible with the enjoyment of one’s *prārabdha*. The obstinacy of *prārabdha* is in compelling the *jīva* to enjoy pleasure and suffer pain, and not in postulating the reality of the objects of enjoyment. Knowledge and *prārabdha* are not contradictories, since they have different contents, like the colour and taste of a substance. The magical feat is witnessed even by him who knows it to be fictitious. If *prārabdha* occasions the reality of the world and then produces enjoyment, it would be in conflict with knowledge. But mere enjoyment does not induce any sense

of reality in the object enjoyed. *Prārabdha* originates enjoyment even without invoking the cognition of the reality of the object. Undiminished enjoyment is caused by the fictitious objects of the dream-world. Similarly, even the objects of waking experience are capable of effecting enjoyment without themselves being real.

Knowledge is not the destroyer of *prārabdha* because it does not effect the dissolution of the world. It reveals only the illusory nature of the world, and by that the world is not dissolved. Just as the people of the world, while not denying the fact of magical feat, know it to be fictitious, the knower of truth, while not discarding the enjoyment generated by *prārabdha*, possesses the cognition of the illusoriness of the world.

“True knowledge is the cause of the dissolution of the world. Scripture declares: ‘Where indeed the world is his self, there who shall see whom and by what? What shall he smell? or what shall he speak?’ It is evident from this statement that in the state of knowledge there is no empirical usage of the distinctions and divisions of the world. There are no seer and the seen, no doer and the deed. If this be the case, how can there be for the knower of the truth enjoyment generated by *prārabdha*? Knowledge destroys duality, and without duality there can be no action and the enjoyment of its fruit.” To this objection the reply is as follows: The *Sūtra* (IV, 4, 17) declares: “(What scripture says about absence of all specific cognition) refers either to deep sleep or union (release); for this is manifested (by the texts).” What the texts say about the absence of specific cognition is said with reference to either the state of dreamless sleep or to the state of release. If this be not admitted and if it be asserted that true knowledge is incompatible with the appearance of duality, then *Yājñavalkya* and others would not have been preceptors. For if there be perception of duality, there

would be no knowledge for them, and if there be non-perception of duality there would be no speech. Thus, this absurd position would lead to the contingency of postulating ignorance for the great preceptors like *Yājñavalkya*.

If it be said that *Yājñavalkya* and others who are entitled to preceptorship possess mediate knowledge and not the intuitive experience which is devoid of the perception of duality, then why should not sleep which is also bereft of the cognition of duality be the intuitive experience? If the non-cognition of duality be the differentia of intuitive experience, the state of dreamless sleep where there is no cognition of duality must be the intuitive experience of *Brahman*.

If it be asserted that in sleep there is not the cognition of the truth of the self, then the cognition of the self, and not the non-remembrance of duality, is the differentia of spiritual intuition. The cognition of the self alone is knowledge, not the non-cognition of duality.

The position of the opponent is in no way improved when he says that knowledge is a combination of the cognition of the self and the non-remembrance of duality. If both together constitute knowledge, then inert objects like pot, etc., would be entitled to half the knowledge, for they are entirely ignorant of the dualities of the world. Even a sage immersed in *samādhi* would not be so non-cognizant of the distinctions of the world as the pot, etc. Does it then mean that the inert things occupy a higher stratum in the evolution of spiritual knowledge than the best among saints? If it be said that the cognition of the self alone constitutes knowledge, it is a contingency of the acceptable. The knowledge of the self requires the control of the mind. When the mind is brought under control, self-knowledge is easily achieved. The control of the mind

is required because it is only by the controlled mind that the illusoriness of the world is cognized.

The words of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text ‘desiring what, etc.’ indicate that the knower of truth does not possess desires which are productive of further consequences. He has his mind under control and his desires are only those which come to him on account of his *prārabdha*. Certain texts of the sacred scripture declare that ‘attachment is the mark of ignorance’, and they say that the knower of truth is non-attached. “How can the tree be verdant, in whose hollow there is fire?” Certain other texts admit desire in the case of the man who possesses true knowledge. “Because the meaning of the sacred teaching is concluded, even by that there is release. Let attachment, etc., be as they are desired. Their existence is not transgressed.” The two sets of scriptural passages seem to involve a contradiction. But in reality there is no conflict between them. Desires which have their roots in ignorance and which are generative of further fruit are denied in the case of the enlightened person. But those desires which have lost their sting are not incompatible with the realization of the saint.

10

Self is Non-attached

It was shown above that the words ‘desiring what’ of the scriptural text indicate the illusoriness of the world. Now, it will be explained how the words ‘for the sake of whose desire’ are intended to inculcate the truth of the non-attachedness of the self. The words ‘for the sake of whose desire’ predicate the absence of enjoyership from the self. By the knowledge of the non-attached nature of the self its enjoyership is negated. The contention that as the negation of a thing must be preceded by its position, and as the self is by nature not an enjoyer, there can be no negation of

enjoyership, can be refuted by the citation of the scriptural texts which attribute enjoyership to the self in the empirical sense. There are scriptural passages which say that husband, wife, son, etc., are not for the sake of their own enjoyment, but that they are for the sake of the enjoyment of the self.

Who is the enjoyer? Is it the immutable self? or, is it the reflection of intelligence? or, is it the combined form of both, the immutable and the reflection? The immutable does not attain enjoyership because it is non-attached. The transformation called the conceit of pleasure and pain is what is known as enjoyment. Hence the predication of enjoyership in the case of the self would be tantamount to the self-contradictory statement that the self is both immutable and changing. Nor is it proper to predicate enjoyership of the reflection of intelligence. The reflection of intelligence is subject to transformation because it is dependent on the changing intellect. But since the reflection has no independence of its own, and since its prototype, the immutable self, is unchanging and not an enjoyer, the reflection also cannot be an enjoyer. Therefore the combined form of the immutable and the reflection is designated, in the world, by the word 'enjoyer'. Enjoyership is adventitious to the immutable. When scripture speaks of the self as the enjoyer, the reference is to the combined form of the immutable and the reflection. There is no real enjoyership for the immutable. This is the purport of all the scriptural statements.

Questioned by Janaka as to 'which is the self', Yājñavalkya began his answer by describing the self of the nature of knowledge present in all the senses, and ended with the statement, 'This *puruṣa* is unattached.' All the scriptures which are engaged in the inquiry 'who is this self?' commence with the combined form of the immutable and the reflection and culminate in the pure immutable self.

The empirical self, which is the enjoyer, induced by non-discrimination, super-imposes on itself the reality of the immutable, and thinking its enjoyership to be absolutely real, it never desires to relinquish it. The scriptural texts which declare that "For the desire of the self everything is dear, etc." do not predicate enjoyership of the immutable, but only of the empirical self which is a mixture of the immutable and the reflection of intelligence. Scripture restates the empirical usage when it says that husband, wife, etc., are for the enjoyment of the enjoyer himself. The objects of enjoyment are the complements, not of the absolute, but of the empirical self. The restatement of the scripture is for enjoining the direction of one's love to the self, drawing it away from the sense-objects. Since the objects of enjoyment are subsidiary to the enjoyer, let there be no attachment to the objects, but only to the principal, the self. There is the traditional code which says: "That constant love of objects which is found in those who are devoid of discrimination, let it, O Viṣṇu, depart from my heart which is ever remembering you."¹⁵ The purport of the code is this: with the intensity with which the ignorant love the objects of sense, the enlightened should love the self. Those who are attached to the self should give up their attachment to the sense-objects. The person who is desirous of discerning the self withdraws his love from the confluence of sense-objects and directs it to the self. Just as the vulgar rivet their attention on garland, sandal-paste, dress, damsel, etc., the man who desires release directs his attention to the enjoyer. He remains constant in the contemplation of the self. Just as those who want victory in the warfare of words are immersed in the study of poetry, drama, logic, etc., the one who longs for liberation engages himself attentively in the quest for truth. Like the

15. An alternative meaning: "Let my love not depart from you!" Here, the reading would be *mā apasarpatu*, instead of *māpa sarpatu*.

heaven-seeker who faithfully performs chanting, meditation, etc., he bestows supreme faith on the self. Even as the *yogin* who, desirous of spiritual powers, achieves one-pointedness of the mind after great effort, he exerts himself constantly in spiritual inquiry and establishes himself in the knowledge of the self. In the various fields of activity detailed above, practice produces skilfulness and the security of success. The *yogin* steadies his mind and obtains spiritual powers. The student of literature gains mastery in his field of study as also victory over his opponents. The heaven-seeker gains his object through chanting and meditation. The *mumukṣu* likewise achieves through practice the lucidity and clearness of his power to discriminate. He discerns the distinction and disparity between the self and the not-self.

By him, who discriminates the real nature of the enjoyer from the aggregate of sense-objects through co-presence and co-absence, is ascertained the non-attachedness of the witness in the states of waking, etc. The objects which are experienced in the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep are distinct by themselves. Each of the states differs from the rest in the character of its content. The objects experienced in waking seem to be relatively permanent and coherent, whereas those perceived in dream are fantastic and fictitious. The dream is a carnival of images. Sleep is a unique experience where there is ignorance as well as bliss. In and through these distinct states and distinct objects there threads the one and the same self. "The self, whatever it sees there (in the different states), does not become conformable to it; for this *puruṣa* is, indeed, non-attached." "That or this (self) attached to the repose of sleep and moving therein, merely sees merit and demerit and again according to the usual custom runs towards every sense." "That which manifests the universe of waking, dream, deep sleep, etc., that *Brahman* am I : knowing thus, (he) is released from all bondage." "The self is to be thought of as being single and the same in

waking, dream, and sleep. The self which knows itself to be distinct from the three experiences has no more transmigration and no more travail." "The object of enjoyment, the enjoyer, and the enjoyment, which are (to be found) in the three states (of experience), distinct from them I am, the bare intelligence, the ever-auspicious witness."

The scriptural texts quoted above teach that the immutable self is without attachment, agency, enjoyership, etc. When the truth is discerned in this manner, it is clearly determined that enjoyership, etc., belong to the changing *cidābhāsa* which is indicated by the word *viññāna-maya*. The reflection of intelligence is cognized to be illusory, through the testimony of scripture and the evidence of experience. "(*Prakṛti*) makes the *jīva* and the Lord as reflections." The world is compared to the magician's feat; and since the reflection of intelligence is a constituent of the world, it is also illusory like the magical show. The illusoriness of the reflection of intelligence is experienced by the witness in sleep where the reflection is non-existent. Thus through revelation and reason, the reflection of intelligence realizes its unreality. When such discrimination sets in, the reflection desires no more enjoyment. The person who has stretched himself on the ground with a desire to die will not long for his wedding. Similarly, the reflection which knows itself to be illusory, how can it desire for sense-enjoyment which is equally illusory? Unlike the ignorant, the enlightened man does not have conceit in objective enjoyment. He is ashamed of calling himself the enjoyer; and like the one whose nose is damaged, he reaps the results of his *prārabdha* without any gusto or relish. If he does not brook to think that enjoyership rests with him, need it then be said that he never imposes enjoyership on the witness-self? To declare the absence of enjoyership from the Absolute, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text employs the words 'for the sake of whose desire'. If the superimposition of enjoyership on the self be removed, the objects of sense

cease to lure us, and there is an end to the feverish pursuit of the ways of the body.

11

Three Bodies : Three Fevers

There are three bodies, the gross, the subtle, and the causal; and for each of them there is a peculiar fever. In the gross body there are innumerable kinds of diseases brought about by the three humours — wind, bile, and phlegm. Bad odour, wounds, thirst, etc., are also the fevers of the gross body. Desire, anger, etc., and calmness, restraint, etc., are diseases present in the subtle body. Like desire, etc., calmness, etc., are also fevers because while the former trouble men by their acquirement, the latter torment men by their non-acquirement. The fever present in the subtle body is set forth in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* by Indra. In the causal body the self knows neither itself nor any other object, and remains as if annihilated. In that state there exists the seed of misery in the form of the impressions of impending acts. These fevers are thought to be natural to the bodies, since if the former be removed the latter do not persist. As the thread is to the cloth, fur to the woollen shawl, and clay to the pot, so are the fevers indispensable to the bodies. The bodies are fever-made; fever is the stuff of the bodies.

In the reflection of intelligence there is no kind of fever natural to it, since for intelligence there is seen only the single nature of light. If fever be impossible even for the reflection, need it then be said that the witness is free from it? Although there be the absence of ailment from the reflection of intelligence, the reflection identifies itself with the bodies through nescience and suffers from the heat of *saṃsāra*. Superimposing the absolute reality which is natural to the witness on itself and on the three bodies, the reflection deems the bodies to be its true form of existence.

During the period of delusion, it suffers from the ills of the bodies, thinking that the fevers are innate in itself, just as the man with a family burns with agony should any of its members fall seriously ill. This unnecessary travail is born of ignorance and attachment. When there is discriminative knowledge, the delusion is dispelled and feverish pursuit of the bodies comes to an end. The cognition of the illusory snake is the cause of fear, running, etc., whereas the knowledge of the real rope destroys the apprehension of the snake with the result that the previous agitation, etc., are regretted.

The reflection which has gained discriminatory knowledge expiates for its earlier association with the defect of illusoriness by taking refuge in the witness-self. Just as a sinner purifies himself by repeated baths in the sacred waters, the reflection becomes centred in the self by repeated meditation. It takes no pride in its former associations and does not wish to return to them. The Crown-Prince who desires to rule over the kingdom acts according to the wishes of the King. The reflection whose goal of effort is release follows the way of the witness. Learning from scripture that "he who knows *Brahman* becomes *Brahman* alone", it makes its mind one-pointed and discerns *Brahman* only, and nothing else. Just as the man who desires to become a *deva* offers himself to be consumed by fire, the reflection loses itself to find itself.

12

Residue of Prārabdha

There is no release from reflection-ness till the present body is extirpated. The humanness of the man who desires to become a *deva* is not terminated indeed until his body is totally consumed. Even after the cognition of the rope, the palpitation of the heart, the shivering of the limbs, etc., are assuaged only by degrees; and when the rope is

enshrouded in twilight, it appears as the snake again. Likewise the enjoyment which has already been commenced gets cooled only gradually, not all of a sudden or by force; and occasionally during the period of enjoyment there may be the cognition 'I am a mortal'. By this transgression, true knowledge is not destroyed. Knowledge is not *vrata* (ceremonial observance); hence it has not to follow rules and regulations. The residual impression of the prior experience may linger for a while, but that throws no impediment in the way of the knowledge of truth. The leader of the ten travellers, when he is informed that he is the tenth individual, stops from striking his head against the ground and weeping; but all the same the wounds which he has already received on his head heal only in the due course of time. The joy resulting from the cognition that the tenth man is not dead overpowers the pain caused by the wounds. Similarly, the gain of release lightens the burden of *prārabdha*.

Since there is not the rule that the individual who is released in embodiment will not have occasionally the cognition of humanness, he must discriminate whenever there occurs in him the apprehension of superimposition. Such repeated effort is seen, for example, in the case of a glutton who eats over and over again. The wounds sustained by the tenth man heal when they are properly dressed and bandaged. In the same way, *prārabdha* perishes when it is exhausted and extinguished by enjoyment.

13

State of Satisfaction

So far the release from grief, the sixth state in the development of the *jīva*, has been explained as indicated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text by the words 'desiring what'. The seventh is the state of satisfaction which results as a consequence of *Brahman*-knowledge.

The satisfaction that results from sense-objects is dependent and limited, whereas the satisfaction consequent on *Brahman*-knowledge is without any limit and determination. When that supreme solace is gained, all obligations are fulfilled and all desires are quenched. Prior to the acquirement of true knowledge man has many duties to be performed and many desires to be satisfied. He works for the pleasures of the world and the happiness of heaven, and he strives for release from his earthly bonds. But when once he attains *Brahman*-knowledge, there is nothing else for him to do. Because he has accomplished his object, reached his journey's end, he contrasts his state of felicity and peace with the miserable condition of those who are struggling, and feels supremely satisfied. The ignorant men who wallow in the misery of the world pursue their desires in the hope of acquiring progeny, etc. But the man who has gained supreme happiness, what more should he desire, and why should he follow the way of the world? Those whose aim is the attainment of heaven tread the path of *karma*. But he who is the self of all the worlds, why and wherefore should he engage himself in rituals and ceremonies? If it be asked whether the *jñānin* cannot indulge in activities for the sake of the welfare of the world, let those who are eligible for it do it by all means. Saviours like Vyāsa and Śaṅkara are entitled to preach to the world. Philosophers like Śaṅkara come to the world with a mission to save it. They are, like huge ships, the carriers of innumerable anguished souls across the sea of *saṃsāra*. But the majority of those who are blessed with *Brahman*-knowledge are not eligible for this task. The *jñānin* is devoid of any kind of activity, be it good or bad. Even the activities like eating, drinking, bathing, etc., which are attributed as indispensable to him do not exist before his vision. The ignorant may speak of the *jñānin* that he is not free from activities, but that in no way affects him. The unenlightened look with the eye of ignorance, whereas to the divine vision of the seer there is no action, nor

action-bred miseries. For the *jñānin* there is not even the obligation of study and reflection, since study is intended for those who do not know the truth, and reflection for those who are troubled by doubts. Nor has the *jñānin* to meditate, for he is rid of all notions of the contrary like conceit in the body, etc. The cognition 'I am a man', etc., which occasionally he may get is not the result of any present perversity on his part. It is occasioned by the impression of his long practice, and it is not capable of obstructing his intuition. Meditation is not the remedy for the removal of this empirical usage, for empirical usage lapses of its own accord when *prārabdha* perishes. As long as the *karma* lasts, even a thousand meditations cannot dislodge empirical usage. If those who do not seek release-in-embodiment but who desire relative pleasures practise meditation, let them do so. But the *jñānin* who understands that by his empirical usage there can be no harm to his realization, for what purpose should he meditate? Nor is there *samādhi* for him, since he has discarded already the projections of *māyā*. Both *samādhi* and projection are modifications of the mind; and a *jñānin* is one who has freed himself from the modifications of the mind. If it be said that *samādhi* is instrumental to the intuition of *Brahman*, then, for him who possesses already the intuition, of what use is the instrument? He has no obligation whatever, nothing to be apprehended or attained. He is centred in the self, and is supremely satisfied therein.

To the *jñānin* who is a non-agent and a non-enjoyer, there may occur activities which are scripturally enjoined or empirically occasioned; but by them he is in no way affected. His actions are conditioned by *prārabdha*, and he has no hand in them. Or, even though there is nothing for him to be accomplished in this world, he may act in accordance with scripture in order to save the world. His physical body may worship the deity, bathe in the holy waters, and take to the life of the mendicant. His speech-

sense may repeat the Vedic *mantras* or study the system of the *Vedānta*. His intellect may meditate on the form of Viṣṇu or become merged in the bliss of *Brahman*. But he does nothing, nor does he cause others to do anything. He is the witness of all things and thoughts without any conceit in the way of the senses and in the functions of his mind.

There is no conflict between the man of works and the man of wisdom. They live in two different spheres which have nothing in common between them. They are like two seas separated by a vast stretch of land. The man of works is tied down to the activities of his body, speech, intellect, etc., but not so the witness. The *jñānin* is unattached because he knows himself to be the witness, and has freed himself from the clutches of the body, senses, and mind. Those who do not know the truth that knowledge and works have different contents quarrel in vain, and become the targets of the ridicule of those who know. The man of works has no discernment of the witness; and the man who knows the truth realizes the witness to be *Brahman*. The two have nothing common to dispute about. The sphere of the *karmin's* activity is not-self, while that of the *jñānin's* contemplation is the self. The *jñānin* understands the body, speech, intellect, etc., to be impermanent and illusory, and relinquishes them. The *karmin* sticks to them like a leech, deluding himself with the notion that they are the instruments to the final values of life. For the *jñānin*, tendency towards, and turning away from, activity are on a par. *Nivṛtti* like *pravṛtti* is useless to him. If it be said that the turning away from activity is the cause of knowledge, then even the tendency towards activity is fruitful in the sense that it is helpful to the desire for knowledge. If it be maintained that there is not the tendency towards activity for the *jñānin* since he has no more desire for knowledge, then even because he is no more in need of knowledge,

there is no necessity of *nivṛtti* for him. For the continued maintenance of his knowledge which is accomplished by non-sublation, no other means is required. Neither nescience nor its product is capable of sublating knowledge, since both of them are sublated prior to the acquirement of true knowledge. The products of nescience which have been sublated may appear to the senses, but by them knowledge is not sublated. They appear to be alive, but in reality they are dead. If even a living rat be incapable of killing a cat, how can a dead rat be capable of that deed? He who does not fall a prey even to the *Pāśupatāstra*, how can he perish when pierced by fragile shafts? In the warfare between knowledge and nescience, the former has come out victorious. Now, how can the victor who is well-established be overpowered by the vanquished? Let the carcasses of nescience and its products remain. They are impotent to harm knowledge. Instead of causing fear, they stand as the symbol of the mighty strength of true knowledge. For the *jñānin* who is yoked to such knowledge which is the enemy of nescience, there is nothing to be gained from *pravṛtti* or *nivṛtti* which pertain to the body. The ignorant man who has not gained true knowledge has to be up and doing for the achievement either of heaven or of release. If the *jñānin* lives in the midst of the ignorant, he also acts like them. And when he finds himself amidst those who desire knowledge, he criticizes and eschews all activities in order to teach them the futility of works. That he should adapt himself to the level of the society in which he lives is but proper. By putting on the semblance of following the way of the ignorant, he in no way degrades himself. It is his mercy for those who are not as fortunate as he that makes him mingle with them. Like a father unto his children, he is compassionate unto them. When the child beats the parent and pushes him hither and thither, the latter is not angered; on the contrary, he feels a pride in being treated so by his darling. In the same way, the *jñānin* is not perturbed by the

abuses of the ignorant; nor does he feel elated by their praises. He returns neither to them, but acts in such a way as to arouse knowledge in them. His actions are governed by this one motive, that is, to give a lifting hand to those who struggle in the slough of misery. No other objective has he in this world than to help the ignorant to see the light. He feels satisfied because what has to be accomplished has been accomplished by him and what has to be attained has been attained by him.

He considers himself fortunate because he is blessed with the immediate vision of the eternal self. The bliss of *Brahman* is clearly manifest to him. His ignorance has taken to flight, and he knows no misery born of *saṃsāra*. He has achieved his life's end, attained the greatest human goal. There is nothing in the world to equal his contentment. His bliss knows no bounds. This is the state of him who has transcended the travails and turmoils of transmigration.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ELUCIDATION OF THE IMMUTABLE

(KŪṬASTHADĪPA-PRAKARAṆA)

In the *Citrādīpa*, the terms *Brahman*, *kūṭastha*, *jīva*, and *Īśvara* were explained by comparing them to ether-at-large, pot-ether, reflection of ether in the water present in the pot, and reflection of ether in the water-particles of the cloud, respectively. *Brahman* and *kūṭastha* are identical in reality; while the *jīva* and *Īśvara* are reflections and have no reality of their own. In the *mahāvākya*, 'That thou art' the express senses of the words 'that' and 'thou' are the *jīva* and *Īśvara*, respectively, but their implied senses are the *kūṭastha* and *Brahman* between which alone appositional relation is possible. As the final truth of the Vedānta is the identity between the self and *Brahman*, between the 'thou' and the 'that', the implied senses of the two latter words alone must be recognized. The finite trappings in which the *jīva* is clothed must be stripped. The word 'thou' must be freed from its empirical associations. This is possible only when, by secondary implication, the word is understood to mean the *kūṭastha*, the immutable, which is no other than *Brahman*, the implied sense of the word 'that'.

In the *kūṭasthadīpa*, the relation between the immutable and the reflection of intelligence (*cidābhāsa*) is explained, the *jīva* is characterized to be a reflection of the immutable, having no reality of its own, the theory of limitations (*avacchedavāda*) is criticized, and the identity between the immutable and *Brahman* is asserted.

1

Cidābhāsa and Brahman-Intelligence

First, the reflection of intelligence is distinguished from the immutable *Brahman* through an analysis of external perception. According to the *ābhāsavāda*, in an act of perception there are four facts involved: (a) The intelligence qualified by the internal organ together with the *cidābhāsa* is the perceiving agent. (b) The intelligence qualified by the mental mode together with the *ābhāsa* (reflection) is the means of valid knowledge. (c) The intelligence limited by adjuncts like pot, etc., is the object-intelligence. And (d) the reflection of intelligence which is generated by the relation of the mental mode with pot, etc., is the fruit-intelligence (*phalacetana*). If a pot is to be known, there must result in it the reflection of intelligence brought about by the contact of the mental mode with the pot. The intelligence which is in the intellect and which has assumed the form of the pot makes known the pot. But the known-ness of the pot is caused by *Brahman*-intelligence.

It may then be asked: 'If the known-ness of the pot be due to *Brahman*-intelligence, what purpose is served by the presence of the intellect?' To this objection, the reply is: The intellect is the instrument for making the pot known. Prior to the intellectual cognition of the pot, the pot is made manifest by *Brahman*-intelligence, not as known, but as a thing un-known; and after the mental mode has come into contact with the pot, the same intelligence manifests the pot as known. Both the statements 'I know the pot' and 'I do not know the pot' have *Brahman*-intelligence as their basis.

'Let *Brahman* illumine the un-knownness of an object, there being no apparatus of perception. But what part has *Brahman* to play in the perception of an object?' If thus

it be asked, we reply: just as *Brahman* generates the attribute of un-knownness in an object which is not perceived, it generates the attribute of knownness in an object which is perceived.

It may then be objected that, as the instrument of perception is intellectual cognition through the channel of the senses, the intellect alone is sufficient to reveal the object, and that no purpose is served by the *ābhāsa* or the reflection of intelligence. But this is not sound. The intellect which is inert, non-intelligent, like the pot, etc., is powerless to manifest any object. Let us imagine a wall studded with pieces of mirror. When the rays of the sun are reflected in the mirrors, we may well say that the wall is illumined both by the reflected rays and by the direct rays of the sun. But when there is neither the sun nor the reflection of its rays, though there may be mirrors, the wall is not illumined. Minds are, like mirrors, ineffectual in themselves to reveal objects. Reflection is necessary, if the mirrors are to manifest the wall, and the sun too is necessary if there is to be reflection at all. It is only that intellect which is endowed with the reflection of intelligence that is able to accomplish the perception of an object. 'Known-ness of a pot means the generation of the fruit, namely the *cidābhāsa*, in that pot'. When a mental mode comes into contact with the pot, there is generated in the pot a reflection of intelligence; and it is this reflection that reveals the pot and is called the fruit (*phala*).

It cannot be said that *Brahman*-intelligence is the fruit, for even prior to the perception of the object it existed and will continue to exist when the perceptive process has come to an end. The fruit that is generated in the external objects of perception is not intelligence as such; it is only the reflection of intelligence. It is futile to quote Sureśvara and say that *Brahman* itself is the fruit. The real

intention of Sureśvara is to say that the fruit is similar to *Brahman*-intelligence. Really, the reflection resembles the prototype. What is generated in the object of perception is a reflection of *Brahman*-intelligence, which in turn illumines the object. Thus it is clear that, while *Brahman* is not the same as the *ābhāsa*, it is yet the basis of the latter. The *ābhāsa* is an appearance of which *Brahman* is the reality.

The distinction between *Brahman* and the *ābhāsa* may be seen also in the following way. *Brahman*-intelligence illumines the mental mode, the *ābhāsa*, and the object of perception, whereas the *ābhāsa* reveals the object alone. Thus, the object is illumined by two intelligences, the real intelligence that is *Brahman* and the reflection that is the *ābhāsa*. First, the object is known, and then there is the knowledge that the object is known. The latter kind of knowledge is called by the logicians reflective cognition, which is referred to in the Vedānta by the term *Brahman*-intelligence. The perceptive process reveals two clear-cut stages. 'This is a pot', we say, and later on we add, 'I know this pot.' The first of these statements indicates the activity of the *ābhāsa*, and the second points to the fact that *Brahman* is the basic intelligence which accounts for the known-ness of the object. This is the distinction, then, that an analysis of the perceptual process yields. Without the *ābhāsa* there cannot be the perception of the object, and without *Brahman*-intelligence there cannot be the generation of the *ābhāsa* which stands to *Brahman* as a reflection to its prototype.

The distinction between the *ābhāsa* and *Brahman* is made patent also when we study the case of internal perception. For external perception, there is an object outside which is reached through the channel of the mental mode and revealed by the *ābhāsa*; but in internal perception there is no object of any kind. And so, it may be asked, where is the need for an *ābhāsa*? Since in inner perception there are no mental modes which have external

objects for their sphere, what ground is there for assuming the *ābhāsa*?

To this objection, the reply is: there are certainly no objects in the case of internal perception. But there are modes like the ego, and there are passions, emotions, etc., like anger, love, hate, which are pervaded by the *cidābhāsa*. A red-hot ball of iron is self-luminous, but it does not illumine any other object. In inner perception there are no objects to be revealed by the *cidābhāsa*, but still there are mental modes which it pervades and illumines. Just as the fire which pervades the ball of iron illumines the ball alone, the *ābhāsa* pervading the mental modes reveals them. Modes by themselves are inert; but when associated with the *ābhāsa*, they become self-luminous.

What has *Brahman* or *kūṭastha* to do with internal perception? What purpose does the immutable serve? In the case of external perception, it was seen to be the fundamental basis for perception as well as for non-perception of an object. Similarly, with regard to internal perception, it is the foundational intelligence which reveals the existence as well as the non-existence of mental modes. The modes are not always existent. They are not to be found in sleep, swoon, and *samādhi*. But these states are not empty of content. There is the immutable witness which silently observes all the changing modes and fleeting moments. The presence of modes is made known by the reflection of intelligence; but their absence is revealed by the immutable intelligence. We noticed above the analogy of the wall studded with pieces of mirror. There are reflections of the rays of the sun wherever there are mirrors on the wall; and those portions of the wall where there are mirrors are illumined both by the reflected and the original rays of the sun. But those places on the wall where there are no mirrors and consequently no reflections are illumined by the direct rays of the sun. Similarly, both the existence

and the non-existence of mental modes are manifested by the immutable. The inter-space and the time-interval between any two modes are also illumined by pure intelligence. The presence of modes is more luminous than their absence, because, while the latter is manifested by one intelligence, viz., the immutable, the former is illumined by two intelligences, namely, the immutable and the reflection. The illumination of the modes by two intelligences is intelligible, for just like the pot which is also illumined by two intelligences, the modes are inert and cannot manifest themselves without their association with the *ābhāsa*. But there is this difference between an external object like the pot and an internal mode like the ego. While we can legitimately speak of a pot as known or as unknown, we cannot do so in the case of the modes. As the modes are the instruments of knowledge, they cannot apprehend themselves. While they lead to knowledge, they cannot be turned on themselves.

An examination of external and internal perception has given us the truth that there are two intelligences, one of which is the original and the other a reflection. Though both share the character of intelligence, they are not the same. While the one is subject to mutations and mutilations, the other is immutable and eternal. The *cidābhāsa* is circumscribed by the wheel of life and death. It is a reflection, having no reality of its own. The *kūṭastha*, on the contrary, is unchanging, eternal, flawless intelligence. The preceptors of old have defined the *kūṭastha* as the witness of the mind and its modifications. Scriptures declare the immutable to be existence, knowledge, and bliss. In the *Upadeśasāhasrī* Śaṅkara distinguishes the *kūṭastha* from the *ābhāsa*. He compares the latter to the reflection of a face in the mirror and the former to the original countenance.

Limitation Theory Criticized

The *avacchedavādin* believes that there is no need for assuming the *ābhāsa* over and above the intellect. The immutable defined by the intellect is the *jīva*. Just as we say that the pot-ether moves when there is a movement of the pot, we can explain the movement of the *jīva* as based on the movement of the mind. When it is possible to account for the migrations and misery of the *jīva* through the mere limitation due to the adjunct, namely, the intellect, it is prolix to assume the *ābhāsa*. This objection urged by the *avacchedavādin* is not sound. If mere limitation be the cause of *jīva*-hood, then even the intelligence limited by pot, etc., must be called *jīva*. The unattached self does not become the *jīva* by bare definition or limitation; otherwise even hills and dales would be *jīvas*, and there would be no distinction between intelligent beings and non-intelligent things. Nor may it be said that the intellect differs from the pot, etc., in being clear and pure; for as a limitation it is not truly different from the latter. Rice-grains may be measured out either by a vessel made of wood or by one made of metal. In either case it makes no difference with regard to the measuring out of the rice-grains. We do not get more rice in the one than in the other. Similarly, the self is conditioned equally by the intellect and by other adjuncts like pot, etc. There is no distinction whatever in the matter of defining or limiting the self. Thus, if the limitation of the self by the intellect be what constitutes *jīva*-hood, then it may be said with equal validity that even such extraneous adjuncts like the pot, etc., convert the self into the *jīva*.

The *avacchedavādin* may turn round and say that in the example of measuring out the rice-grains, though the two vessels equally and without any difference whatever

measure out the grains, there is this distinction between them, that while the wooden vessel has no capacity for reflection the other has. This objection is a contingency of the acceptable. While the non-intelligent objects like the pot, etc., do not have the capacity to reflect, the intellect has; and it is this reflection of intelligence that is called the *ābhāsa*. Hence, bare limitation of the self does not invest it with *jīva*-hood. Where the extraneous adjunct is the mind, there the self is reflected; and this reflection of intelligence is termed the *jīva* or the *ābhāsa*. The *ābhāsa* is that which has limited manifestation. While it is devoid of the characteristics of the prototype, namely, the self, it shines like the latter. It is unlike the self, since it is subject to attachment and mutation; and it is like the self, since it possesses at least limited luminosity.

It may be objected that the *ābhāsa* has no existence apart from the intellect—nay, that it is identical with the latter—just as the pot is identical with clay. But if this objection be true, then, the intellect must be non-different from the physical body, since, it is seen to be dependent on the latter. The difference between the intellect and the body may be sought to be maintained on the ground that the intellect survives the destruction of the body, and that this is known from the evidence of scripture. But there are also scriptural passages which declare the ‘entry’ of the reflection of intelligence which is different from the intellect. The opponent may assert that the ‘entry’ of that intelligence alone which has the intellect for adjunct is possible. But this statement is not in consonance with the evidence of scripture; for the *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, assuming the ‘entry’ of the self which is distinct from the intellect, declares that ‘it entered’. In the words of the Upaniṣad, “The self observing, ‘Without me this psycho-physical organism would not be’, breaks open the middle part of the

head, enters (through that channel), and migrates.”¹ But how the non-attached self comes to be attached to the body, we cannot say. Just like creation, the ‘entry’ of the self cannot be explained; but both the concepts of creation and the self’s entry share in the common character of being illusory. The creation of the world and the self’s entry which constitutes *jīva*-hood are both of them not absolutely real, and they perish when there dawns the light of *Brahman*-intuition.

3

The Immutable Self

While pointing out that the *ābhāsa* is not absolutely real, the scriptures declare that there is an absolute reality, different from the *ābhāsa*. The *kūṭastha* is indestructible and immutable, unattached and eternal. The opponent may quote here a scriptural passage which reads, “This body, verily, deserted by the *jīva* dies, but the *jīva* does not die”,² and argue that the *jīva* is not changing and perishing, that it is immutable and permanent. He has not understood the purport of this text. The scriptural passage does not assert that the *jīva* is eternal and everlasting, but only that it does not perish with the decay and decomposition of the body. When it has cast out its worn-out garment, it puts on a fresh one and finds a new environment. It migrates to other bodies and other worlds. There is a change of habitation; and the *jīva*-hood lasts so long as ignorance is not dispelled. Absolute eternality is not predicated of the *jīva*, but only its relative persistence.

There crops up here another difficulty. “If the *jīva* be a perishing, impermanent entity, how can there be apposition between it and the immutable, impartite *Brahman*?

1. *AIU*, iii, 12.

2. *CU*, VI, xi, 3.

The *mahāvākya* 'I am Brahman' would be a contradiction in terms. The entire doctrine of the Vedānta which teaches the identity between the *jīva* and *Brahman* would be faulty and futile". This objection is ill-founded. There are two kinds of appositional relation—apposition in the principal sense and apposition through sublation. Between the *kūṭastha* and *Brahman* there is apposition in the principal sense; between the *jīva* and *Brahman* there is apposition through sublation. The *mahāvākya* 'I am Brahman' states that 'I' and 'Brahman' are appositional through sublation. Let us examine the case of illusory perception. When a man mistakes a person for a post and subsequently corrects his wrong notion and says, 'That which seemed to me to be a post is really a person,' there is not meant apposition between the post and the person in the principal sense. The notion of the post is sublated and then there is asserted apposition between the person and what was earlier taken to be a post. The apposition which the *mahāvākya* intends to convey is analogous to the above illustration. The notion of *jīva*-hood is sublated, and between *Brahman* and what is mistakenly cognized as the *jīva* appositional relation is asserted. This view is lucidly set forth in the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* by the preceptor, Sureśvara. In such passages of scripture as "All this is *Brahman*," we notice that apposition through sublation alone is what is meant. Surely, there cannot be apposition in the principal sense between the world and *Brahman*. In the *Vivaraṇa*, however, apposition in the sense of sublation is refuted. But in that work, Prakāśātman does not intend to say that there is apposition in the principal sense between the finite *jīva* and the infinite *Brahman*. Through secondary implication, he takes the word 'I' to mean the *kūṭastha*, and then declares that the *kūṭastha* and *Brahman* are identical in the principal sense. This is not really in conflict with our view; on the contrary, it is in perfect agreement with

it. In the *Vivaraṇa*, as elsewhere, the deeper sense of the word 'thou' is examined, and the identity between the immutable and *Brahman* is proclaimed.

By the *kūṭastha* we mean that intelligence which is the substrate of the illusory reflection, namely, the *jīva*, which is associated with the body and the senses. The word '*Brahman*' denotes that substrate which is declared in the Vedānta texts to be the basis of the illusion of the entire world. Just as the world is superimposed on *Brahman*-intelligence, the *jīva*-reflection which is but a part of the world is also superimposed on the same *Brahman*. In the *mahāvākya* 'That thou art', the word 'thou' denotes the *kūṭastha* and the word 'that', *Brahman*. Superficially understood, the two words seem to conflict in their denotations. But the difference between them is the result of the difference in superimposition. The word 'thou' signifies the self whereon the *jīva*-reflection which is a part of the world is superimposed. The word 'that' implies *Brahman* whereon the entire world is superimposed. But when unreal superimposition is discarded, the self is seen to be identical with *Brahman*.

If the *ābhāsa* is to be proved to be what is superimposed on the self, then it must be shown that the *ābhāsa* possesses two aspects, the general nature of the locus and its own particular character of being what is superimposed. In the judgement of illusory perception 'This is silver' there are two elements. The word 'this' refers to nacre, and the word 'silver' denotes the superimposed illusory silver. In the same way, the *ābhāsa* has a two-fold character. Agency, etc., which are the attributes of the intellect mark the superimposed nature of the *ābhāsa*; and its manifestedness shows the general nature of the self. Hence the *ābhāsa* is an illusory entity.

It is non-discrimination that is the cause of illusion. We do not determine what the intellect, the *ābhāsa*, the self,

and the world are. We superimpose on the self what is not the self; and consequently, being deluded, we get involved in the vicious circle of metempsychosis. But he is called the liberated who searches for the truth in the Vedāntas and determines the real nature of the self to be different from the intellect, etc.

3

Testimony of Scripture

Those who are engaged in vain disputations and crude logic argue that on the Vedāntic theory there is no bondage, no liberation, none to be bound, and none to be liberated, and that the Vedānta has no truth to give to humanity. But all their specious arguments have been criticized and shown to be fallacious in such treatises as the *Khaṇḍana*. The Vedānta traces its doctrines to the Vedānta texts, scriptures, and traditional codes. The final court of appeal is the testimony of the Vedas. A thousand arguments cannot prove that a pot is a cloth. Logical reasoning is employed as an aid to the Vedas and not as their enemy.

The Vedas and the Purāṇas declare that the self is the witness which illumines both the existence and the prior non-existence of mental modes. The self is real, because it is the locus of the unreal world. It is of the nature of intelligence, since it illumines all inert things. Being ever the object of infinite love, it is of the nature of bliss. Because it is the source of all auspicious things and because it is the basis of all things, it is the plenary bliss. In these and other words, the Śaiva-purāṇas distinguish the *kūṭastha* from the changing world, the finite *jīva* and the non-absolute *Īśvara*.

The *jīva* and *Īśvara* are not absolutely real, because of the scriptural passage which says “*Māyā* created the

jīva and *Īśvara* as reflections". But there is this difference between the *jīva* and *Īśvara* on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other. While the former are clear and intelligent, the latter is dull and inert. Though pots are similar in being pots, a glass-jar differs from an ordinary pot in that, while the former is clear and transparent, the latter is not. Both mind and body are products of food ; but whereas the mind is subtle, the body is gross. Likewise, the *jīva* and *Īśvara*, though products of *māyā*, differ from the rest of the world in being intelligent and luminous. It may be asked how the *jīva* and *Īśvara* can be illusory and intelligent at the same time. But this is not a difficult task for *māyā* which has the power of accomplishing the impossible. *Māyā* not only creates *Īśvara*, but it also invests him with attributes like omniscience, etc.

Unlike the *jīva* and *Īśvara*, the *kūṭastha* is not a product of *māyā*. There is no excellence created by *māyā* in the self; and there is no evidence to prove that the *kūṭastha* is a product of *māyā*. All the Vedāntas declare with one voice that the self is absolutely real, self-evident, and uncontradicted by any other fact of experience. The *jīva* and *Īśvara* are illusory creations of *māyā*, and they in their turn produce the entire universe. But the *kūṭastha* is unattached, impartite, and immutable. It produces nothing, nor is it produced by anything else. In reality, there is no dissolution, no creation ; there is no one bound, no one longing for release, and none liberated. This is the supreme truth. But this real nature of the self is beyond the reach of speech and mind. Hence, scripture declares the truth, basing itself either on the world, the *jīva* or *Īśvara*. It adopts whatever mode of teaching would easily reveal the truth. The wise discern the real through the aid of scripture ; but the ignorant wallow in darkness, being unable to get at the truth.

ELUCIDATION OF MEDITATION

(DHYĀNADĪPA-PRAKARAṆA)

The *Dhyāna-dīpa* distinguishes the way of meditation from the way of discrimination and declares that the former, though not directly instrumental to *Brahman*-intuition, is an auxiliary thereto. Meditation is prescribed in the Upaniṣads for those who are not fit for the path of knowledge. It arrests the current of the mind which courses its way to objects of sense, and causes it to contemplate *Brahman*. The meditation stated to be conducive to *Brahman*-knowledge, in this chapter, is the meditation on *Brahman* without attributes. *Nirguṇopāsanā* leads to *Brahman*-knowledge.

1

Meditation on Brahman

The meditation on *Brahman* can be compared to a delusion that is fruitful. Though it must be characterized as illusory, it yields fruitful result. Innumerable meditations are prescribed in the Upaniṣads like the *Tāpanīya* as the means to release. *Samvāḍibhrama* is a delusion which yields a fruitful result. Both the light of a lamp and the light of a gem may be mistaken for a gem. Both are equally cases of delusion. But the man who mistakes the lamp-light for gem and approaches it gains nothing, whereas the man who mistakes the light of a gem for the gem itself gets the gem. The former is not, while the latter is, a delusion which culminates in a fruitful end. These are instances of *saṁvādi* and *visaṁvādi-bhrama* respectively, in the field of perception. There are also in-

ferences which are delusive and yet fruitful. A person mistakes steam for smoke and infers the existence of fire. He hastens to the place where he thinks there is fire, and as chance would have it, he finds fire there. The existence of fire does not make his inference valid; but still it serves the purpose of that man who was in search of fire. In scripture it is declared that bathing in the sacred rivers cleanses a man and confers merit on him. A person thinking that the Godāvarī is the Gaṅgā, bathes in that river or sprinkles its water on his head. Mistaking the Godāvarī for the Gaṅgā is no doubt a delusion; but still the sprinkling of the sacred water makes the man pure and holy. It is said in the sacred texts that if a person utters the name of the Lord at the moment of his death, he attains heaven. A dying man may utter the name of the Lord even without intention. Still it is declared that he reaches heaven. All these are cases of *saṁvāḍibhrama* culled from different fields of knowledge. The spheres of perception, inference, and verbal testimony alike give us cases of numerous delusions bearing fruitful results. If the possibility of *saṁvāḍibhrama* be ruled out of court, then the worship of stocks and stones cannot be explained. We hear of many meditations on imposed forms in the Upaniṣads. It is said that woman is to be regarded as fire. We read that mind is to be contemplated as *Brahman*. All these would be unintelligible if all delusions be regarded as utterly fruitless. It is an incontrovertible fact that sometimes knowledge of an unreal object yields the desired fruit. Just as *saṁvāḍibhrama*, though delusive, is the source of a fruitful result, even so meditation on the real nature of *Brahman* causes the fruit of release.

“Does a man meditate on *Brahman* after knowing its real nature? Or, is meditation possible for a man who is ignorant of the real nature of *Brahman*? On the first alternative, meditation would be to no purpose, since there is present knowledge, the direct means to release. On the second,

meditation would be "impossible, because the object of meditation is unknown. The object must be known before there can be meditation thereon." If thus it be said, the reply is: the man who meditates on *Brahman* is not totally ignorant about it. Nor, has he an immediate, intuitive experience of *Brahman*. He learns from the Vedāntas that *Brahman* is of one consistency of impartite intelligence, and his meditation takes the form 'I am this *Brahman*'. That meditation on an object mediately known is possible is well proved by the worship of deities like Viṣṇu. The worshipper of Viṣṇu has not an immediate knowledge of the object of his worship. He reads the description of Viṣṇu in the sacred texts and begins to meditate on the deity even without an immediate experience thereof. Nor can it be said that because his knowledge is mediate, the object of his knowledge and meditation is unreal and illusory. Immediate experience or perception is not the only test of truth. Verbal testimony gives him knowledge, though mediate, of the true form of the object of his worship; and this is enough to kindle in him meditation. In the same way, even meditation on *Brahman* is made possible by the mediate knowledge gained from scripture. From the Upaniṣad it is known that *Brahman* is of the nature of reality, intelligence, and bliss. But because *Brahman* is not realized to be identical with the inner witness, the immediate experience of *Brahman* is not gained. The true nature of *Brahman* is determined in the way mentioned in scripture. This is no doubt mediate knowledge; but nevertheless it is the knowledge of the true, and not of the illusory.

The *avāntaravākya*s of the Upaniṣads give only a mediate knowledge of *Brahman*. But the *mahāvākya*s make known the immediate and intuitive nature of *Brahman*-knowledge. They declare that *Brahman* is non-different from the inner self. But still the *mahāvākya*s do not convey their sense to those who do not perpend them. Those who inquire into the implication of the *mahāvākya*s get an immediate intuition

of *Brahman*, and not those who have a superficial knowledge of their sense. The reason why all do not gain intuitive experience even after studying the *mahāvākyas* is this: the dull-witted who identify themselves with the body, senses, and mind do not realize their identity with *Brahman*. The cognition that the body, etc., constitute the self obstructs the real knowledge of *Brahman*; and the wrong notion can be dispelled only through inquiry. Hence for a man who has not inquired into the purport of the *mahāvākyas* there is no immediate experience of *Brahman*. One who knows the *śāstras* easily understands mediately the true nature of *Brahman*. But on account of the obstruction caused by lack of inquiry, he does not get *Brahman*-intuition. On the contrary, the sphere of his immediate experience is the world of woes and worries. But still, the mediate cognition of *Brahman* and the immediate experience of the world do not contradict each other in his case. A worshipper of idols sees before him only idols made of stone or stock; but this does not in any way hinder his mediate cognition of the Lord. He does not debate or discuss whether there can or cannot be the presence of the Lord in idols. Through instruction from a trustworthy person or through study of scripture he gets a mediate cognition of the nature and form of the object of his worship; and even without inquiry or discussion he meditates on the deity of his heart.

When there is doubt as to what is to be undertaken and what not, there is inquiry conducted in scripture into religious rites and meditations. But the ordinary run of mankind is incapable of undertaking the inquiry afresh. And so, a man who has faith in the sacred texts begins to perform the rites even without inquiry, on the basis of the declarations found in the *Kalpa-sūtras*, etc. Similarly, in the case of meditations, those who have faith in scripture and are not intellectually virile to conduct fresh inquiry, perform the meditations as they are described in the treatises of the sages. The learned inquire into the passages of the *Vedas*

in order to determine their purport. But even without such inquiry, the performance of rites and meditations is made possible.

2

Inquiry essential for Brahman-Intuition

“If meditation on *Brahman* be not dependent on inquiry, why should *Brahman*-intuition be the result of inquiry? Just as mere instruction is sufficient to cause meditation, so also bare *upadeśa* may lead to *Brahma-sākṣātkāra*.” If thus it be said, the reply is: *Brahman*-intuition is not possible without inquiry. Just as lack of faith obstructs mediate knowledge, lack of inquiry is an obstacle to immediate intuition. Faith in the words of scripture gives mediate knowledge; inquiry into the purport of scripture leads to *Brahman*-intuition. If, even after inquiring once into the real nature of the self, a person does not get immediate experience of *Brahman*, then he must continue his inquiry till it culminates in *Brahman*-intuition. The goal of inquiry is intuition of the self. But owing to some obstacle inquiry may not immediately cause *Brahman*-intuition. If in this life, *Brahman*-intuition be not achieved on account of obstruction caused by some obstacle, then in the next life, when the obstacle is removed, the true nature of the self will be realized. Evidence for this fact is found in the *Vedāntasūtra* (III, iii, 51): “In this life also (the origination of knowledge takes place) if there is no obstruction of what is ready at hand; on account of this being seen (in scripture)”. The *Sūtrakāra* says that knowledge is gained either in this life or in the next or in some other life. Scripture declares that the self is not known so long as there is some obstacle. “Many people, though they study, do not realize the self in this life.” We hear of instances of men like *Vāmadeva* attaining release while remaining yet in the mother’s womb. The student who studies the *Vedas* by rote remembers what

he has studied even after the lapse of some days. Similarly, what is done in one life does not go to waste. The seeds that are sown in this life may yield their fruit in some future life. The fruition of the inquiry into the self is sure, though it may be slow.

The *Vārtika* says that the non-rise of *Brahman*-intuition even after frequent inquiry is due to three kinds of obstacles. It is only when all the obstacles are removed that there results *Brahman*-knowledge. Obstacles, we said, are of three kinds, past, present, and future. Though a person might have studied the Vedas and the Vedāntas, if there be present in him any of these obstacles, he is not released. As an illustration of this fact, the example is given in scripture of a man who walks over a mine of gold without knowing the existence of the mine at that place. Here the obstacle is the earth that covers the treasure.

The story is told of an ascetic, who, on account of his former affection for a buffalo, could not easily understand the true nature of self. His preceptor, knowing the mental tendencies of the ascetic, instructed him how *Brahman* is the truth even of the buffalo he loved. Then, it is said, the obstacle in the form of affection for the buffalo was removed, and the ascetic realized the true nature of *Brahman*. This is an instance of an obstacle which relates to past time. The ascetic's love for the buffalo has reference to the time when the ascetic was a house-holder, i. e., before he renounced the world. That love stands as an obstacle to the acquirement of *Brahman*-knowledge. The obstacle that relates to present time is four-fold: attachment to objects, dullness of intellect, bad reasoning, and foolish obstinacy in asserting what is contrary to truth. These obstacles are removed by calmness, etc., and study, etc. Each kind of obstacle is to be met by the appropriate means that can remove it. With regard to the removal of obstacles that relate to future time, no

time-limit can be set. To Vāmadeva one life was enough for completely overcoming all the obstacles; but Bharata took three lives before the obstacles could be discarded. *Āgāmi-pratibandha* or obstacle that relates to future time is the remnant of one's *prārabdha*. As the quantity of *prārabdha* varies with different people, so also the length of time required for the removal of the obstacle has a corresponding variation. Śrī Kṛṣṇa says in the *Gītā* that in the case of a *yogabhraṣṭa*, a man fallen from the path, the destruction of obstacles is during the course of many lives. Inquiry can never be fruitless. If it does not bear its fruit in this life, then it must be due to some obstacle that clogs the way; and when the obstacle is removed, the stream of inquiry resumes its course and reaches its goal, viz., *Brahman*-intuition. In the *Gītā*, Śrī Kṛṣṇa says that no man who earnestly strives to reach the goal need lose heart. A man who inquires into the true nature of the self till the very end of his life and does not, owing to some obstruction, achieve *Brahman*-knowledge, attains to the worlds of the righteous and reincarnates in the home of the pure and the prosperous. Or else, he is born in a family of *yogins* who possess the knowledge of the real nature of *Brahman*. This indeed is very rare to obtain because it is difficult. There he is united with the cognition acquired in his previous life, and strives more than before, for perfection. By that previous practice alone, he is borne along in spite of himself; and then, gaining perfection by degrees through many lives, he reaches the supreme goal. Just like the residual *prārabdha*, even the desire for attaining the world of *Brahmā*, etc., is an obstacle that has reference to the future. The man who desires to reach *Brahma-loka* does not inherit *Brahman*, even though he may inquire into the purport of the Vedāntas. It is said in scripture that he attains *Brahma-loka* and is released along with *Brahmā* at the end of the world-aeon.

Meditation prescribed for Those who cannot inquire

We have seen so far the cases of persons who are capable of inquiry and yet who are prevented from reaching the goal owing to some obstacle or other. But there are some persons who are not capable even of inquiring into the true nature of the self. *Karma* makes inquiry impossible for them. Either due to extreme dullness of intellect or due to the impossibility of the causal aggregate for inquiry, they are incapable of inquiring into the purport of the Vedāntas; and for them scripture prescribes constant meditation on *Brahman*. Nor may it be said that meditation on *Brahman* without attributes is impossible; for just as in the case of meditation on *Brahman* with attributes, even in *nirguṇopāsanā* there is the possibility of the repetition of cognition. If it be said that meditation on what is beyond the reach of speech and mind is impossible, then even the knowledge of such an object would not be obtained. *Brahman*-knowledge would, then, turn out to be a contradiction in terms. If *Brahman*-knowledge be within the province of possibility, then even meditation on *Brahman* must be possible. It may be said that *Brahman* is known to be beyond the spheres of speech and mind. Then, it can equally be maintained that the meditation on *Brahman* is of the form that *Brahman* is not the sphere of speech, mind, etc. If meditation invests *Brahman* with attributes, then even knowledge of *Brahman* would convert it into an object with attributes. If it be said that knowledge, having recourse to secondary implication, cognizes only the attributeless *Brahman*, then let meditation be on the secondary implication which is the cause of presenting *Brahman* without attributes. It may be maintained that scripture expressly prohibits meditation on *Brahman*. "What is not thought of by the mind, but what impels the mind to activity, know that alone to be *Brahman*, not this which they worship here." If this scriptural text be an evidence in respect of meditation not being a means

to *Brahman*-knowledge, then, other passages can be quoted which declare that *Brahman* is not what is known. "It is other than the known, and greater than the unknown." The solution that *Brahman* is to be known in accordance with scripture—i. e., that it is other than the known and greater than the unknown—is common to the view of meditation also; for it is easy to say that *Brahman* is to be meditated on as what is other than that which is worshipped here, in this world. Nor may it be asserted that the knownness of *Brahman* is unreal; since that assertion holds good even in the case of meditation. If it be said that the pervasion by the mental mode is what is known, then that consideration is common also to what is meditated on. The opponent of meditation may at last ask, "Why are you so much devoted to meditation?" But he may well be questioned why he has so much aversion for meditation.

Evidences there are in abundance in scripture to show that meditation on *Brahman* without attributes is possible. *Nirguṇopāsanā* is mentioned in many of the Upaniṣads like the *Tāpanīya*, *Praśna*, *Kaṭha*, *Māṇḍūkya*, etc. The devas said to Prajāpati: "Tell us about the self of the form of *Om*, the subtlest of the subtle; and we shall meditate on that." The *Praśnopaniṣad* speaks of the man who meditates on the supreme *Puruṣa* of the nature of *Om*, consisting of three *mātrās*. The *Kaṭha* and the *Māṇḍūkya* also prescribe meditation on the *Praṇava*.

The mode of performing meditation is clearly described by Sureśvara in his *Pañcīkaraṇa*. Meditation is admittedly the means to *Brahman*-knowledge. Merely because the generality of men worship only *Brahman* with attributes, it cannot be said that meditation on *Brahman* without attributes is useless. Many fools there are who are not even capable of *saguṇopāsanā*. They think that charms and spells are more efficacious than meditation; but their inclinations and tendencies do not in any way dislodge meditation from its rightful place. Just as *saguṇopāsanā* does not suffer on

account of the opinion of the fools, so also *nirguṇopāsanā* gets in no way diminished in value merely because many people disregard or dislike it.

4

Meditations are Identical

The meditations taught in the Upaniṣads are identical. Bādarāyaṇa says in the *Vedānta-sūtra* (III, iii, 1) “(The cognitions) intimated by all the Vedānta-texts (are identical), on account of the non-difference of injunction, and so on”. And, because the meditation is the same in all the *śākhās*, the qualities mentioned therein must be taken together as denoting *Brahman*. Qualities, names, and attributes of that which is meditated on are of two kinds — those that are enjoined and those that are prohibited. “Bliss is *Brahman*.” “*Brahman* is knowledge and bliss”. “The supreme inner essence is eternal, pure, intelligent, true, free, faultless, all-pervasive, blissful”. Passages like these ascribe certain qualities to *Brahman*. *Vedānta-sūtra* (III, iii, 11) declares: “Bliss and other (qualities) as belonging to the subject of the qualities (have to be attributed to *Brahman* everywhere).” There are certain Upaniṣadic passages which say what *Brahman* is not. “It is not gross, not atomic, not short, etc.” “It is that which is not seen, not grasped, not spoken of, not touched, without colour, and without mutation.” These texts prohibit certain qualities from being applied to the self. All these negative qualifications which are mentioned in the various topics dealing with meditation must be collectively regarded as signifying *Brahman*. We read in the *Vedānta-sūtra* (III, iii, 33) “But the (denials of) conceptions concerning the *Akṣara* are to be comprehended (in all meditations on the *Akṣara*), on account of the equality and of the object being the same, as in the case of the *upasad*; this has been explained (in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*)”. All the meditations are equal in value and have one and the same object. Hence, even though only

some of the qualifications are taught in each of the texts, the qualifications in their totality, be they negative or positive, must be understood as referring to *Brahman*. Śaṅkara, while commenting on this *sūtra* writes: "The attributes of the *Akṣara* have, because they are subordinate to the *Akṣara* itself, to be connected with the latter everywhere, in whatever places the text may originally state them". The objection that the mention of a host of qualities in a topic about meditation on the attributes is unintelligible must be put to Vyāsa himself. But it may be said that as images like the Sūrya with a golden beard, etc., are not mentioned, there is no conflict with attributelessness. This solution is most welcome even to those who maintain that meditation on the attributeless *Brahman* is legitimate and possible. If it be held that qualities indicate the true self without themselves entering into its constitution, then it is possible even to meditate on the self which is by itself attributeless but which is indicated by qualities. The meditation takes the form: I am that impartite essence indicated by such attributes as "bliss, etc.", "not gross, etc."

5

Meditation and Knowledge

We have seen that the difficulties which beset the view of meditation equally affect the view of knowledge, and that the mode of solving those difficulties is identical in both the views. It may then be asked in what manner meditation differs from knowledge. To this question, the reply is: Knowledge depends on the object; meditation depends on the agent. From inquiry, knowledge is generated. It is not removed by mere non-desire. On the bare origination of knowledge, the real-ness of the entire world vanishes. For a man who has known *Brahman*, there are no more obligations. Being released in embodiment, he is eternally satisfied and awaits only the end of *prārabdha*.

In the case of meditation, no inquiry is necessary. What is of vital importance in meditation is firm faith in the teaching of a trustworthy person. Being instructed in the secrets of meditation, a man, even without inquiring, proceeds to contemplate his object, directing towards it a stream of uninterrupted mental modes. He contemplates the object of his desire till he begins to have a conceit in it, and continues the course of his meditation to the very end of his life. In the *Saṁvarga-vidyā* of the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*, the story is told of a *brahmacārin* who approached two princes for alms. The two princes, Kāpeya Śaunaka and Kākṣaseni Abhipratārin, kept quiet at first in order to see what the *brahmacārin* would say. Then the *brahmacārin* said: "He to whom this food belongs, to him it has not been given," thus identifying himself with the *prāṇa* and the *prāṇa* with *Brahman*. The *Saṁvarga-vidyā* is a meditation which identifies *Brahman* with *Vāyu*. Thus in all meditations the agent has to place his conceit in the object. Meditation, we have seen, depends on the desire of the agent. It can be done, not done, or done otherwise. But if meditation is to be fruitful, it must be constant and uninterrupted. The man who takes to the method of meditation must make meditation his second nature. Just as the student who learns the *Vedas* by rote repeats what he has got by heart even in his dreams, the man who takes to the way of meditation must, by constant practice, be able to meditate even without effort. Uninterrupted meditation leads him to such a state when even in his dreams the object of his thought does not leave him. The impression born of meditation becomes so deep that, even if he will, he cannot get away from the object of his heart.

It may be asked how constant meditation is possible for a man who is drawn by the force of his *prārabdha* to the objects of sense. *Prārabdha*, no doubt, goads him on to activity other than meditation. But the great desire

which he has for the object of his meditation enables him, even though bound down by *prārabdha*, to give his mind up to meditation. It is just like the woman who, though attending reluctantly to the duties of her household, has her thoughts centred in her sweetheart.

The man of meditation attends to the affairs of the world with extreme reluctance. But the man of knowledge has no such feeling, while performing the duties of empirical life. He undertakes duties of all kinds with perfect equanimity and carries them out most satisfactorily. Because he knows perfectly well that the universe is of the nature of *māyā* and that the self is the only absolute reality, any amount of empirical usage is ineffectual to shake off his knowledge. For, empirical usage does not require the reality of the universe; nor does it need the self to be non-intelligent by nature. And so, a man of realization is able to move in the world even after knowing the illusory nature of the world. The means of empirical usage are the mind, speech, body, etc. These the *jñānin* does not control; for he knows that there is no need to meddle with their course. Hence there is possible in his case empirical usage which does not in any way affect his spiritual insight.

It may be objected that even a *jñānin* requires the control of mind. But this is not so. Mental control is needed for a man who meditates on *Brahman*, and not for him who knows *Brahman*. No control or restriction of the mind is needed for the perception of a pot. Even one cognition is enough to reveal the pot. If this be the case in respect of an inert object like the pot, need it then be said that the self which is self-luminous does not require the control and concentration of the mind?

Now, *Brahman* may be self-luminous. But what is called true knowledge is only the mode of the intellect

of the form "I am *Brahman*". Since this mode is momentary, there is need for directing it constantly towards *Brahman*." If thus it be said, we reply that this difficulty is common even to the case of pot-perception. If it be said that in the case of the perception of pot, etc., there is not desired the constancy of the mind, then even with regard to *Brahman*-intuition the steadiness of the mind is not needed. Just as after once perceiving the pot, empirical usage is made possible in respect thereof, even so in the case of *Brahman*, after once it has been cognized, it is made the subject of speech, reflection, or meditation, whenever desired.

Like the man of meditation, even the *jñānin* might sometimes meditate. But his meditation is for forgetting the world. The forgetting of the world and its affairs is born of meditation and not of knowledge or illumination. The *jñānin* has no need to depend on meditation for release; since it is declared in scripture that by knowledge itself freedom is gained. "Knowing that he crosses death; no other path to release exists." "Having known that Deity, he is released from all sins." If a *jñānin* meditates sometimes, it is because he desires it; but his release is not the result of his meditation; for already he has been freed by virtue of his knowledge.

The objection that if a *jñānin* does not meditate, his entire attention would be carried away by the affairs of the world, is not sound. We have already observed that there is no conflict between knowledge and empirical usage. The latter does not sublate the former. Any amount of external activity would not detract the *jñānin* from his knowledge of the infinite. If it be said that the *jñānin* would then be transgressing the injunctions of scripture, we reply that in the case of him who has realized the self, both prescriptions and prohibitions lose their meaning. The knower of the true self is not bound down by rules and regulations. Injunctions and prohibitions are

intended only for those who cling to the empirical concepts like caste, *āśrama*, infancy, youth, age, etc. But the *jñānin* knows that caste, etc., are unreal superimpositions made by *māyā* on the body; and he forsakes all conceit in them. Since he has relinquished all desires, he is, verily, a released soul; and for him there is not enjoined any duty. He is above all obligations. It matters little whether he works or not, whether he meditates or not. For the *jñānin*, both activity and non-activity lose their significance. Non-activity is of no use to him, because his mind is already empty of *vāsanās*; activity does not corrupt him, because he knows that he is ever pure. He knows without a shadow of doubt that the self is un-attached and that the magical show of the universe is illusory; hence in his mind there are no *vāsanās*. Thus it is clear that the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions do not apply to the *jñānin*. They do not govern his life; for he is above their reach. In the case of the child where there is not the application of injunctions, there is no transgression of injunctions as well. Similarly, in the case of the *jñānin*, whom no injunction binds, there cannot arise even a suspicion of transgression. If it be said that there is no injunction for an infant, since it does not know anything, then, even for the *jñānin* who is omniscient there is the futility of injunctions. Prohibitions and prescriptions are intended only for the middlings, those who are neither thoroughly ignorant nor omniscient.

It may be objected that only those who are capable of showering either curses or grace on others can be omniscient and knowers of the true. But this is not so; for the capacity for cursing, etc., is the result of austerity and not of knowledge. In the case of sages like Vyāsa, who possess the capacity for cursing, etc., *Brahman*-knowledge is not the fruit of austerity. The austerity which generates capacity to curse, etc., is different from the *tapas* which is the cause of knowledge. Sages like Vyāsa

had the power to curse, etc., and knowledge as well, because they had performed both the kinds of *tapas* ; but he who does only one kind of austerity reaps the fruit that is adequate to it, and not the other. A *jñānin* who has not performed the *tapas* which is the cause of supernormal powers is in no way to be ridiculed. If the *karmins* are right in scoffing at the *jñānin* for his non-possession of such powers, then the vulgar can with perfect justice tease the *karmin* who believes in the rites enjoined in the Vedas, leaving all the pleasures that the world affords. Just as the abuses of the vulgar do not affect the man who is devoted to the duties of caste, status in life, etc., even so the censure of those who take the body to be the self and stick to the code of caste, etc., does not in any way degrade the *jñānin*.

Thus it is now clear that empirical usage and affairs of the world do not come into conflict with the knowledge which the *jñānin* has. He may be at the helm of political power, having sway over a vast empire, or he may be the lowliest of the low in the social scale. But his knowledge is not in the least unsettled. He has no desires, because he knows the world to be illusory. Even if he should meditate or indulge in some other activity, it is due to his *prārabdha*, and not the result of any inherent desire in him.

Unlike the *jñānin*, the *upāsaka* has to meditate constantly. In his case, *Brahman*-hood is a creation of his own mind, and not the result of means of valid knowledge. Hence he has to meditate without intermission, so that *Brahman*-hood can be maintained. The *Brahman*-hood that is achieved by meditation is not absolutely real, for it dissolves into nothing when there is a cessation of meditation. But the real *Brahman*-hood which is the object of knowledge does not vanish even when the knowledge disappears. The eternal *Brahman* is indicated, and not generated by

knowledge. And so, that which is indicated remains even though the indicator may cease to exist.

It may be said that even in the case of the *upāsaka* there is real *Brahman*-hood. To this contention we reply that this fact does not distinguish him from other creatures like the birds and the beasts. Every being has *Brahman* as its inner reality. In what way, then, is the *upāsaka* different from the rest of the creation? The assertion that what distinguishes the *upāsaka* from the rest is his cognition of *Brahman* is without any basis. The *Brahman*-hood which is the object of his meditation is not the supreme human goal, because it is not cognized. Non-knowledge is common to the *upāsaka* and the vulgar. Meditation is better than the other methods in the same manner as begging is better than starving. But begging by itself is not what is desired or welcome; nor is meditation a human goal. Better than other methods is meditation; and better than meditation is knowledge.

The ordinary avocations of the worldly-minded are inferior to the performance of Vedic rites and rituals. Meditation on *Brahman* with form is superior to the path of *karma*; and superior still is the meditation on the attributeless *Brahman*. The criterion by which the superiority of a particular method is judged is its relative proximity to *Brahman*-knowledge. That which is more proximate to *Brahman*-knowledge is superior to that which is remote. Judged by this standard, meditation on the attributeless *Brahman* is superior to the remoter methods like the performance of rites and rituals. Just as *saṁvādhībhrama* becomes very much like valid knowledge at the time of yielding fruit, even so *upāsana*, when it matures, becomes like knowledge at the time of release. It may be objected that *saṁvādhībhrama* does not itself become valid knowledge, but that for the man who is impelled to activity by it there comes about valid knowledge as a result of the contact

between his sense organs and the object. This objection in no way weakens our position ; for meditation, we hold, gives rise to knowledge which directly makes known *Brahman*.

If it be said that even meditation on some imposed form or image is a means to *Brahman*-intuition through the channel of generating one-pointedness of the mind ; it is a contingency of the acceptable. But there is this difference between meditation on an image and meditation on the attributeless *Brahman*, that while the former is remote, the latter is proximate. When *nirguṇopāsanā* ripens, *samādhi* is attained ; and soon after that, *savikalpa-samādhi* flowers into *nirvikalpa-samādhi*. When this state of mental equanimity and control is reached, the unattached self remains as the imperishable residue ; and when the mind gets a deep impression of this self as a result of constant and continued meditation, true cognition is generated from the major texts of scripture like 'That thou art', etc. Without effort, the man who is matured in meditation grasps the essential nature of the self. He realizes that the self is immutable, unattached, eternal, self-luminous, etc.

There are some people who do not have recourse to meditation on the attributeless *Brahman*. They leave that course and pursue such paths as chanting *mantras*, etc. Others who are not capable of inquiry take to *nirguṇopāsanā*. For those whose minds are muddled and agitated, no inquiry is possible ; and so for them the most adequate means to adopt is the path of *yoga* or meditation which curbs the conceit and arrogance of the mind. For those whose minds are calm and collected, but who are victims to delusion, the path of *sāṅkhya* or discrimination is the principal means.

That state which is reached by the *Sāṅkhyas*, says Kṛṣṇa, is reached by the *Yogas* as well ; he really sees

who sees that both *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are one.¹ Scripture declares that a person who follows the paths of *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* attains the highest and gets released from nescience, etc. In the systems of *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* there are certain elements which conflict with the purport of scripture. Those elements must be wisely discarded while treading the paths of *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*.

We have seen that *upāsana* leads to *Brahman*-knowledge. An *upāsaka* who dies before attaining *Brahman*-knowledge may obtain it in the world of *Brahmā* or in his next birth. "Whosoever at the end abandons the body, thinking upon any being, to that being only he goes", says Kṛṣṇa, "He goes to that of which he thinks."² Just as the man who meditates on imposed forms or particular deities attains those deities or forms at the end, he who meditates on the attributeless *Brahman* acquires at the time of his death a cognition of the attributeless *Brahman*. By the capacity of the meditation on the attributeless there arises a cognition which removes principal nescience, even as the meditation on what has attributes gives rise to the cognition of *Tāraka-Brahman*.

6

Fruit of Meditation

The fruit of the meditation on the attributeless is thus declared in the *Tāpanīya Upaniṣad*: "That man who desires (*upāsaka*) becomes desireless. He desires the self and gets his desires fulfilled. His vital airs do not depart; they get dissolved here in his own body. Being *Brahman*, he attains *Brahman*. He becomes of the nature of self-luminous reality, intelligence, and bliss, without body, sense organs, vital airs, and mind". Because it is said that by the capacity of

1. *Gītā*, v, 5.

2. *Gītā*, viii, 6.

meditation knowledge is generated, there is no conflict with the text which declares 'No other path is known'. The *Tāpanīya* clearly sets forth that release is the final fruit of meditation on the attributeless *Brahman*; while the *Praśna Upaniṣad* maintains that the attainment of *Brahma-loka* is the fruit of *saguṇopāsanā*. The *Praśna Upaniṣad* says that he who meditates by the three *mātrās* is led to *Brahma-loka*, where it becomes possible for him to behold the supreme *Puruṣa*. In the *Sūtra*, IV, iii, 15, Bādarāyaṇa maintains that all those who meditate on the effected *Brahman*, except those who take their stand on symbols, are led to the world of *Brahman* on the principle of '*tatkratu*' that 'in whatever form they meditate on him, that they become themselves'. "Those who do not take their stand on symbols he leads, thus Bādarāyaṇa (opines); there being no fault in the two-fold relation (resulting from this opinion); and the meditation on that (i.e., *Brahman*) (is the reason of this twofold relation)". Those *upāsakas* who meditate on the attributeless *Brahman* and yet are not rid of desires reach the world of *Brahmā*, and there they acquire the knowledge of the true and are released at the end of the world-aeon.

Meditation on the *praṇava* is mostly of the *nirguṇa* type. But in some places there is the mention of the meditation on the *praṇava* of the *saguṇa* type. *Oṃkāra* is described by sage Pippalāda to be of two forms, higher and lower. *Oṃkāra* in its higher aspect signifies the supreme *Brahman*; and in its lower aspect it stands for the effected *Brahman*. In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, Yama makes a similar distinction to Naciketas, between the higher *Brahman* and the lower *Brahman*. Meditation on the higher *Brahman* is superior to the other kind of meditation. He who meditates on the *praṇava* that signifies the supreme attributeless *Brahman* attains *Brahman*-intuition either in this life, or at the end of his life, or in the world of *Brahmā*.

That those who are not capable of achieving true knowledge through inquiry are eligible for meditation on the attributeless *Brahman* is declared in the *Ātma-gītā*. "He who is incapable of intuiting (*Brahman*) let him meditate as one free from doubts; in good time he will be firmly established in experience, and will attain without fail the fruit of release". Just as there is no other means to obtain a treasure hidden in the heart of Mother Earth except digging, there is no other method except meditation on one's own self to gain the final goal. The *Ātma-gītā* explains the analogy thus: Uprooting the body which is comparable to a huge rock, and digging the field of the mind by means of intellect, the spade, the inner treasure, the self, is to be gained. There are other passages which declare that even though there be no experience of *Brahman*, a man may think that 'he is *Brahman*' and constantly ruminate on this thought until it matures into a fact. The seen fruit of meditation is that day by day the *upāsaka* discards the cognition of things which are other than the self; and this must be a sufficient reason why the method of meditation is of supreme value to those who are incapable of inquiry. Destroying the conceit in the body through meditation and beholding the non-dual self, the mortal *upāsaka* becomes immortal and attains *Brahman* even here, in this world.

CHAPTER TEN

ELUCIDATION IN THE LIGHT OF STAGE-ANALOGY

(NĀṬAKADĪPA-PRAKARAṆA)

In the previous chapter, a distinction was drawn between the way of knowledge and the way of meditation. It was stated that for those who are incapable of pursuing the path of inquiry, the various meditations are prescribed in the sacred texts. Of all the meditations, the contemplation of the attributeless *Brahman* was characterized as the highest. It, no doubt, is based on a delusion; but, nevertheless, it is a delusion which is fruitful. It is a guess which happens to be true. *Dhyāna* or meditation is useful in so far as it removes the obstacles that clog the way to *Brahman*-intuition; hence it is an auxiliary to *Brahman*-knowledge.

1

Study, Reflection, and Meditation

The Advaitins differ with regard to the fixing of the relative values of study, reflection, and meditation. The *Vivaraṇa* school maintains that all the three are not the direct means to *Brahman*-knowledge. The ascertainment of the purport of the *Vedāntas* through reasoning is "hearing" (*śravaṇa*); reflecting on the non-dual *Brahman* through reasonings which establish non-difference and condemn difference is *manana*; and the constancy of the mental flow of the form of *Brahman* without being clouded by the mode of the form of the not-self is meditation (*nididhyāsana*). These three are aids to remove the notions

that the non-dual *Brahman* is impossible and that the contrary of that is true. Doubts and delusions are destroyed by this triple means. But the direct means to knowledge are the *Vedānta* texts which come into contact with the sense of hearing. The *avāntaravākya*s which reveal either the nature of the supreme self or that of the *jīva* give us mediate knowledge. The *mahāvākya*s or major texts which assert the identity of the Supreme Intelligence and the *jīva* give us immediate intuitive knowledge. The contention that verbal testimony can yield only mediate knowledge is met in this manner. The knowledge through verbal testimony of an object which is remote is always mediate. But of an object which is proximate, verbal testimony gives both mediate and immediate knowledge. This point may be explained by citing the episode of the tenth man. Through the words of a trust-worthy person the tenth man at first learns mediately that the tenth man is not lost, and then he realizes that he is himself the tenth man. *Brahman* is not remote; it is identical with the *jīva*; hence of it, immediate intuitive knowledge is possible through verbal testimony.

For Vācaspati (founder of the *Bhāmatī* school) who follows the tradition of Maṇḍana, verbal testimony of itself is not the cause of immediate knowledge. Uninterrupted contemplation of the cognition which results from verbal testimony ultimately causes the final intuition. The process of *prasaṅkhyāna* is indispensable for *Brahman*-intuition. This view which is urged by Vācaspati differs from the *Vivaraṇa* view. Unintermittent meditation, and not mere hearing of the *Vedāntas*, takes the prominent and primary place as the means to intuition. The tendency to place more and more importance on meditation reached its climax in Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. His strong leaning to the path of devotion led Madhusūdana to maintain that *bhakti* is as good a means as *jñāna* for the realization of the attributeless *Brahman*.

The view of the *Pañcadaśī* was clearly stated in the *Dhyānadīpa*. *Śravaṇa* is the principal means to release ; while *manana* and meditation are auxiliaries thereto. The path of inquiry has priority over the way of meditation. Those who are not able to walk along the way of knowledge have to adopt the course of meditation. But meditation is not without its results. It also leads to the same goal, even though the process may be slow and tortuous.

2

Analogy of Dramatic Stage

In the *Nāṭaka-dīpa* the path of inquiry is set forth. Even in the earlier chapters various methods of inquiry were explained. Through co-presence and co-absence it was shown that the self is the witness of the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. Through a searching analysis of the elements and the elementals it was demonstrated that *Brahman* is different from them, and that the elements and their products are mere illusory superimpositions. In the present chapter, the familiar method of superimposition and subsequent removal (*adhyāropāpavāda*) is adopted in order to exhibit the true nature of the self.

The process of superimposition is first set forth. Prior to creation there was the non-dual *sat*, one only without a second. Then it itself became the world through its *māyā*, and in the form of the *jīva* entered the world. This is the story of the creation. *Māyā* is at the root of the manifestation of the world. Inquiry leads to the destruction of *māyā* ; and when *māyā* is thus dispelled the true nature of the self is realized. What is called bondage is nothing but mistaking the non-dual self to be one among many reals ; and release is freedom from this wrong notion. Non-discrimination is the cause of bondage ; inquiry is the way to its removal.

The nature of the *jīva* must first be discriminated from the nature of the immutable witness. The agent who has the conceit of "I" is the *jīva*; and his instrument is the mind. The mental modification of the form of "I" which is turned inward manifests the agent, and the modification of the form of "this" which goes out makes known the external world. Thus the agent through the channel of the mental mode perceives, acts, and enjoys. The agent, the act, and the objects are at the same time illumined by the witness-intelligence which is like a lamp set on a dramatic stage. The lamp gives light to the manager of the drama, to the actors and to the audience without any distinction; and it shines even if the theatre be emptied of all persons. Similarly, the witness manifests egoity, the intellect, and the objects, and continues to shine even when they are non-existent. It cannot be said that the intellect is enough to illumine the objects, for it shines by borrowed light. It is the self-luminous, immutable intelligence that is the giver of all light. The sense of egoity may be compared to the proprietor of the drama, the objects to the audience and the intellect to the danseuse; and the various sense-organs are auxiliaries or accompaniments which aid the actors. All these are without any distinction illumined by the witness. Just as the lamp on the dramatic stage illumines without moving and without being affected by the movements of the actors and the audience, even so the witness which is permanent and immutable manifests all things both within and without.

The distinction between 'inner' and 'outer' which is dependent on the body has no reference to the witness. Those objects which are external to the body are called the 'outer' and those that are within the 'inner'. The impermanence and the vacillation natural to the intellect are superimposed on the witness-intelligence. The witness neither goes in nor goes out. It appears

as if it acts on account of its association with the intellect. It knows no 'inner' and no 'outer' which are distinctions created by the intellect. Even to say that the self is omnipresent and all-pervasive is to superimpose on it the category of space. In itself, the witness is beyond the reach of speech and mind. If, then, it be asked how it can be known, we reply, the self is not an object of apprehension. When all cognitions get dissolved, it alone remains. Because it is self-luminous, it is not dependent on means of valid knowledge.

The central idea which is expressed in the *Nāṭakadīpa* is that the witness is the true self and that the *jīva*-hood is an imposed form. The world is like a stage illumined by the witness-intelligence. When through inquiry all superimpositions are removed, the self is recognized to be the only reality, all-that-which-is.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

YOGA – BLISS

(YOGĀNANDA-PRAKARAṆA)

The last five chapters of the *Pañcadaśī* are devoted to an exposition of the bliss-aspect of *Brahman*. The essential nature of *Brahman* is defined in scripture as reality-intelligence-bliss. The first five chapters of the *Pañcadaśī* made out that *Brahman* is the absolute reality whereon the world of animate and inanimate objects is superimposed. The second five chapters characterized *Brahman* as pure intelligence which is the witness-consciousness of this world-drama. And it is the aim of the last five chapters to elucidate the third part of the definition, viz., the bliss-nature of *Brahman*.

1

Classification of Bliss

Two different classifications of bliss are given in this chapter. *Śloka* 11 speaks of *Brahman*-bliss, the happiness of knowledge, and the pleasure due to sense-objects. The chapters XI, XII, and XIII expound the nature of *Brahman*-bliss; the XIV chapter explains what the happiness of knowledge is; and the final chapter is an exposition of the pleasure born of sense-objects. *Śloka* 87 of the present chapter substitutes the happiness due to the residual impression of bliss for the happiness of knowledge. The justification for this change is that the happiness of knowledge is included in the pleasure generated by sense-objects. “The happiness of knowledge is, like the happiness born of sense-objects, a modification of the intellect” (XIV, 2). Hence the classification of bliss into *Brahman*-bliss, the happiness which is the result of the residual impression of bliss, and the pleasure due

to sense-objects, is shown to be valid and uncontradicted by the earlier classification found in this chapter. In truth, however, there is only one bliss and that is *Brahman*. We delude ourselves by thinking that happiness rests in external objects, in the world without. But the real centre of happiness is the self. The self-luminous *Brahman*-bliss is the generator of even the other two kinds of happiness.

2

Non-dual Bliss

That *Brahman* is of the nature of bliss is clearly taught in the episode of Bhṛgu in the *Tāittirīya Upaniṣad*. Bhṛgu approached his father Varuṇa, with a burning desire to know *Brahman*, and got a formula the application of which had to be worked out by himself. "From which all these beings arise, by which those that are born live, and into which dying, they enter, know that to be *Brahman*". This is the general enunciation with the help of which Bhṛgu had to find out the nature of *Brahman*. Through inquiry he decided that gross matter, vital airs, mind, and intellect cannot satisfy the conditions of the formula, and finally arrived at the truth that *Brahman* is bliss, the prototype of the reflection found in the sheath of bliss. "From bliss, indeed, all creatures come into being; in bliss they live; and unto bliss they return. Hence, bliss is *Brahman*". Bhṛgu solved in this manner the fundamental problem of metaphysics. He was given by his father the qualification *per accidens* of *Brahman*; and with the help of this qualification he discovered the essential nature of *Brahman*, viz., bliss (*ānanda*) which is inseparable from reality and intelligence.

If *Brahman* be of the nature of bliss, it must be the only reality without a second, and it must also be self-luminous. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* reports a conversation between Nārada and Sanatkumāra where the latter instructs the former about the nature of the infinite (*bhūmā*) which is

Brahman. Prior to the creation of the world there was the Infinite alone, since there were not the threefold distinctions of empirical usage, viz., the cognizer, the thing cognized, and cognition. "That is the Infinite wherein nothing else is perceived, nothing else is heard, and nothing else is cognized". The sheath of the intellect which is a product is the cognizer; the sheath of the mind constitutes cognition, and the objects of sense, sound, etc., are the objects of cognition. These, verily, did not exist prior to their production. Hence the Infinite alone existed with nothing else as opposed to itself. The Infinite which is the "Full" (*pūrṇa*) is experienced in the states of sleep, *samādhi*, and swoon. Wherever there is the absence of empirical distinctions, there the non-dual self alone remains. That prior to creation the non-dual Infinite alone existed must be admitted because of the unintelligibility of the other alternatives. There could not have been then something which was neither dual nor non-dual, for such a thing is impossible, being self-contradictory. Nor could there have been the dual things, since they were not yet produced. Hence, by elimination, we must admit that the Infinite alone existed.

It cannot be said that the non-dual is established by reasoning and not by experience. Reasoning alone cannot establish the non-dual, because there is no illustration. It may be syllogistically argued thus: The state of dissolution is devoid of duality, since there is no apprehension of duality, as in the state of sleep. Here, the sleep experienced by another person cannot be the illustration. The inference, "The other person is sleeping because he is without activity, like me when sleeping", establishes the self-luminosity of the experience of sleep. Hence it is experience that makes known the reality of the non-dual. That which is non-dual and self-luminous, we have said, is bliss. "That which is the Infinite (*bhūmā*) is bliss; there is no happiness in the finite (*alpa*)". The objects of sense yield no unmixed

happiness. Even the little pleasure that they seem to yield is shrouded in misery and pain. And so Sanatkumāra declares that there is no happiness in the finite.

3

Evidence of Sleep-Experience

“Now, let there be no happiness in duality ; but how is there happiness in the non-dual? If there were happiness, it would be apprehended ; and if it were apprehended, there would be the empirical distinctions again which would negate the non-dual”. If thus it be said, the reply is : let there be no bliss *in* the non-dual, because the non-dual itself *is* bliss. Nor does this fact require any evidence ; for in respect of the self-luminous no evidence is needed. That the infinite, non-dual *Brahman* is self-luminous is evident from the experience of sleep. In sleep there is not the functioning of the senses. Nor can that experience be established through inference from the sleep of another person. Means of valid knowledge like perception and inference are not able to establish the experience of sleep. But still we cannot but testify to the fact of such an experience ; and hence it is self-luminous.¹

The experience of sleep which reveals the self to be non-dual and self-luminous indicates also that it is of the nature of bliss. In sleep there is no misery, no pain. Hence there remains in that state happiness or bliss. Scripture declares : “ Crossing the bund of the experiences of waking and dream, viz., the conceit in the body, the *puruṣa*, though blind, becomes one who is not blind, though wounded, becomes one who is not wounded, though suffer-

1. The following inference establishes the self-luminosity of the experience of sleep :— What is in dispute, viz., the experience of sleep, is self-luminous, because it is manifest even without the means of knowledge, like the self admitted by the Sāṅkhyas, or the *samavedana* of the Prābhākaras, or the cognitional self of the *Vijñānavādins*.

ing from disease, becomes one who is free from disease".² The non-existence of misery in sleep is testified to in many other passages of the Upaniṣads. Nor may it be said, by quoting the example of an inert object like the stone, that mere absence of pain does not guarantee the presence of happiness. In the case of stone, etc., there cannot even be the suspicion of misery or pain, and hence also of happiness. We do not infer the existence of happiness because of the non-existence of misery in the case of inert things. But in the case of beings which are subject to happiness and misery, we can say that when one of them is non-existent the other is present. Further, the non-existence or existence of misery or pain in the self is directly experienced, not inferred. Since in sleep the non-existence of misery is experienced, we say that there is in that state the presence of happiness. If there were no happiness in sleep, why should men prepare their beds smooth and soft? Comfortable beds are not intended merely for the removal of pain; for, if that were so, only those who are suffering from such pains as are caused by disease, etc., should need them.

The happiness that is afforded by soft beds, etc., is no doubt external and extrinsic. Tired of its avocations, the *jīva* seeks happiness in such objects of enjoyment as bed, etc. It experiences the reflection of its own bliss in the mode of the intellect. This is what is known as *viṣayānanda*; and it is not completely free from misery. It is only the semblance of bliss; and the semblance cannot be a substitute for the substance. In sleep there is the experience of happiness which is not the product of anything else. Scripture declares that the *jīva* in sleep experiences its identity with *Brahman* and the bliss thereof. By means of five examples they indicate what the *Brahman*-bliss experienced in sleep is like. Just as a bird which is tied by means

of a thread flies in vain to various places in search of rest and returns at last to the abode to which it is bound, even so the mind, which is the adjunct of the *jīva* roams about in waking and dream in order to reap the fruits of its merit and demerit, and when its *karma* perishes it gets dissolved in its material cause, viz., nescience; and when the mind ceases to function, the *jīva* becomes one with the supreme. Just as a falcon wings its way in the sky, gets exhausted and returns to its nest, even so the *jīva* runs to the experience of sleep longing for *Brahman*-bliss. Like a suckling child which is free from attachment and aversion, or like an emperor who has reached the highest limit of human happiness, or like a knower of *Brahman*, learned in the sacred lore, who is at the helm of the happiness of knowledge, the *jīva* experiences unalloyed bliss in the state of sleep. Of all the persons in the world, only the infant, the emperor, and the enlightened can be said to be happy; and so they were cited as illustrations of the bliss experienced in sleep. The *śruti* compares the *Brahman*-bliss that is experienced in sleep to the happiness which a person experiences in company with his consort. In both the kinds of experience there is not the cognition of the objects which belong to the external and the internal worlds. Such passages of scripture which declare that in sleep a father becomes non-father, etc., show that the *jīva* loses its *jīva*-hood and hence also its transmigratory nature; and when *jīvatva* is removed in sleep, *Brahman* alone remains. The conceit in the body is the root-cause of all the sorrows of life; since that conceit is non-existent in sleep, the *jīva* is said to have transcended misery and pain. The *Kaivalya Upaniṣad*³ says :“During the time of sleep when everything is dissolved, the *jīva* which is obscured by *taṃas* attains the nature of happiness”.

Scripture is not the only evidence for the existence of happiness in sleep. There is also the testimony of the

experience of all who say after waking up from sleep: "Happily did we sleep; we knew nothing in our sleep". Thus there is the reflective cognition of happiness and nescience which were experienced in sleep. Reflective cognition is grounded in experience, for without the latter the former is not possible. Nor may it be said that since in sleep there are no recognized means of knowledge there can be no experience of happiness and nescience. As it was pointed out already, the experience of happiness in sleep which is no other than *Brahman*-bliss requires no instrument of knowledge, because it is self-luminous; and nescience is revealed by *Brahman* which in so doing is not in need of any external channels of cognition.

That the self-luminous bliss experienced in sleep is *Brahman* is declared by the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* in the passage "*Brahman* is intelligence-bliss". Granting that the bliss experienced in sleep is *Brahman*, a question may be asked here as to who experiences the bliss. "The *jīva* which has the intellect for adjunct remembers that it slept happily without knowing anything. Since experience and the recognition thereof must have the same locus, the *jīva* conditioned by the intellect must have experienced happiness and nescience in sleep." This statement is not valid, for in sleep the intellect and the mind which are the products of nescience get resolved in their cause; and since the adjunct, the intellect, is non-existent, there cannot be the *jīva* as conditioned by intellect. What experiences happiness and nescience in sleep is the *ānandamaya* self, and the remembrance of that by the *viññānamaya* self is intelligible because the self is the same in both the states of experience, although the adjuncts may vary.

In the moment immediately antecedent to sleep there is the mode of the intellect which is turned inward and wherein there is the reflection of bliss; and later, the same mode along with the reflection of bliss gets resolved in the

form of sleep and comes to be called *ānandamaya*. *Ānandamaya* self has for its adjunct nescience which is associated with the residual impression generated by the inward-turned mode of the intellect; and it experiences in sleep *Brahman*-bliss which is its true nature by means of the mode generated by nescience. In sleep there is not the conceit "I am experiencing happiness", etc., because the modes of nescience, unlike the modes of the intellect, are subtle and not clearly manifest.

The Upaniṣads like the *Māṇḍūkya* and the *Tāpanīya* set forth that the *ānandamaya* enjoys *Brahman*-bliss by means of the subtle modes of nescience. "The mass of intelligence which has become one in the state of sleep is the *ānandamaya*, which enjoys bliss through the channel of the modes possessing reflection of intelligence". The self which assumes many forms in the states of waking and dream becomes of a single consistency in sleep; and the intelligence which is reflected in nescience serves as the channel for the enjoyment of bliss. Again, due to the force of *karma*, the *jīva* awakes from sleep and gets involved in the troubles and turmoils of the transmigratory life. The *Kaivalya Upaniṣad*⁴ says that awaking from sleep is caused by *karma*. "Again, due to conjunction with the *karma* of the previous life, the same *jīva* dreams and awakes".

An examination of the moment immediately succeeding the termination of sleep gives us intimation of the *Brahman*-bliss experienced during sleep; for there is then the persistence of residual impression of *Brahman*-bliss which is borne out by the fact that a person who has just got up from sleep remains calm and happy without any thought of external objects. But being prompted by *karma*, the *jīva* loses sight of its blissful nature and gets entangled once again in the vicious circle of *samsāra*.

We observed above that in the state of calmness there is the manifestation of *Brahman*-bliss in the form of residual impression. Now, since the manifestation of *Brahman*-bliss is obtained in the state of calmness the need for the teaching of scripture and the preceptor may be questioned. The declarations of *śruti* can be meaningful only when it connotes something which is not established by any other means. This objection is not sound. A man who does not know a piece of precious stone to be such finds no use for it. Even so, although every one experiences *Brahman*-bliss in sleep and its residual impression in the state of calmness, he does not recognize it to be *Brahman*-bliss or the residual impression thereof without the help of scripture and the preceptor. Nor may the opponent say that he has understood *Brahman* from the words of the Siddhāntin, for it is analogous to the instance of the man who hoped to win the prize for proficiency in the Vedas by merely saying that the Vedas are four in number. Even if the words which constitute such statements as "You are the impartite non-dual *Brahman*-bliss, etc.", be mastered and their meaning learnt, there remains to be acquired the intuition of *Brahman*. And this intuition can be got only through the declarations of scripture and the instruction of the preceptor.

So far we have seen how there is the experience of *Brahman*-bliss in the state of sleep, how it is self-luminous and non-dual, as also how there is the indication of the bliss immediately prior to sleep, and an intimation thereof in the form of residual impression immediately subsequent to sleep. The happiness which is the result of the residual impression of bliss is experienced whenever there is happiness which is not due to the objects of the external world. This is what we have called *vāsanānanda*. What is known as *viṣayānanda* is the reflection of bliss in the mental mode which has turned inward after the desire for external objects is destroyed through attaining them. As was remarked above,

the latter two kinds of bliss are but products of *Brahman*-bliss, *vāsanānanda* being its residual impression and *viśayānanda* being its reflection in the modes which cognize objects of sense. Both the latter kinds of bliss point towards their generator, viz., *Brahman*-bliss.

4

Residual Impression of Bliss

Through an analysis of the state of sleep we found that there is every kind of evidence for the experience of *Brahman*-bliss. We shall now point out how the residual impression of bliss experienced during the state of waking serves as a ground for asserting the existence of *Brahman*-bliss. The *vijñānamaya* self which is the agent in the state of waking experiences both pleasure and pain as also the balanced state where there is neither pleasure nor pain. The experience of pleasure and pain is the product of *karma*, while the state of indifference expresses the innate nature of the self. In the enjoyment of external objects and in day-dreams there is the experience of pleasure and pain; and in the intervals between pleasures and pains there is the experience of the state of silence which is the expression of the real nature of the supreme bliss. In those moments of care-free indifference men very often say, "We are free from anxieties and worries; we are happy". It must be noted however that even these moments do not directly manifest *Brahman*-bliss; for what we have is only the residual impression of that supreme bliss. The direct manifestation of bliss is made impossible because, it is obscured by egoity. Coolness is felt on the outer surface of a pot containing cold water; but that coolness itself is not water. In the same manner, during moments of indifference and silence there is the experience only of the residual impression of bliss. But just as coolness on the surface is the basis for inferring water inside the pot, even so the residual impression is the indica-

tor of the existence of *Brahman*-bliss. And when through constant effort egoity is gradually quelled, the real nature of bliss is revealed in increasing degrees. The intellect becomes refined and culminates in the destruction of all modes of the form of the not-self; and then there arises the cognition "I" in the internal organ which has become of the form of *Brahman*. This subtle state of intellect is not sleep, since there is not here the dissolution of the intellect. That *Brahman*-bliss is manifest in this state which is distinct from sleep and wherein there is cognition of duality is taught by Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna.

5

Method of Yoga

The method by which the intellect is to be refined so that the supreme bliss may be attained is described in the *Gītā* as *yoga*. *Yoga* is separation from contact with pain. It is to be achieved by constant and slow practice with a determined and untiring mind. Whatever drags the mind to the objects of sense and makes it waver and wander away should be regarded as an obstacle to the progress of a *yogin*. Renouncing all desires and restraining with his mind all his senses, the *yogin* should gain tranquillity, and with a steady and steadfast purpose concentrate his mind on the supreme Self. When thus the mind is restrained and withheld from sense-objects, and the intellect is refined and tranquillity reached, the *yogin* experiences unexcellable bliss which is super-sensible and grasped only by the intellect.

The same method of tranquillizing the mind is taught in the *Maitrāyaṇī-śākhā* by sage Śākāyanya to king Bṛhadra-
tha. Whatever the mind thinks that it becomes. When it is attached to the senses and the objects thereof, it gets muddled and mutilated; but when it is concentrated on *Brahman* it becomes of that form. That mind is impure which is in contact with desires; and that mind is pure

which is completely free from the pestilence of desires, etc. Mind alone is the cause of the bondage and release of men ; attachment to objects brings about bondage, while detachment from them effects release. The mind is to be purified and tranquillized by constant and vigilant practice. Just as the fire which is unfed by fuel cools down, even so when all the mental modes are destroyed, the mind gets dissolved in its source. When the channel of the mental flow is turned away from the objects of sense and directed towards *Brahman*, and when the mind gets attached thereto, then the bonds of *saṃsāra* break. Rid of its impurities through *samādhi*, the mind experiences unexcellable bliss which defies all description and which is grasped by the tranquil mind alone.

The mental equanimity cannot be maintained for long. *Samādhi* does not stay for a long time. But still it gives the *yogin* a lasting taste of the supreme bliss. Even when he is out of that balanced state of mind, he thinks longingly of that bliss with the same ardour and intense fervour with which a woman contemplates the lord of her heart. In the moments of indifference when there is manifest the residual impression of bliss, he discerns the supreme bliss itself and concentrates his mind thereon. That the *yogin* is able to fix his mind on *Brahman* and at the same time carry on the activities of the world can be illustrated by examples. The crow which is said to see with only one eye directs its vision alternately through the two cavities. A man who is a master of two languages discerns meaning in both of them. One who stands in a river half-immersed, with the scorching sun above, experiences both the pleasure afforded by the cool waters and the pain inflicted by the piercing shafts of the sun. In the same manner, the *yogin* is able to bear the miseries of the world and yet at the same time centre his mind in *Brahman*. Thus, unlike the ordinary run of mankind which experiences *Brahman*-bliss only in sleep,

the *yogin* perceives it even in the hours of waking and dream. To the yogic perception *Brahman*-bliss is revealed.

The method of *yoga* has been detailed in the concluding verses of this chapter as the means by which *Brahman*-bliss can be attained. *Yoga* is the method by which the mental current is arrested in its flow towards objects of sense and directed towards *Brahman*. *Yoga*, in short, is the concentration and the tranquillizing of the mind. This method was explained in greater detail in the *Dhyāna-dīpa*, where a secondary place was assigned to it, priority being given to the method of inquiry (*jñāna*). The author of the *Pañcadaśī* does not go to the extent of saying with Vācaspati that it is only through *prasaṅkhyāna* that *Brahman*-intuition is gained. Though following the *Vivaraṇakāra* he maintains that *śravaṇa* is the principal means to *Brahman*-knowledge, he concedes to mental concentration the position of being an auxiliary thereto. But he is firm on this point that knowledge is the only direct means to release, and that there can be no combination of knowledge and *karma*. The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* says: "Knowing that, he crosses death; there is no other path to release".⁵ There are some passages of scripture and the traditional code which seem to enjoin either *karma* or the combination of *karma* and *jñāna* to be the means. "Doing *karma* here in this world, let him desire for living a hundred years; to you who desire thus there is no other way except that by which you will not be affected by *karma*." "He who knows both *vidyā* and *avidyā*, transcends death through *avidyā* and attains immortality through *vidyā*." "Through *karma* alone did Janaka and others attain *samsiddhi*". "Like the honey which is mixed with food or the food which is mixed with honey, *tapas* and *vidyā* together constitute a potent medicine." These texts, though they seem to enjoin either *karma* or a combination of *karma* with *jñāna* are not really in conflict

with those passages of the *śruti* which declare that there is no other path except knowledge. The word, “*samsiddhi*” connotes the purification of mind which is auxiliary to *Brahman*-knowledge. The word “*vidyā*” which is used in combination with the word “*avidyā*” or *karma* means *upāsana* and not knowledge. Thus it will be clear that none of the above quoted passages prescribes *karma* to be the means, either alone or in combination with knowledge. There is evidence in abundance in the Upaniṣads for knowledge being the only direct means to release. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* says, “The knower of *Brahman* attains the highest”. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, Nārada asks Sanatkumāra, “I have heard from men like you that the knower of the self crosses sorrow ; and I, who am versed in the scriptures, because of the lack of that knowledge, am in distress. Therefore, O Lord, enable me to cross the bounds of sorrow.” Gods like Indra, Varuṇa, Yama, and Agni are said to be in constant fear of the supreme, because they are lacking in *Brahman*-knowledge. “Wherever there is duality, there is fear.” “He who knows *Brahman* which is bliss is never afraid.” The *jñānin* is not affected by *karma* in the form of merit and demerit. “When the most high is seen, the knots of his heart are cut, all doubts are dispelled and all *karmas* are destroyed”.

CHAPTER TWELVE

SELF – BLISS

(ĀTMĀNANDA-PRAKARAṆA)

For the sake of those dull-witted persons who are not able to grasp the manifestation of *Brahman*-bliss in the experience of sleep and the persistence of its residual impression in moments of calmness, another mode of conveying the bliss-nature of the self is set forth in this chapter. This method, however, will prove helpful only to those of the dull-witted who are desirous of knowing *Brahman*. For the others either *karma* or *upāsana* is prescribed, the way of knowledge not being open to them.

1

Self, the Seat of Love : Evidence of Scripture

The method which the present chapter adopts is the one which Yājñavalkya had recourse to while instructing his younger wife, Maitreyī. As Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*¹ observes, "In order to teach that non-attachment is instrumental to immortality, he (Yājñavalkya) creates a distaste for wife, husband, sons, etc., so that they may be renounced." Yājñavalkya does this by declaring that the self alone is the seat of supreme love. The love that one bears to other objects is not really for their sake ; but it is for the sake of the one who loves. "This self is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than everything else, and is innermost." The love for other objects is secondary, since they contribute to the pleasure of the self ; and the love for the self alone is primary. Husband, wife,

progeny, wealth, cattle, castes, the worlds, gods, the Vedas, elements, and all the rest have no intrinsic value in themselves. They are dear for the sake of the self. "Not for the sake of the husband is the husband dear, but for the sake of the self is the husband dear." A woman loves her husband only when she likes him, and that too for her own pleasure. Were the husband the object of her absolute love, she ought not at any time and under any circumstance be displeased with him. But it is a matter of common knowledge that couples fall out with each other not infrequently over trifling and trivial things. "Not for the sake of the wife is the wife dear, but for the sake of the self is the wife dear." Even when husband and wife are attracted towards each other at the same time, each loves the other for his or her own sake. Similar is the case with the love that one bears towards one's children. "Not for the sake of the sons are the sons dear, but for the sake of the self are the sons dear." Sometimes a child may cry when fondled by its parent, but the parent derives pleasure and does not weep with the child. This shows clearly that he loves the child for his own pleasure and not for the sake of the child itself. If this be the case with beings which are endowed with intelligence, need it then be said that inert things like wealth, caste, and the worlds, and the lower animals like cattle, etc., are loved not for their own sake but for the sake of the self? "Not for the sake of wealth is wealth dear, but for the sake of the self is wealth dear. Not for the sake of brahminhood is brahminhood dear, but for the sake of the self is brahminhood dear. Not for the sake of kṣatriya-hood is kṣatriya-hood dear, but for the sake of the self is it dear. It is not for the sake of the worlds that they are dear, but for the sake of the self that they are dear". The gods like Viṣṇu are worshipped not without any ulterior motive. The devotee worships them for the removal of his sins, and not for the sake of the gods themselves who are devoid of sin. "Not for the sake of the gods are the gods dear, but for the sake of the self are the gods dear". The brahmins study

the Vedas in order to preserve their brahmin-hood. The members of the three higher castes take to Vedic study so that they may not become outcastes. Hence even the study of the Veda is not intrinsic. "Not for the sake of the Vedas are the Vedas dear, but for the sake of the self are the Vedas dear." In short, everything subserves the purpose of the self. The self is the centre and the seat of love.

"Now, what is this love which is said to be for the sake of one's own self? It may be attachment, faith, devotion, or desire. There is attachment to objects like women; there is faith in such rites and rituals as the sacrifices; there is devotion to the preceptor, the deity, and the elders; and there is desire for things which we long to have. But all these four forms of love are not found for one and the same object. Hence love as such cannot have everything for its object. If love be regarded as devotion, then as there is no devotion to one's wife, it would result that there is no love for her. Thus it is with love taken in any of its forms." If thus it be said, we reply that the statement would be true only when love is understood in the above manner. In all the varied manifestations of love, there is a constant character which does not change. That mode of the mind is called love, which has for its object pure pleasure or happiness. It cannot be said that this love is identical with desire; for unlike the latter, it is observed to have for its objects those things which have perished as well as those which are procured. Nor may it be said that since love is seen for food, etc., which are the instruments of happiness, there may be love for the self, not because it is an end in itself, but because it is also a means to happiness; for the inference "The self is fit to be a means to happiness, because it is dear, like food, etc.," is conditioned by an adjunct. Food, etc., possess the characteristic of

being enjoyed (*bhogyatva*) ; but the self is not what is enjoyed. It is the enjoyer, the subject of all experience. And to say that the self is its own object is a contradiction; for one and the same thing cannot be at the same time both the helper and the helped, the subject and the object.

The happiness that is dependent on external objects excites mere love — love of a very low degree. But the self is the most lovable, the locus of supreme happiness. The happiness that is got from the objects of sense is not constant, whereas the happiness that is centred in the self is ever present without any inconstancy. When a person gets disgusted with a particular object which for some time has given him pleasure, he puts it by and takes to another object in the hope of finding happiness there. Thus the pleasure which the objects yield is not constant. That the self is the seat of supreme love is shown by the fact that never does a person get a desire to destroy or relinquish the self. The self can neither be abandoned nor be accepted, neither be renounced nor be received. It cannot be said that because the self can neither be abandoned nor be accepted there can be only indifference in respect thereof; for, even if there were indifference, since the self is the subject which has that indifference, it cannot be itself the object of indifference. Nor may it be said that since, when a man gets disgusted with himself owing to excessive attachment or aversion, he desires to put an end to his life, what was said before that nobody desires to destroy the self is wrong ; for what the man who is tired of his life wants to do is to destroy his body ; and the body, verily, is not the self. The *jīva* which desires to abandon its body is not the object of disgust. It is the body that is sought to be destroyed and not the self.

We have seen above the evidence of scripture for the fact that the self is the locus of absolute and unconditioned

love. It is possible to arrive at the same conclusion through reasoning. In the world it is observed that a parent, Viṣṇudatta, loves his son, Devadatta, more than his son's friend, Yajñadatta. His son is dearer to him than his son's friend who is remote in regard to relationship. Similarly, since the self is dearer than all other things, it is the locus of supreme love.

Further, the experience of the desire "Let me not go out of existence ; let me live for ever" proves that the love for the self is direct, immediate, and unconditioned. Thus it is established from scriptural statements, reasoning, and the evidence of experience that the self is the source of happiness and the locus of love.

2

Three Notions of Selfhood

There is a view which holds that the self is secondary to son, wife, etc., and it cites in its favour such scriptural texts as "The self verily came to be called the son, etc."² That the son, etc., are principal in importance is alleged to be evident from the declarations of the *Aitareya Upaniṣad*. The second chapter of that Upaniṣad begins by saying that the *jīva* becomes at first the vital fluid in the parent-*puruṣa* ; and when the male-parent entrusts this fluid to the woman, he causes the soul to be born. This is called his first birth. The parent is said to sustain the child before and after the birth, for in doing so he sustains himself for the continuation of the race, thus securing the continuation of the species. This is called his second birth. The son, when he comes of age, takes on himself the burdens of his father, he becomes the representative of his father for the right performance of religious rites. Then, the father becoming aged on the completion of his life's purpose passes away, and is reborn.

This is his third birth. Thus the Upaniṣad sets forth the primal importance of a son to a father.

It is because the birth of a son is considered to be supremely valuable to a father that it is said that "there is no other world for him who has no son." The *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* states the same idea in a positive way in the passage, "They speak of an educated son as being conducive to (the attainment of) the (other) world".³ Not only is the attainment of the other world made possible by the son; even this world is to be won through him. "This world of men is to be won through the son alone and by no other rite." By describing the *Samprattikarma* (the entrusting rite), the Upaniṣad states how the worlds are to be won through the son. The rite is so called because a father, when he is about to die, is to entrust his own duties to his son in the following manner. He is to call his son, "You are *Brahman*, you are the sacrifice, and you are the world", and the son, thus addressed, is to reply, "I am *Brahman*, I am the sacrifice, and I am the world." The word '*Brahman*' has reference to whatever has been and remains to be studied; the word 'sacrifice' stands for whatever sacrifices have been performed and still remain to be performed; and the word 'world' signifies whatever worlds have been won and still remain to be won. The significance of the rite is this. The father entrusts to his son the resolve which was his of dutifully undertaking the study of the Veda, sacrifices, and the conquest of the worlds, and is freed from the resolve concerning these ties of duty. The son takes on himself all this load which belonged to his father and protects him from this world. Hence it is said that a well instructed son is conducive to the world for his father.

Even the derivation of the word '*putra*' points out that, should anything, any duty, be left undone by the

father, through any slip or slight omission in the middle, the son exonerates him from all that unfulfilled duty of his, standing as an obstacle to his attainment of the world, by fulfilling it himself. Because he saves his father by fulfilling his duties, he is called a son. The father, although dead, is immortal and lives in this world through such a son. Thus it is that he wins this world of men through his son. From all this it is argued that scripture is evidence for the fact that the self is subsidiary to son, wife, etc.

Those who uphold this view do not rest content with quoting scripture in their favour. They show how even empirical usage testifies to the correctness of their position. The son is regarded as the principal member of his family. Through sweat and toil the father hoards money for the sake of his son. Hence the son, etc., are more important and primary than the self.

The arguments set forth above do not prove that the self is subsidiary to other things. The self can be characterized in three ways, as the secondary self, the illusory self, and the principal self. The appositional usage 'Devadatta is a lion' has only a secondary or figurative sense. Similarly, the self-hood of son, etc., is secondary, for difference is seen of son, etc., from the self. There is difference between the psycho-physical organism which consists of five sheaths and the witness-self; and yet that difference is not manifest. The mind-body combination is mistaken to be the self. Hence there is for it illusory self-hood. There is neither the existence nor the manifestation of difference between the witness-self and anything else, for there is nothing apart from the self of which the latter is the counter-correlate. And because the witness is the self of all, it is called the principal self. Thus there are three notions of self-hood, secondary, illusory, and principal; and according to the difference in empirical

usage, the conception of self-hood also varies. In an empirical usage concerning any one of the three, that one assumes primacy and the other two 'take on a subsidiary position. For example, in the act of protecting the family of a dying person, what is useful is the secondary self in the form of son, etc. In the empirical usage, 'I am lean, I am going to become fat', etc., it is the body-self (viz., the illusory self) that is meant. What is adequate as the subject of such assertions as "Through austerities I shall attain heaven" is the agent-self, and not the body-self; for a man who desires heaven performs sacrifices even at the risk of neglecting the care of his body. That which is the subject of the usage "I shall be liberated, etc." is the intelligence-self. Rituals and rites are of no use to him who desires release. From the instruction of the preceptor and from the statements of scripture he knows the truth. Thus it is clear that the notion of self-hood differs according to the difference in the mode of empirical usage. It is analogous to the distinctions that are made in respect of eligibility for particular rites. Saerificial rites like the *Brhaspatisava* are prescribed for the brahmin and not for the members of the other castes. Similarly, kings are asked to perform the *Rājasūya* sacrifice; and for the merchant class the *Vaiśyastoma* is enjoined. In the same way, it is to be understood that each empirical usage has for its content a particular notion of self-hood as the primary one, to which the rest are subsidiary. Whatever notion of self-hood is primary in a particular usage, that notion exacts supreme love; and there is also love of a lower degree to such of those things of the class of not-self which subserve the purpose of the self. To what is neither the self nor a subsidiary thereto, there is not even a fraction of love. Thus it is seen that the self, whatever may be the conception thereof, is the centre and seat of love. If there be love for any other thing, it is for the sake of the self to which that thing is but a subsidiary.

Grades of Love and Happiness

What is neither the self nor a subsidiary thereto is either the object of disregard or the object of disdain. For things like a blade of grass on the wayside, we have no regard ; while we look with horror upon such harmful beings like the scorpion and the snake. The self, we have said, is the seat of supreme love, while what is helpful thereto is the object of moderate love. There is no rule, however, by which we can characterize certain things to be helpful all the time and certain other things to be harmful. The tiger, for example, is hated when it pounces upon us ; when it is indifferent to us we take no notice of it ; and when it is in a playful mood with us, we love it. Thus we cannot fix which things are lovable, which are hateful, and which we can disregard. But we can give general definitions. Those things are lovable which are helpful to us ; those things are hated which are hurtful to us ; and those are objects of our indifference which are neither helpful nor hurtful. But the case with the self is unalterable. It is always the locus of supreme love. This is what Yājñavalkya had in view when he said that for the sake of the self everything is dear.

That the self is the most lovable of all is declared in the passage, "This self is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than everything else, and is innermost."⁴ While commenting on this passage, Viśvarūpācārya (Sureśvara) observes, "Dearer than wealth is the son ; dearer than the son is one's physical body ; dearer than the body are the senses ; dearer than the senses is the mind ; but dearer than the mind and the dearest of all is the self." The nearer a thing is to the self, the dearer it is than the rest. The

intensity of love that an object merits is dependent on its proximity to the self.

Those who do not realize this fundamental fact and consider things other than the self to be dearer than the self meet with disappointment and finally disillusionment. They find themselves in a 'vale of tears', and what they regard as dear turns out to be the cause of their misery. That things other than the self are sources of misery becomes very clear when we examine, for example, the life-history of a son. The parent is worried so long as a son is not born to him ; when a son is about to be born there are the dangers of delivery ; after the child is ushered into existence, anxiety continues to sit on the brow of the parent who is in constant fear of his darling being badly influenced by malevolent stars ; when the child grows up into a boy, there is the risk of his turning to bad ways ; even after the boy is invested with the sacred thread, there is the contingency of his continuing to be illiterate ; or if he becomes proficient in learning, the anxiety for getting him properly married haunts the parent ; when the boy is married, there is the fear whether he would be faithful to his wife or not ; if he begets children and becomes the father of a large family, there is the difficulty of finding means to provide him and his offspring with money ; and when the son is provided with enormous wealth, there is the contingency of his passing away. Thus there is no end to the misery which things other than the self bring in their train. Hence a man of discrimination must discern the defects that lie deep-seated in things other than the self, and cease to be attached to them. He must realize that the witness-self alone is the locus of supreme love.

When it is settled that the self is the locus of supreme love, it is easy to deduce that it is also the seat of the highest happiness. The self is of the nature of supreme happiness, because it is the object of unexcellable

love. What is not of the nature of supreme happiness is not the object of unexcellable love, just as pot, etc., which are neither of the nature of supreme happiness nor the objects of the highest love. In the *Taittirīya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads* we find it declared that according to the increase or decrease in love there is a corresponding increase or decrease in happiness. "From the post of an emperor to the position of Hiraṇyagarbha, wherever there is an increase in love, there is also an increase in happiness." Since the self is the apex of this pyramid, it is the locus of supreme love and the seat of the highest happiness.

4

Manifestation of Happiness and Intelligence

The self which is of the nature of happiness is the witness-intelligence which manifests the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. But unlike the intelligence-aspect of the self, its bliss-aspect is not manifested in all the modes of the intellect. Just as the lamp, which is of the nature of both light and heat, spreads only light and not heat, even so the self, which, no doubt, is of the nature of both happiness and intelligence, reveals only its intelligence-nature in all the mental modes. Nor may it be asked why, if intelligence and happiness be non-different, both of them are not manifested in one and the same mode; for there is no invariable rule that where intelligence is revealed, happiness should also be revealed. In a flower, though fragrance, colour, etc., reside, a single sense-organ is able to apprehend only a single quality and not the rest. Similarly, it is intelligible that in a mental mode wherein the intelligence-nature is revealed, the bliss-aspect need not necessarily be revealed. It cannot be said that in the example of the flower, fragrance is different from colour, whereas in the case of the self there is no difference between intelligence and bliss; for, although in reality there is no difference between intelligence and bliss, we admit that there is

apparent and adventitious difference. Even in the flower we do not recognize any inherent difference between its fragrance and its colour. They appear to be different only because they are apprehended through different sense-organs. In the same way, happiness and intelligence which constitute the essential nature of the self appear to be different because they are manifest in different modes. In that mode of the intellect which is of the nature of the transformation of the *sattva*-constituent brought about by meritorious deeds, there is revealed the identity of intelligence and happiness, because that mode is flawless and pure. And in the mode of the nature of *rajas*-constituent, because of its impurity, there is manifest only the intelligence-aspect, the bliss-nature being veiled. This is analogous to the sourness of the tamarind fruit being concealed when it is seasoned with salt. Because the happiness-nature is not revealed in some of the modes, we cannot say that it is non-existent. Nor can we say that happiness and intelligence are not identical. We have already established that the witness-intelligence is the locus of supreme happiness.

5

The Two Ways

There are two roads which lead to the knowledge of the bliss-nature of the self—the way of discrimination and the path of *yoga*. The fruit of both the methods is the same, namely, the knowledge of the self. What is called discriminative knowledge is the intuitive experience of the inner self gained through an inquiry into the nature of the five sheaths. *Yoga* is said to be for the sake of the attainment of self-knowledge. That both these methods, *viveka* and *yoga*, are instrumental to knowledge is declared by the Lord in the *Gītā*. “The place which is reached by the *Sāṅkhyas* is reached by the *Yogins* also. He who sees that the way of *sāṅkhya* and the way of *yoga* as one—he sees

indeed".⁵ The path of *yoga* may be difficult to some people; and the way of discrimination may be difficult to others. And so, these two paths are intended to suit the difference that is found among the seekers of truth.

It cannot be said that the path of *yoga*, because it is more difficult to follow, is superior to the way of discrimination. The alleged superiority of *yoga* cannot be due to its being the cause of intuitive knowledge; for even *viveka* leads to the same result. It cannot be said that because *yoga* causes the removal of attachment and aversion, it is superior to discrimination, for the latter also destroys attachment and aversion to objects. The man of discretion who knows that the self alone is the locus of supreme love, how can he be attracted to external objects? And for him who has attained the balanced vision, how can there be the feeling of hatred or aversion? He is no whit inferior to the *yogin* in being free from all flaws of the mind. Nor can the superiority of the *yogin* be sought to be maintained by pointing out that for him there is no apprehension of the world of duality, while the man of discrimination is not devoid of that apprehension. In the state of empirical usage, both the *yogin* and the *vivekin* apprehend the world. Just as in the state of *samādhi* there is no cognition of duality for the *yogin*, even so for the man of discrimination there is no presentation of duality when he is possessed of discriminative knowledge. Thus both the methods, *viveka* and *yoga*, lead to the same goal, viz., release, through the channel of knowledge.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

NON-DUAL BLISS

(ADVĀITĀNANDA-PRAKARAṆA)

The chapter *Advaitānanda* sets forth the non-duality of *Brahman*, the indeterminability of *māyā*, and the illusory nature of the world.

1

Non-duality of Brahman

In the previous chapter the notion of the self was said to be threefold—principal, secondary, and illusory. The witness-intelligence is the principal self; son, etc., constitute the secondary self; and the body, etc., go to make up the illusory self. Now, if over and above the principal self there are other selves, secondary and illusory, which belong to the same class as itself, and if there be also ether, etc., which do not belong to the same class as the self, it is possible to argue that the non-duality of the self is destroyed. But in reality, what are regarded as selves belonging to the same class as the principal self fall within the range of what constitutes the world, and the world as apart from the self which is bliss has no existence. Hence the non-duality of *Brahman* is in no way affected. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (II, i, 1) declares that all things from ether to the physical body have their origin in the self. “So, from this *Ātman* has sprung ether,” etc. “From *Brahman* which is *Ātman* was born the *ākāśa*, *ākāśa* being that whose attribute is sound and which gives space for all things having form. And from *ākāśa* the rest of the elements and elementals arise. The pre-eminent of all is the *puruṣa* who, as identical with the sheath of food, is but a product of matter”. Thus,

since *Brahman* is the cause of the entire world, the latter has no existence apart from *Brahman*, and hence it cannot destroy the non-duality thereof. It cannot be objected that, since the above scriptural passage characterizes only the self as the cause of the world, it is not established thereby that bliss is the primal cause and that it is not conditioned by duality; for the same Upaniṣad declares in another place that bliss is the source, sustenance, and solace of all that exists. "From bliss, verily, these creatures are born; having come into being, by bliss they live; and having departed, into bliss, again, they enter."¹

Because the world is the product of *Brahman* which is bliss, it is evident that the former has no reality apart from its cause. Just as pot is not different from clay, the world is not different from the self. *Brahman* is not merely the efficient cause of the world as the potter is of pot, in which case the product cannot be identical with the cause. On the other hand, it is the material cause of the world as clay is of pot. Were the self the efficient cause alone, the scriptural passage declaring that in bliss the beings have their existence and unto it they return would have no meaning. Verily, pot is not dependent on the potter for its existence, and when destroyed, it does not get dissolved in the potter. In clay, which is its material cause, pot exists, and when destroyed, unto clay it returns. Similarly, since it is declared by scripture that *Brahman*-bliss is the locus of the origination, sustenance, and destruction of the world, *Brahman* is the material cause and not merely the efficient cause of the world.

Now, what kind of material cause is *Brahman* of the world? Does its material causality consist in origination, as in the case of the primal atoms? Or, does it consist in transformation, as in the case of Primal Nature? Or, is it characterized by being illusorily manifested? The

Vaiśeṣikas and others who hold the view of absolute creation say that something originates from something else ; and they attribute the creation of the world to the conjunction of primal atoms. The Sāṅkhyas and those who are in sympathy with their view of transformation characterize the world as a transformation of Primal Nature, as curds are of milk. When a thing attains a state which is different from its present one, it is called transformation. When a thing, while not abandoning its prior state, appears to be of a different state, it is known as illusory manifestation. "That change, which is of the same grade of reality as the thing, is transformation ; what is of a different nature from that is illusory manifestation ; or the effect, which is non-different from the cause, is a transformation ; the effect, which even without being non-different from that cause is yet difficult to state apart from that, is an illusory manifestation ; such is the distinction between transformation and illusory manifestation."²

Brahman can be neither the originating cause nor the transformed cause. What is partless by nature cannot originate something *de novo*,³ nor can it get itself transformed into something else. *Brahman* illusorily manifests itself as the world, as a rope appears to be a snake. Illusory manifestation is possible for what is partless. On the sky which is without parts spherical shape and blue colour are superimposed. Similarly, the world of names and forms is illusorily superimposed on the partless bliss.

2. *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha* tr. by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, p. 46.

3. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, pp. 302—3 : The idea of creation as a special act or event that took place once upon a time represents the universe as in no way organic to the divine life.....Such a conception of creation belongs to the same circle of ideas as the waving of a magician's wand.

Indeterminability of Māyā

The power of *māyā* is the ground of the superimposition, just as the magical power of the magician is the ground of his feats. Because of the admission of the power of *māyā* there does not result duality for *Brahman*. Power does not exist apart from the possessor of power. Nor is it non-different from the possessor. Heat which is the power of fire is not different from fire; nor is it identical with it. If it were non-different from fire, then it must be found always therein. But we observe that fire does not burn when it is influenced by spells. It is no doubt true that we cannot directly perceive power, for power is always inferred from its products. In the case of fire, when it is under the influence of spells, we infer that there is no power, because of the absence of sparks emitted therefrom. Hence power cannot be identical with the possessor of power.

That there is the power known as *māyā* in *Brahman* is evident from the passage which reads: "They who follow the path of meditation beheld the power of the divine self hidden by its own *guṇas*."⁴ The Upaniṣad states that sages who wanted to find out the cause of the world, rejecting the other cosmological views which attribute the causality of the world to time, *svabhāva*, etc., discovered that there is a power known as *māyā* located in the self which is the ground of the projection of the world. "The supreme power of this (self) is declared to be manifold, being volitional, emotional, and cognitional in nature."⁵ The conative power of *māyā* has a preponderance of the *tamas*-constituent; the cognitive power has a preponderance of the *sattva*-constituent; while the power of emotion present in *māyā* having a preponderance of the *rajas*-constituent, serves to help the

4. *SU*, i, 3.

5. *SU*, vi, 8.

other two powers. Thus the Upaniṣad points out how there is the power of *māyā* in *Brahman* which is the cause of the projection of the world.

In the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, we have a description of the power that is located in *Brahman*. "The supreme *Brahman* is eternal, full, non-dual, and omnipotent." As waves are to the sea, so are the powers to *Brahman* which are neither identical with nor different from it. "By whatever power the self is pleased, that power gets manifested Observe, Rāma, how the power of intelligence which belongs to *Brahman* is found in the various bodies. There is in the winds the capacity to move; in the rocks there is manifested the power of immobility; there is fluidity in water, and in fire the power to consume. In ether there is void; in perishable objects there is the power to get destroyed." "Just as within the shell of an egg there is a great serpent, even so in the self the world exists. Everything is located in *Brahman*, as the tree with its roots and sprouts, leaves and branches, flowers and fruits exists potentially in the seed. As the earth produces its harvests according to the particular soil and season, so the powers that belong to *Brahman* manifest themselves differently in accordance with the difference in place and time. O! Rāma, when that omnipresent and ever-luminous self whose nature is greatness assumes the power known as thinking, then it is called mind." "All causality and instrumentality, and their resultants as well as the production, continuance, and destruction of all things, take place in *Brahman* itself, beside which there is no other cause whatever." "The whole is a form of the supreme self, and all things are but forms of the same; and the mind is also a mode thereof, as a golden ornament is but a form of gold."

To illustrate that the power of *māyā* which creates the world is neither real nor unreal, that it is a phantom-creation like the magical feat of a magician, Vasiṣṭha relates to Rāma a fantastic story. The cosmological theories have

the same kind of reality as is possessed by the fables that are related to young children. "At first the mind ; after that the cognition of bondage and release ; then the creation of the universe which goes by the name of the world ; thus and in other ways the world has attained an appearance of reality. But this is just like the fable which is told to handsome children in order to amuse them." The story is that of an old nurse who related to the boy who was under her care a fantastic fable. Vasiṣṭha addressed Rāma and said : "Hear me tell you the tale of a silly and dull-witted boy, who once asked his nurse to recite to him some pretty story for his amusement. The nurse began to relate her fine-wrought story for the pleasure of the boy with a gladsome countenance and in accents sweet as honey." There were once three handsome and healthy princes. Two of them were not born and the other was not even in the womb of his mother. Virtuous by nature, they lived in a town which was absolutely non-existent. Leaving their city of void, the three princes who were endowed with undeluded minds, beheld on their way fruit-bearing trees hanging in the sky. And then, after sporting in the forests, they lived happily in the land of the future.⁶ When this story was told by the nurse, the boy was very much amused and he believed all that the nurse had told him to be true. The story of world-creation fares no better than the fable related by the nurse.⁷ As the princes, the sport and the future city, were mere creations of the nurse's imagination, so the existence of the

6. See how Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* (II, 1, 1.) contrasts the definition of the essential nature of *Brahman* with a definition which is meaningless like, "Having bathed in the waters of the mirage, crowned with a garland of sky-flowers, this son of the barren woman is going, armed with a bow made of a hare's horn."

7. All creation-stories have a metaphorical and not a metaphysical import. Swami Jagadisvarananda in his review of the *Aitareya Upaniṣad* :— "The story of creation, as Śaṅkara puts it, is mere

visible world, is but a production of the imaginative power of man. Through stories such as the above one, Vasiṣṭha explained the nature of *māyā*.

Māyā, the power of *Brahman*, is different both from its products and its locus. The power of fire to burn is inferred, while the locus of the power, viz., fire, and its products, the sparks, are directly perceived. Hence it is patent that power is different from the locus and from the products. The power that resides in clay is different from clay as well as from pot. It is neither the clay with the five attributes, nor the pot with a definite shape. In it there are neither gross-ness, etc., which are the attributes of pot, nor sound-ness, etc., which constitute the attributes of clay. Hence the nature of power is unthinkable. Nor may it be said that unthinkable-ness is itself the nature of power; for power which is neither different nor non-different from its locus and products cannot take on even the attribute of unthinkableness. In no way can it be characterized.⁸ Prior to the production of the effect, it lies hidden in its cause; and what we term as the production of the effect is but the manifestation of power. The power which belongs to clay is latent in clay, and when assisted by the potter, etc., it attains the status of a modification of clay, viz., pot.

‘*arthavāda*’ or figurative, it has no philosophical meaning. Śaṅkara, expounding meticulously the texts of cosmology to which the whole fourth *adhyāya* of *Aitareya Upaniṣad* is devoted, gives his final opinion that no serious consideration should be given to this account of world-creation and that these *śrutis* are to be understood in a secondary sense.” Śaṅkara says: “There is absolutely nothing to be gained by the knowledge of creation.” The creational texts do not have creation for purport, but the identity of the self and *Brahman*.

8. Bradley: *Appearance and Reality*, p. 511: “The fact of appearance, and of the diversity of its particular spheres, we found, was inexplicable.”

People who are lacking in discrimination confuse the pot possessing a spherical shape, etc., with clay which is endowed with the five attributes. They combine both and call the combined form 'pot'. The empirical usage of 'pot-ness' is born of ignorance, because prior to the operations of the potter, there is no pot-ness in clay. Pot-ness which is characteristic of the object with spherical shape, etc., is intelligible only after the operations of the potter are over and not before.

Pot, like the power which has produced it, is indeterminable. It is not different from clay, for it is not found to exist apart from clay. Nor is it non-different from clay, for it does not exist in clay prior to the production of pot. Hence it is, like the power, indeterminable. The very fact that it is the product of an indeterminable power guarantees to it indeterminability. If both be indeterminable, it may be asked, how are they different? The unmanifest state is called power; and when the same power manifests itself, it takes on the name of pot. The magical power of the magician is not manifest when he does not perform his feats. It gets itself manifested in the wonders that he works. Thus the modifications, because they are of the nature of *māyā*, are illusory, unreal. What is the locus of the modifications is real. This is what the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* says. It asserts that when the self is known everything else becomes known, "Just as, my dear, by a single clod of clay all that is made of clay becomes known,—all modification being only a name based upon words, the truth being that all is clay; and just as, my dear, by a single ingot of gold, all that is made of gold becomes known,—all modification being only a name based on words, the truth being that all is gold; and just as, my dear, by a single pair of nail-scissors, all that is made of iron becomes known,—all modification being only a name based upon words, and the truth being that all is

iron.”⁹ All modification is “only a name based upon words, and there is no such reality as modification. In truth, the only reality is the clay.”¹⁰ The unmanifest power and the manifest product which appear to be different only on account of the difference in time are unreal. But the locus of the two, namely, clay, is real, because it persists in both without being destroyed by them.

The manifest product is unreal because it is devoid of truth, because it is apparently real, and because it is originated and destroyed. After it is produced men give it a name; hence scripture says that the modification is only a name based on words. And even after the modification or product is destroyed, the name persists in the words of men. Since the product is designated by a name, it is said to be of the nature of that name. The product is unreal because it has no essential nature of its own, because it is perishable, and because it is of the nature of a name based on words. These three *probans* firmly establish the unreality of the product. Unlike pot which is a product, clay is said to be real because it does not lose its essential nature by the non-production, production, or the destruction of pot.

It may be asked why, if the modification, pot, be unreal, it is not removed by the cognition of clay. We reply that it is removed in so far as the notion that it is real is destroyed. In the case of delusion not due to an adjunct (*nirupādhika-bhrama*), when there is the sublation of the delusion of the cognition of the true, not only is the notion that the modification is real is destroyed, but also the modification ceases to appear. When there is the cognition of the rope, not only is the cognition of snake re-

9. *CU*, VI, i, 4-6. See Gaṅgānāth Jhā's tr. (V. C. Seshachari's publication), Vol. IV, pp. 84 - 86.

10. Śaṅkara's Commentary.

alized to be unreal, but also the snake ceases to appear. In the case of delusion due to adjunct (*sopādhika-bhrama*), however, sublation consists only in the knowledge that what is superimposed is unreal, for so long as there is the proximity of the adjunct, what is superimposed will not cease to appear. Even after one gets the knowledge that crystal is colourless, the crystal appears red so long as there is the proximity of the hybiscus flower. The instance of pot being superimposed on clay is a case of delusion due to adjunct. Hence its sublation consists in the cognition that pot is unreal. No one regards the reflection that is cast in water by the man standing on the bank of a tank to be true. Though the reflection appears, it is not true.

The Advaitins admit that the very knowledge that the world is unreal, consequent on the cognition of the absolute reality of the self, is what constitutes the human goal. The world may continue to appear, but that does not negate the cognition of the self. In the example of pot, when it is realized that clay is real while pot is unreal, the continued appearance of pot does not in any way hinder the cognition of the reality of clay. That pot is only an illusory manifestation of clay is evident from the fact that it does not relinquish the nature of being clay. If it were a real transformation of clay, then its nature would be different from that of clay, as curds differ in nature from milk. Pot does not abandon the nature of being clay; nor does an ornament made of gold cease to be gold. Hence pot, ornaments, etc., are illusory manifestations of clay, gold, etc. It cannot be said that pot is not an illusory manifestation of clay because when it is broken it does not turn into clay; for even in the potsherds clay-ness is present. When it is shown that even the view of transformation does not explain the cases of pot, etc., it is not difficult to prove that the view of absolute creation is thoroughly inadequate to explain them. In the view of absolute creation, the cause, clay, is different from the effect, pot. Then a distinction will

have to be made between clay as the cause and clay as the effect. Thus also it would have to be stated that sound, etc., which belong to clay as clay are different from sound, etc., which belong to clay as pot. But as a matter of actual experience we do not see any absolute difference between clay and pot. Though empirical usage is the cause of the distinction between clay and pot, it does not show the two to be mutually different. Thus we find that the theory of absolute creation fares no better than the doctrine of transformation in explaining pot, etc.

Uddālaka cited the cases of clay, gold, and iron, as examples, because all the three illusorily manifest themselves as their respective modifications. He took them as instances also to prove that when the cause is known, its products become known. It may be doubted how the cognition of the real clay, etc., can be concomitant with the cognition of the unreal pot, etc. In the effect there are two aspects, the real and the unreal. The clayness of the effect is real whereas the pot-ness thereof is unreal. When it is said that by the knowledge of the cause the effect becomes known, what is meant is that the cognition of the cause, viz., clay, accomplishes also the cognition of the real aspect of the effect, viz., the clayness of pot. The unreal aspect of the effect need not be cognized, for it is of no use. It is only the knowledge of the true that is the human goal, and not the knowledge of the untrue.

“Now, to say that by the knowledge of the cause there is the knowledge of the effect is, then, tantamount to saying that by the knowledge of clay there is the knowledge of clay-ness. But, what novelty is there in this assertion? On the contrary, it appears to be a tautology.” If thus it be said, we reply: true, there is nothing novel in saying that by the knowledge of clay there is the knowledge of clay-ness. Those who know that in products what is real is the cause do not wonder

when they are told that when the cause is cognized the real-aspect of the effect also becomes cognized. But those who believe in the theories of absolute creation and transformation as also the men of the world are struck with wonder when they hear that the knowledge of the cause leads to the knowledge of the effects. How the knowledge of the one causes the knowledge of the many is an enigma to them. The purport of the scriptural passage in question, however, is not the knowledge of the many. What is of prime importance to the *śruti* is the knowledge of the one. When Uddālaka questions his son, Śvetaketu: "Did not thou ask for that instruction by which the unheard becomes heard, the unperceived becomes perceived, and the unknown becomes known?",¹¹ what he means is that the knowledge of the self is the supreme human goal. When *Brahman*, the material cause, is realized, the entire world, its unreal manifestation becomes known.

3

Illusoriness of the World

Brahman is of the nature of reality (*sat*), intelligence (*cit*), and happiness (*sukha*). The world consists of names and forms. The *Nṛsimhottaratāpini Upaniṣad*¹² gives the definition of the essential nature of *Brahman* in the passage: "All this is *Brahman* alone, reality - intelligence - bliss." Uddālaka (Āruṇi) said that Reality is *Brahman*. "In the beginning, my dear, this was Reality alone, one only, without a second."¹³ The *Aitareya Upaniṣad* establishes the intelligence - nature of *Brahman* in the words, "This Brahmā (Hiraṇyagarbha), this Indra, this creator, all these gods, these five great elements, earth, air, ether, water, fire, and

11. CU, VI, i, 2-3.

12. NUTU, 7.

13. CU, VI, ii, 1.

all these small creatures, these others, the seeds of creation, and these egg-born, womb-born, sweat-born, sprout-born, horses, cows, men, elephants, and whatever else which breathes and moves and flies and is immovable ; all this is guided by Intelligence and is supported by Intelligence ; the universe has Intelligence for its guide ; Intelligence is the basis ; Intelligence is *Brahman*.”¹⁴ Sanatkumāra declared that *Brahman* is bliss. “The Infinite is bliss. There is no bliss in what is finite. The Infinite alone is bliss. The Infinite alone is to be understood.”¹⁵ In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* the same purport is conveyed in the words, “He understood that bliss is *Brahman*, (because) from bliss these creatures are verily born, by bliss they live, and having departed into bliss again they enter.”¹⁶

That the world is of the nature of names and forms is evidenced by such scriptural texts as : “Thinking all the forms and creating the names, the brave (supreme self) remains naming them ;” “This deity thought, ‘Well, may I enter into all those three *devatas* by means of the *jīva* and appear under different names and forms.’”¹⁷ “This (universe) was then unmanifest. It became manifest into name and form — it was called such and such, and was of such and such form.”¹⁸ It was unmanifest in the causal state because *māyā*, the indeterminable power which is located in *Brahman*, was not active. What is called the manifestation of the world is the differentiation of *māyā* into the manifold of names and forms.

The evidence for the residence of *māyā* in *Brahman* is the passage : “Know *māyā* to be the primal cause (*prakṛti*)

14. *AIU*, iii, 3.

15. *CU*, VII, xxiii, 1.

16. *TU*, III, v, 1.

17. *CU*, VI, iii, 2.

18. *BU*, I, iv, 7.

and the Lord to be the *māyin*".¹⁹ *Brahman* as conditioned by *māyā* is the cause of the world. Just as the appearance of pot in clay is a delusion due to adjunct, even so the manifestation of the world in *Brahman* is a delusion due to adjunct; and the adjunct is *māyā*. We saw above that in the product there are two elements, the real and the unreal. In pot, pot-ness is unreal while clayness is real. In the world, what is real is *Brahman*: world-ness is only an appearance.²⁰ Appearance is true in so far as it is real. "All name-and-form is true, only in its nature as the real self—all modification by itself being false."²¹ What is real in the world is the nature of *Brahman*, and what is unreal is the nature of *māyā*.

Ether, the first product of *māyā*, exhibits the real nature of *Brahman* in so far as it exists (*asti*), is luminous (*bhāti*), and is of the nature of love (*priyam*). But spatiality (*avakāśa*) which is its own nature is illusory. When we say that ether is unreal, we do not mean that its existence, luminosity, and love-ness are unreal; what we mean is that its spatiality is illusory. Spatiality is illusory, because prior to the manifestation of ether, it did not exist, and when ether is destroyed, it will cease to exist. What is unreal at the beginning and unreal at the end cannot be real in the middle. "Beings are unmanifest in the beginning, manifest in the middle, and unmanifest again in the end."²² But the real nature of *Brahman* persists in ether for all time, as clay-ness in pot. When it is realized

19. *SU*, iv, 10.

20. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*: "Appearance is content not at one with its existence, a 'what' loosened from its 'that'. Appearance is the looseness of character from being, the distinction of immediate oneness into two sides, a 'that' and a 'what'".

21. Śaṅkara's commentary on *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI, iii, 2. See Bradley, *op. cit.*, p. 259: "Nature by itself has no reality. It exists only as a form of appearance within the Absolute."

22. *Gītā*, II, 28.

that the spatiality of ether is unreal, then the essential nature of *Brahman* is experienced. If spatiality be removed from ether, what remains is not void ; for it must be admitted that there is something which is apprehended as what is qualified by the non-existence of spatiality. This locus is the real and it is of the nature of happiness.

What is neither helpful nor hurtful is real happiness. Hilarity is consequent on the cognition of what is helpful; and pain is the wages of what is hurtful. When there is the non-existence of both, there is the manifestation of real happiness. It may be asked how, if real happiness is ever and everywhere present, there is the cognition of pain. Real happiness is not always cognized, because what apprehends it, namely, the mind, is momentary ; and the cognition of pain is also intelligible because it is the nature of the mind. Happiness is the very nature of all things, but when obstructed by adjuncts, it is not manifest. Thus, in ether real happiness is found, when its unreal character, viz., spatiality, is removed. Similarly, it can be discovered also in all things from air down to the physical body. What are known as the distinctive features of each object cloud the Real. The attributes of movement and tangibility belong to air ; fire has the attributes of inflaming and illumining ; fluidity is found in water, and hardness in the earth. Thus each object is distinguished from the rest by some characteristic marks. But these marks are adventitious and they are the products of *avidyā*. What is persistent in all these things, namely, reality-intelligence-bliss, is *Brahman*, even as what is persistent in pot, jar, etc., is clay.

4

Analogy of Dreams

Like the power of clay, the power of *māyā* which is located in *Brahman* creates many unreal things. This is

analogous to the dream-creations of the *jīva* in sleep. Just as the power of sleep which is present in the *jīva* is the cause of the inexplicable dreams, even so *māyā* which is located in *Brahman* is the cause of the creation, sustentation, and destruction of the world. Impossible events, such as floating in the air, surviving after the severance of one's own head from the body, and the experience of immeasurable time take place in dreams. Hence the dreams are inexplicable. If the power of sleep possesses such wonderful capacities, need it then be said that *māyā* is capable of unthinkable and impossible feats?

The person who sleeps lies like a log of wood, without any activity. But still sleep that resides in him creates the most incoherent dreams. In the same way, *māyā* superimposes modifications on *Brahman* which is without any modification. The modifications that *māyā* superimposes consist of intelligent beings and non-intelligent things. Beings are intelligent because they bear the reflection of the self, and the inert things do not have intelligence because they are incapable of receiving the reflection. But the persistence of *Brahman* is the same in both. It is only the names and forms that vary.

5

Release in Embodiment

Names and forms are superimposed on *Brahman* as pictures are painted on the canvas. They are to *Brahman* as waves are to the sea. When the names and forms are realized to be mere superimpositions, the real nature of *Brahman* becomes known. The names and forms are to be recognized as being unreal, just as a man standing on the edge of a tank knows his reflection in the water to be unreal. There may be innumerable day-dreams flitting across the mental arena; but no man in his senses pays any heed to them. They are evanescent, ever fleeting. So also are names and forms, and their empirical usage. Boy-

hood is not found in youth, and youth is not recovered in senility. The deceased father never comes; nor does the dead past ever return. Thus there is no real difference between day-dreams and the facts connected with this world. Hence, though the world may continue to appear, the cognition that it is real must be given up. When the objects of the world are seen in their true colour, the intellect is set free to indulge in the contemplation of *Brahman*. Like the histrion who does not lose his individual identity in the roles that he happens to play, the intellect, though attending to the affairs of the world, does not lose sight of the real. Just as the rocks that lie buried in the river-bed are not affected by the flow of the stream, even so the immutable *Brahman* remains unchanged in spite of the fleeting things of the world. The appearance of the world in *Brahman* is like the reflection of the heavens in a mirror. Without seeing the mirror it is not possible to behold the reflections of the sky. Similarly, without the thought of *Brahman*, there is not even the thought of names and forms. Superficial cognition of *Brahman* is vouchsafed even by the cognition of objects. But if that cognition is to be constant, we must cease to cognize the world as real. When *Brahman* which is of the nature of reality-intelligence-bliss is seen, the cognition of names and forms vanishes of its own accord. In order that *Brahman*-knowledge may be firmly established, there must be the relinquishment of the world of duality. The abandoning of the cognition of duality and the attainment of *Brahman*-intuition are interdependent. When through constant and continued practice the cognition of duality is given up and *Brahman*-intuition is gained, the *jīva* achieves release in embodiment. What is known as the practice of *Brahman* is the contemplation of *Brahman*, conversation about it and having it as the only purport. Through such practice, duality which has been presenting itself without beginning is destroyed and *Brahman*-intuition is gained.

KNOWLEDGE - BLISS

(VIDYĀNANDA - PRAKARAṆA)

The present chapter is more or less a recapitulation of the *Tr̥ptidīpa-prakarāṇa*. Verses 40 to 64 of this chapter are repetitions of verses 253 to 270 and 291 to 297 of the *Tr̥ptidīpa*. The aim of both the chapters is to give a description of the post-knowledge state. While the *Tr̥ptidīpa* details the stages that lead to the final intuition as also the state of a man who has attained the intuition, the *Vidyānanda* gives only an analysis of the consequences of *Brahman*-intuition.

1

Brahman-knowledge : Its Four Aspects

Brahman-knowledge is of the nature of happiness or bliss. It is said to be four-fold in character. It marks the cessation of all sorrow, it signifies the culmination of all desires, the accomplishment of the unaccomplished as it were, and the attainment of the unattained as it were. A man of illumination has no wants and is impelled by no desire. He has nothing to accomplish in this world or in the next. Nor is there anything left for him to attain. When he has achieved the supreme human goal, what need has he for the trinkets of the world? The entire choir of heaven and furniture of the earth seem as nothing before his divine vision. He revels in the bliss of *Brahman*; and the realization that he is non-different from *Brahman* gives him felicity and peace.

Cessation of Sorrow

The happiness that is consequent on knowledge is characterized, first, by the cessation of sorrow. This is the negative aspect of release, while the other three characteristics may be termed the positive aspects. Misery or sorrow is of two kinds—that which belongs to this world and that which is associated with the other world. That there is no misery in this world for him who has realized the self is proclaimed by the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* which reads: “If a man knows the self as ‘I am this’, then desiring what and for whose sake will he suffer in the wake of the body?” The afflictions of the body are “possible for the man who does not see the self and consequently desires things other than it. He struggles, desiring something for himself, something else for his son, a third thing for his wife, and so on, goes the round of births and deaths, and is diseased when his body is diseased. But all this is impossible for the man who sees everything as the self.”¹ It is only when the *jīva* gets itself attached to the psycho-physical organism that there is for it misery and pain. But its true nature is reality-intelligence-bliss. When it discriminates its true nature from the illusory name- and form-world, then there is no more misery which is born of the superimposition of agency and enjoyership. It is only when the *jīva* thinks itself to be the agent and enjoyer that it runs after the external objects of sense and comes to grief. The ailments of the body, the passions of the mind and the seeds of both which lie dormant in sleep—all these are inseparable attributes of *avidyā* and its products. When through the cognition of non-difference the supreme self is known the *jīva* wakes from its slumber and shakes off the superimpositions of agency, enjoyership, etc. When it is realized

1. Śaṅkara's commentary on *BU*, IV, iv, 12. See Mādhavānanda's translation, p. 739.

that there is in reality neither an enjoyer nor objects of enjoyment, the root of all evil is removed.

The thought about merit and demerit is the cause of misery in the next world. For a man who has transcended the notions of merit and demerit there can be no misery in the other world. Future deeds do not bind him, because he lives in the world unattached like water on a lotus-leaf. He has no *saṁcita-karma* since that has been burnt up in the flames of *Brahman*-knowledge. All his evils are burnt "just as the soft fibres of the *iṣīkā* reeds would burn, when thrown into the fire."² "As the fire which is kindled reduces all fuel to ashes, O Arjuna, so does the fire of knowledge reduce all *karmas* to ashes."³ "He who is free from the notion of 'I', and whose understanding is unsullied—though he slays these men, he slays not, nor is he bound."⁴ The actions of the man who has attained release do not bind him. The *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* goes to the extent of saying that even such heinous crimes as matricide, parricide, theft, and infanticide do not affect him who is released.⁵ This does not mean that the knower of *Brahman* can be a moral rake. His very nature cannot lead him to sinful ways. What scripture intends to say is that he is a-moral and not immoral. His actions do not spring from him. Hence he is not responsible for those actions which others see in him. When, thus, he is not bound by *karma*, merit and demerit which are the cause of misery in the other world do not affect him.

3

Culmination of Happiness

The positive aspect of release is that the man who is released attains the culmination of happiness. The *Aitareya*

Upaniṣad gives the example of Vāmadeva who, attaining the fulfilment of all desires, became immortal.⁶ The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* declares: "There he moves about, laughing, playing, and rejoicing, be it with women or conveyances, or relatives—not minding the body in which he was born."⁷ Commenting on this passage in the words "That serene Being, resting in its own nature of the universal self, 'moves about',—sometimes as Indra, and others, 'laughing', or eating all desired foods, high and low, sometimes playing and rejoicing with women and others, only in the mind, these being created in the mind by the mere force of will, these women, and others, being those of the regions of Brahmā or of this world; not thinking the body that is born of the connection of man and woman, or that which was born for himself—i.e., into which he was born; as any thought of the body would only cause pain, as the body abounds in pain," Śaṅkara pertinently points out that this scriptural passage is intended as an eulogy of the knowledge of the self. Hence, this text must not be literally understood as allowing moral lapses in the case of the *jñānin*. As was remarked already, the knower of *Brahman* cannot by his very nature be immoral. To say that he transcends ethical considerations is one thing, and to say that he is immoral is another. While the former is true, the latter is a gross misrepresentation and distortion of the purport of scripture.

After defining the self as reality-intelligence-infinity, the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* says that "He who knows it as placed in the innermost recess, the transcendent *ākāśa*, realizes all his desires with the omniscient *Brahman*"⁸. In the calculus of happiness which the *Upaniṣad* gives, there is found a description of the grades of happiness; and

6. *AIU*, iv, 6.

7. *CU*, VII, xii, 3.

8. *TU*, II, i, 1.

it is declared that the happiness which the knower of *Brahman* attains defies all calculation. "If there be a youth, noble, well-versed in scriptures, full of hope, resolute and strong, and if the whole world be full of wealth for him—that is the unit measure of human bliss."⁹ The king possessing universal empery is regarded to have reached the summit of human happiness. There is nothing else which he can desire to have in this world. Similarly, the *jñānin* who enjoys the supreme happiness is free from wants, all his desires having been fulfilled. But there is difference between the happiness which the king has and that which the *jñānin* enjoys. While the former lies within the frontier of *māyā*, the latter is located in the realm of *vidyā*. The king is satisfied for the moment, since he has at his command external means of enjoyment in abundance. But very soon he gets disgusted with them and discovers that there is a higher grade of happiness than his. The *jñānin* has no such fears. His happiness is not extrinsic. It is born of discrimination, and not of delusion. He is unafflicted by desires; and he is happy, because he is desireless. The happiness that kings enjoy is observed to be very little, when it is compared to those grades of happiness which are above it. The *jñānin* is without any desire; he has nothing to attain and nothing to accomplish. But the king, not satisfied with what he has got, longs for more happiness. He aspires to equal the human *gandharvas*, who are beautiful in form, who possess the power of disappearing at will and who are skilled in dance and song.¹⁰ They are called human *gandharvas*, for they have attained *gandharvatva* through the abundance of their meritorious deeds performed by them in this aeon as human beings. The happiness that they enjoy is a hundred-fold of that which the humans possess. A hundred-fold of the happiness of human *gandharvas* is the unit measure of the happiness of cel-

9. *TU*, II, viii, 1.

10. Suresvara's *Vārtika* (Ānandāśrama Edn.), p. 142.

estial *gandharvas*. A hundred-fold of the happiness of celestial *gandharvas* is the unit measure of the happiness of the manes whose abode is the eternal heaven. A hundred-fold of the happiness of the manes is the unit measure of the happiness of the *devas* born in heaven. A hundred-fold of the happiness of the *devas* born in heaven is the unit measure of the happiness of gods known as *karmadevas* who have been exalted to heaven by their sacrificial deeds. A hundred-fold of the happiness of the *karmadevas* is the unit measure of the happiness of the *devas*. A hundred-fold of the happiness of the *devas* is the unit measure of the happiness of Indra. The happiness of Indra multiplied by a hundred is the happiness of Bṛhaspati. Still a hundred times greater is the happiness of Prajāpati. A hundred-fold of the happiness of Prajāpati constitutes the unit measure of the happiness of Hiraṇyagarbha. The bliss that is experienced by the knower of *Brahman* is greater than all these grades of happiness. The bliss of self is beyond the reach of speech and mind. The secret of the *jñānin*'s greatness lies in his freedom from desire. Proficiency in scripture and acting according to the dictates of *śruti* may be common to all who seek happiness. It is meritorious deeds that are the cause of happiness in the case of all individuals, both human and divine. But what distinguishes the *jñānin* and his unexcellable bliss is his not falling a victim to the lure of desire. The increase in happiness is proportionate to the increase in the freedom from desire and greed.¹¹ In the supreme bliss which is *Brahman* there are no such distinctions as happiness and the experiencer thereof. There is scriptural evidence for the non-existence of even the least difference in *Brahman*. No channel is needed for experiencing that bliss, for it is eternally established, ever attained. What is required is the destruction of

nescience, and when that is accomplished, the self-luminous *Brahman*-bliss shines of its own accord.¹² Thus the bliss that is experienced by the *jñānin* is different from the happiness that is enjoyed by others, not only in degree but also in kind. The happiness of *Brahman* is the real, of which all the other pleasures may be called appearances. The *jñānin* enjoys the unalloyed bliss; and hence the *śruti* declares that all his desires are fulfilled.

The attainment of all desires in the case of the *jñānin* may also mean that he experiences happiness in all objects and beings in the form of the witness-intelligence. In this sense, it may be said that even the ignorant man, because of his real non-difference from the witness, experiences the fulfilment of all desires. But the difference between the man who is released and the man who is bound is this, that while the former knows his non-difference from *Brahman*, the latter does not. Ignorance is the source of misery and pain.

Because the *jñānin* has realized that he is the self of all, he sings the *sāman*, "I am the food! I am the food-eater",¹³ etc. For him there is no distinction between enjoyment and the one who enjoys. His is the distinctionless happiness of non-difference.

The positive element of release, we said, consists in the achievement of the culmination of all desires, the attainment of the unattained as it were (*prāpta-prāpyatva*) and the accomplishment of the unaccomplished as it were (*kṛta-kṛtyatva*). As for the two latter aspects of the positive phase of release, they were set forth in detail in the *Tṛptidīpa*. Hence, for fear of prolixity they are not explained here again.

12. Sureśvara's *Vārtika*, p. 145.

13. *TU*, III, x, 5.

Endeavour and effort are found in a man who is yoked to the wheel of *saṁsāra*. He labours under a heavy burden imposed on him by *māyā*. He is estranged from the supreme Self, and he seeks consolation and comfort in things which are finite and perishing. But, disappointed and destitute, he realizes that there is no happiness in the finite. Scripture reveals to him that difference is the cause of death. So long as there is the cognition of difference in him, he runs after the things of the world, he wants to accomplish something, to attain something else. But when once he realizes the truth of non-difference, when he is blessed with the intuition of the Highest, there are no more obligations for him, no more duties and deeds.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

OBJECT - CONDITIONED BLISS

(VIṢAYĀNANDA-PRAKARAṆA)

The *Viṣayānanda-prakaraṇa* speaks of the trace of *Brahman*-bliss that is found in the objects of sense, and describes the method by which that bliss can be discerned in them.

1

Reflection of Bliss in Pure Mental Modes

The happiness that is associated with the objects of sense is but an aspect of *Brahman*-bliss. Though in the case of the ignorant, it serves as an obstruction to the knowledge of the true, men of discrimination discern in it the reflection of the supreme bliss. "This which is of the nature of the impartite essence is the supreme bliss; all other beings enjoy but a fraction of that bliss".

The happiness that we find in the objects of sense is of the form of mental modification. Modifications are of three kinds, the pure, the virile, and the dull, answering to the three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. The pure modes are characterized by such elevating and ennobling qualities as renunciation, restraint, generosity, etc., the virile modes are marked by violent passions like thirst, intense attachment, aversion, anger, etc., and the dull modes have the attributes of delusion, fear, etc. In all these modes there is the reflection of the intelligence-aspect of self; but the happiness-aspect is reflected only in the pure modes. That the self is reflected in all things is evidenced by the *śruti* which declares: "As one fire

having entered the world assumes forms according to the shapes of the different objects (it burns), so the one soul that exists in all the beings, appears in (different) forms according to the different objects (it enters), and (exists) also without. As the one air, having come into the world, assumes (different) forms according to the different objects (it enters as breath), so the one *ātman* that abides in the heart of all the beings appears in different forms according to the different objects (it enters), and (exists) outside also.”¹ “The self of all, though one alone, resides in every being as one and many, just like the reflection of the moon in the water.”² As one, the reflection is *Īśvara*; and as many, the reflections are *jīvas*. Just as the reflection of the moon is dull in impure and muddy water and bright and clear in pure and undisturbed water, even so, the reflection of the self is entire in pure modes, while it is dull and disturbed in impure modes. This is the reason why we stated above that the virile and dull modes reflect the intelligence-aspect of the self, while the pure modes reflect the happiness-aspect also. In the virile and dull modes the happiness-aspect is obscured by impurity; and since there is a little purity in them the intelligence-aspect is revealed. Water receives from fire the latter’s heat and not its luminosity; but a piece of wood receives from fire both its heat and luminosity. Similarly, while the pure modes reflect the intelligence and happiness aspect of *Brahman* the modes which are impure reflect the intelligence-aspect and not the happiness-aspect. Even among the pure modes there is difference in the manifestation of happiness. The purer a mode is, the intenser is the manifestation of happiness. When the *rajas* - and *tamas*-qualities overbalance the *sattva*, then the happiness-aspect is obscured totally, and there is the cognition of misery and pain. Desire for external objects brings misery along

1. *KAU*, V, xix, 20.

2. *Brahmabindu Upaniṣad*, 12.

with it. There is the anxiety whether the desired object would be obtained or not. If it is not obtained, misery increases, and there arises aversion to those things that stand in the way. If the obstruction be difficult to be removed, then there is misery again; thus in those activities of the mind which are prompted by *rajas* and *tamas* there is not even a suspicion of happiness. When what is desired is obtained, there is the feeling of pleasure and satisfaction. When it is enjoyed, there is still greater happiness. But in the contact with what is gained there is only a little amount of happiness. The greater happiness, however, is not in the objects of sense; it is in non-attachment to objects. This is what we have called the happiness of knowledge. Thus, there are grades of happiness. The purer the mode, the clearer will be the reflection of happiness therein.

Scriptures define *Brahman* as reality-intelligence-happiness. In the inert there is the revelation of reality alone. Intelligence and happiness are not manifested in non-intelligent things. In the impure modes, as we have seen, there is the manifestation, besides reality, of intelligence also. In the pure modes, however, there is the manifestation of all the three. Because *Brahman* is mixed up with the pure modes, etc., it is called the self with attributes (*miśram Brahma*). The attributeless *Brahman* is known through *jñāna* and *yoga* in the manner set forth in the earlier chapters.

2

Meditation and Its kinds

Māyā is of the nature of unreality, inertness, and misery. Since the non-intelligent objects and the modes of the mind are products of *māyā*, the attributes of *māyā* are revealed in them. But the essential nature of *Brahman* is also made manifest in them in a greater or less degree.

A man who wants to realize *Brahman* must carefully distinguish the real from the unreal, intelligence from non-intelligence, happiness from misery. Discarding name and form, he must meditate on the reality that is revealed in inert things like the stones and rocks. Relinquishing the misery that is associated with the impure modes, he must contemplate the reality and the intelligence which are revealed in them. But finally, he should concentrate his mind on all the three aspects of the essential nature of *Brahman* which are made manifest in the modes which are pure. These three kinds of meditation are prescribed for the benefit of those who are not capable of cognizing the attributeless *Brahman*. The fourth variety of meditation is on the reflection of *Brahman*-bliss in the residual impressions. Thus, four kinds of meditation are taught.

Strictly speaking, these are not mere meditations. When through meditation the mind is made one-pointed, knowledge sets in. In knowledge, reality, intelligence, and bliss do not appear as disjointed. The essential nature of *Brahman* is not split up there. Being conditioned by the mental modes, pure and impure, it appeared as if *Brahman* were three-fold. But the truth is revealed in knowledge that the self which is of the one consistency of intelligence-reality-bliss admits of no difference or distinction. When the self-luminous non-difference which is the real nature of the unconditioned *Brahman* is revealed in knowledge, there is no room for the distinctions and divisions of empirical usage. Hence, the infinite *Brahman* is called bliss. When the Infinite is intuited, all differences vanish and the supreme happiness is gained.

G L O S S A R Y

Ābhāsa : reflection.

Ābhāsavāda : the theory that the *jīva* is an illusory reflection of *Brahman*-intelligence in *avidyā*; a variety of *pratibimbavāda*.

Abhāva : non-existence.

Acit : insentience, inert, non-conscious.

Ādhidaivika : (of pain, etc.) caused by supernatural agencies.

Adhyāropāpavāda : illusory superimposition to be followed by subsequent withdrawal.

Ādhyātmika : (of pain, etc.) caused by the mind.

Adṛṣṭa : unseen potency.

Advaita : not-two, non-duality.

Āgāmi-pratibandha : obstacle that relates to future time.

Akṛtābhyaṅama : the influx of the unacquired; suffering the consequences of the deeds that one has not done.

Akṣara : the Imperishable.

Alpa : the finite.

Ānanda : bliss, happiness.

Ānandamaya : the sheath of the nature of bliss; the innermost of the five sheaths of the soul; the self as identified with this sheath.

Anātman : not-self.

Anirvacanīya : indeterminable as either what is real or what is unreal.

Annamaya : the sheath of the nature of food; the outermost of the five sheaths of the soul; the self as identified with this sheath.

Antaḥkaraṇa : internal organ.

Antaryāmin : the inner ruler of the four sheaths and the five gross elements; pure intelligence associated with *māyā*.

Anumāna : inference.

Anuyogī : correlate.

Anvaya : invariable concomitance, agreement in presence of instances.

Asat : non-existence, non-being.

Āśrama : one of the four stages of life.

Ātman : the inner Self of the individual; it is non-different from *Brahman*.

Avacchedavāda : the theory that the *jīva* is *Brahman*-intelligence delimited by *avidyā*.

Avakāśa : spatiality.

Avāntara-vākya : intermediary text of the Upaniṣads which gives us the knowledge of *Saguṇa Brahman*.

Avasthātrayaśākṣī : witness of the three states of experience.

Avidyā : nescience.

Avyākṛta : unmanifest.

Bādha-sāmānādhikaraṇya : apposition through sublation.

Bhāva : existence, being.

Bhoga : enjoyment.

Bhūmā : the infinite.

Brahmā : God as creator; one of the Hindu Trinity, the other two being Viṣṇu, the protector, and Śiva, the destroyer.

Brahmaloka : the world of *Brahmā*; in special contexts like Chāndogya VIII, iii, 2, *Brahman* itself is referred to as *Brahmaloka*.

Brahman : the absolute Reality, according to Vedānta. Existence (*sat*)-consciousness (*cit*)-bliss (*ānanda*) constitute its nature.

Brahma-nirvāṇa : realization of the supreme Brahman; *mokṣa*; release.

Bṛhaspati : the preceptor of the devas.

Buddhi : intellect, the faculty which decides.

Caitanya : consciousness.

Cārvāka : Indian Materialism; means probably 'sweet-tongued' (*cāru-vāka*) from the pleasure-philosophy it teaches; the classical authority to whom the system is traced is Bṛhaspati; hence also called the *Bārhaspatya* doctrine; another name is *Lokāyata*.

Cidābhāsa : the reflection of intelligence in the internal organ.

Cit : pure consciousness, awareness, intelligence.

Citdharma : having consciousness as attribute.

Citsvabhāva : having consciousness as essential nature.

Darśana : insight; perspective; system of philosophy.

Dehatraya-vilakṣaṇa : distinct from the three bodies.

Devas : gods, celestial beings, especially those born in heaven (opp. *karmadevas*).

Dhyāna : meditation.

Duḥkha : misery, pain.

Gandharva : a human being who has attained beauty and special powers through the abundance of his meritorious deeds performed in this aeon.

Guṇa : constituent ; quality, attribute.

Hiraṇyagarbha : consciousness conjoined with the subtle universe.

Īśvara : God ; the absolute Reality appearing with attributes.

Īśvaratva : the state of being *Īśvara*.

Jīva : individual soul.

Jīvanmukta : one who is liberated in life.

Jīvanmukti : liberation in life ; release while yet living in the body.

Jīvatva : the state of being the individual soul.

Jñāna : knowledge ; the method of inquiry.

Kāma : desire.

Kāraṇa-śarīra : causal body, i. e. nescience.

Karma : action, fruit of action.

Karma-deva : one who has been elevated to heaven by his sacrificial deeds (opp. *deva*).

Karmin : one who believes in the rites prescribed by the Vedās.

Kodrava : a species of grain eaten by the poor.

Kośa : the five vestures (sheaths or cases) which successively make the body enshrining the soul.

Kṛtanāśa : destruction of the acquired ; what one has done not yielding its fruit.

Kūṭastha-caitanya : the immutable intelligence, which is *Brahman*.

Mādhyamika : one of the later-day schools of Buddhism ; the term signifies an adherent of the 'middle-path', which is a distinctive feature of Buddhism ; it believes neither in outer reality nor in the inner ; hence its doctrine is known as *sūnya-vāda*.

Mahābhūta : a great or primary element.

Mahāvākya : major text of the Upaniṣad through which knowledge of *Nirguṇa Brahman* is gained, which asserts the identity of *Brahman* and the *Jīva*.

Manana : rational reflection; reflecting on the non-dual *Brahman* through reasonings which establish non-difference and condemn difference.

Manas : mind, deliberative function of the internal organ.

Manomaya : the sheath of the nature of the mind; one of the five sheaths of the soul; the self as identified with this sheath.

Mātrā : measure; a mora or prosodial instant, i. e. the length of time required for pronouncing a short vowel.

Māyā : the indeterminable principle that brings about the illusory manifestation of the world; some Advaitins distinguish between *māyā* and *avidyā*; the Vivaraṇa view identifies the two.

Māyā-śakti : the power or potency by which *Īśvara* creates the world.

Māyin : *Īśvara* as the wielder of *māyā*.

Mithyā : illusory.

Mokṣa : release, freedom, liberation.

Mumukṣu : one who aspires for *mokṣa*.

Muñja : a kind of grass.

Nididhyāsana : meditation, or the constancy of the mental flow of the form of *Brahman* without being clouded by the mode of the form of the not-self.

Nirguṇopāsanā : meditation on *Nirguṇa Brahman*.

Nirupādhika-bhrama : delusion not due to an adjunct, e. g., the superimposition of snake on rope.

Nivṛtti : the state of abstinence from action.

Phalacetana : the reflection of intelligence which is generated by the relation of the mental mode with the object.

Pradhāna : same as *prakṛti*.

Prajāpati : the god presiding over creation; an epithet of *Brahmā*; one of the ten mind-born sons of *Brahmā* who complete the work of creation started by him.

Prājña : the individual form of the Self as the witness of the bare nescience in the state of sleep; also called *ānandamaya*,

Prajña : intelligence; understanding; wisdom,

Prajñāna : the consciousness which is conditioned by the internal organ.

Prakṛti : primal nature ; prius of creation.

Pralaya : resolution of the universe.

Pramāṇa : means of valid knowledge ; source of knowledge.

Prāṇa : vital force, breath.

Prāṇamaya : the sheath of the nature of vital force ; the self as identified with this sheath.

Praṇava : the mystic syllable 'Om'.

Prārabdha : that portion of past *karma* which has begun to fructify, and is responsible for the present life.

Prasaṅkhyāna : uninterrupted contemplation of the cognition which results from verbal testimony.

Pratiyogī : counter-entity.

Pratyakṣa : perception.

Pravṛtti : the state of engagement in action.

Prayojana : aim, objective, use, result.

Pūrṇa : the full ; the infinite.

Puruṣa : person ; self ; soul.

Puruṣa-viśeṣa : God as a superior *puruṣa*.

Rajas : one of the constituents of primal nature, marked by agitation, passion, activity, etc.

Saguṇopāsana : meditation on *Saguṇa Brahman*.

Sākṣātkāra : direct experience.

Sākṣi : witness.

Śakti : power, force.

Śama : calmness.

Samādhāna : equanimity.

Samādhi : state of absorption.

Sāman : a metrical hymn or a song of praise ; a text of the *Sāmaveda*.

Samcita-karma : accumulated fruit of deeds that have not begun to take effect.

Samsāra : transmigration, metempsychosis, cycle of empirical involvement.

- Saṁsiddhi* : the purification of the mind which is auxiliary to *Brahman*-knowledge.
- Saṁvargavidyā* : a meditation which identifies *Brahman* and *Vāyu*.
- Saṁvāḍibhrama* : delusion which yields a fruitful result.
opp. *visaṁvāḍibhrama* : delusion which does not yield a fruitful result.
- Sat* : being, existence.
- Sattva* : one of the constituents of primal nature, marked by goodness, purity, etc.
- Siddhāntin* : one who holds the final view, here, Advaita.
- Sopādhika-bhrama* : delusion due to an adjunct, e.g., the superimposition of pot on clay, or of redness on crystal.
- Śravaṇa* : the ascertainment of the purport of the Vedāntas through reasoning.
- Śruti* : Veda, a text of the Veda, literally 'what is heard'.
- Sthūla-śarīra* : gross body.
- Sukha* : happiness.
- Sūkṣma-śarīra* : subtle body.
- Śūnya* : void, nothingness, nullity.
- Sūtrātman* : the self when it creates the subtle universe.
- Svabhāva* : the nature of a thing.
- Svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* : essential definition; self-nature.
- Tādātmya-sambandha* : relation of identity.
- Taijasa* : the self having a conceit in an individual subtle body in dream-experience.
- Tamas* : darkness; one of the constituents of primal nature, marked by inertia, stupidity, etc.
- Tapas* : austerity.
- Tāraka* : that which saves, carries over.
- Upapatti* : intelligibility in the light of reasoning.
- Uparati* : renunciation.
- Upasat* : service, worship; name of a ceremony forming part of the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice and lasting several days.
- Upāsaka* : one who meditates or worships.

Vaiśeṣika : the word is derived from 'viśeṣa', which means 'difference'; the school of philosophy derived from the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda is designated by this name because, according to it, diversity characterizes the universe.

Vaiśvānara : the supreme Self identified with the universe in the gross state.

Vāsanā : residual impression.

Vāsanānanda : the happiness which is the result of the residual impression of bliss not due to the objects of the external world.

Videhamukta : one who is liberated from the body; or more properly, one who is released from the conceit in the body.

Vidyā : *upāsanā*, meditation.

Vijñāna : the internal organ of the mode 'I'.

Vijñānamaya : the sheath of the nature of self-consciousness; the self associated with this sheath.

Virāṭ : the self when it causes the gross universe; the full blown stage of the universe.

Viśaya : content, subject-matter; object of knowledge and experience.

Viśayānanda : pleasure due to external objects.

Viśva : the individual form of the self having a conceit in a gross body while awake.

Vivarta : transfiguration, illusory appearance.

Viveka : the method of discrimination.

Vrata : ceremonial observance.

Vyatireka : agreement in the absence of instances.

Vyāvahārika : empirical.

Yoga : method of quietening the mind by concentration.

Yogabhraṣṭa : a person fallen from the path.

Yogin : one who practises *yoga*.

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